2 Nov 2000, 16:51 UTC
Re: California Regulatory Strategy
- From
- Roger Yang roger.yang@enron.com
- Date
- Thu, 2 Nov 2000 08:51:00 -0800 (PST)
The inequities that I am referring to are: SDG&E is charging a CTC charge to recover $115 million in CTCs for 2001 and $115 million for 2002; wheras, their expectation is that there will be no stranded costs in those years for SONGS and QF/PPs. SDG&E plans to use these overcollections to offset the undercollections from their cap for the subset of small customers. SDG&E has filed at FERC to apply RMR overcollections recovered from all customers to the undercollections from their cap for the subset of small customers. SDG&E is applying the stranded benefits from SONGS and QF/PPs for which all customers have paid for the stranded costs in the past to the undercollections from their cap for the subset of small customers. This is not necessarily a DA versus SO customers, since small DA and SO customers are treated the same. It is more of a subsidy issue between large and small customers. However, since most DA customers are large customers, it becomes a DA and SO issue. I don't believe SDG&E is hiding this fact, because they filed an application at the CPUC on October 24, 2000, illuminating this issue. We also need to keep our eyes open to spot any other transfer of overcollections that should rightfully be used to reduce rates for all customers. What is motivating SDG&E is their perceived shareholder risks with respect to the undercollections caused by the cap. They want to reduce their exposure. We need to be sensitive to our TURN friends, but we want to illuminate the shortcomings of this type of transition mechanism to prevent legislators and regulators from switching to this mechanism in the shortrun. Roger
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
Mona L Petrochko@ENRON 11/01/2000 03:29 PM To: Roger Yang/SFO/EES@EES cc: Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron, Susan J Mara/NA/Enron@Enron, Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES, Scott Stoness/HOU/EES@EES Subject: Re: California Regulatory Strategy The inequities that you are referring to in #4 is that the cap be applied both to bundled service and d/a customers, right? Roger Yang@EES 11/01/2000 04:44 PM To: Mona L Petrochko/NA/Enron@Enron, Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron, Susan J Mara/NA/Enron@Enron, Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES cc: Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES, Scott Stoness/HOU/EES@EES Subject: California Regulatory Strategy The purpose of this e-mail is to discuss the regulatory strategy in California. As we have discussed, I believe the regulatory strategy can be summarized as follows: Support the TURN proposal in order to maintain leverage against PG&E and SCE. We will have to do this strategically to avoid negative consequences. Provide comments on mitigation measures at the CPUC's disposal to mitigate PG&E's and SCE's undercollections on December 31, 2001 in order to make the CPUC comfortable with their decisions. Work with PG&E and SCE on developing a post-freeze solution at the legislature to recover undercollections over a 5 year period in order to facilitate an acceptable solution. Expose the inequities of the rate caps implemented in SDG&E's service territory for small customers in order to avoid a similar transition mechanism in PG&E's and SCE's service territories that might facilitate an end to the rate freeze for all customers prior to December 31, 2001. Watch and prevent adverse changes to how the PX credit is calculated. Roger