1 Nov 2000, 17:29 UTC
Re: California Regulatory Strategy
- From
- Mona L Petrochko mona.petrochko@enron.com
- To
- Roger Yang
- Date
- Wed, 1 Nov 2000 09:29:00 -0800 (PST)
The inequities that you are referring to in #4 is that the cap be applied both to bundled service and d/a customers, right?
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
Roger Yang@EES 11/01/2000 04:44 PM To: Mona L Petrochko/NA/Enron@Enron, Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron@Enron, Susan J Mara/NA/Enron@Enron, Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES cc: Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES, Scott Stoness/HOU/EES@EES Subject: California Regulatory Strategy The purpose of this e-mail is to discuss the regulatory strategy in California. As we have discussed, I believe the regulatory strategy can be summarized as follows: Support the TURN proposal in order to maintain leverage against PG&E and SCE. We will have to do this strategically to avoid negative consequences. Provide comments on mitigation measures at the CPUC's disposal to mitigate PG&E's and SCE's undercollections on December 31, 2001 in order to make the CPUC comfortable with their decisions. Work with PG&E and SCE on developing a post-freeze solution at the legislature to recover undercollections over a 5 year period in order to facilitate an acceptable solution. Expose the inequities of the rate caps implemented in SDG&E's service territory for small customers in order to avoid a similar transition mechanism in PG&E's and SCE's service territories that might facilitate an end to the rate freeze for all customers prior to December 31, 2001. Watch and prevent adverse changes to how the PX credit is calculated. Roger