4 Jun 2001, 12:20 UTC
PJM Orders
- From
- Sarah Novosel sarah.novosel@enron.com
- To
-
Kevin M Presto, Mark Dana Davis, jeff.ader@enron.com, Edward Baughman, joe.gordon@enron.com, Janelle Scheuer, mbrown9@enron.com, Mark Bernstein, John Llodra, George Wood, Paul J Broderick, jason.thompkins@enron.com
and 29 more
Mason Hamlin, Robert Stalford, Tom May, Gautam Gupta, Narsimha Misra, Steve Montovano, Garrett Tripp, berney.aucoin@enron.com, Rob Wheeler, Rogers Herndon, Jim Meyn, Aleck Dadson, Daniel Allegretti, Pearce W Hammond, Joe Hartsoe, Donna Fulton, Howard Fromer, Kathleen Sullivan, Tom Hoatson, Thane Twiggs, Sarah Novosel, Christi L Nicolay, James D Steffes, Linda Robertson, Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean, Charles Decker, Nick Politis, sscott3@enron.com - Date
- Mon, 4 Jun 2001 05:20:00 -0700 (PDT)
The Commission issued a couple of orders in PJM last week: PJM,s Load Response Program: FERC approved implementation of two load response pilot programs proposed by PJM which will be effective June 1, 2001 through May 31, 2002. Under the first program, referred to as the &Emergency Option,8 a PJM member may sign up to be a participant in the program and will be paid the higher of the relevant zonal LMP or $500/MWh for the actual kWh relief provided when the PJM member nominates load reduction in response to a request from PJM. Under the second option, referred to as the &Economic Option,8 the PJM member will be able to reduce load in response to economic signals, regardless of whether emergency conditions exist. PJM will bill the LSE serving the end-use customer the LMP that would have been charged absent the reduction. PJM will then refund to the LSE the retail generation and transmission charges that the LSE would have received had the load not been reduced. The difference between the amount billed and refunded to the LSE will be paid to the end-user. Several customers opposed PJM,s programs, particularly the Economic Option. However, FERC found that both programs allow end use customers to see prices and respond to them when it is economically beneficial for them to do so. FERC noted that because PJM's current market structure does not communicate wholesale prices to retail customers in real time, they have no incentive to reduce demand when prices increase. FERC finds that PJM's plan will, in part, fix this flaw in its market structure. PJM is required to file a report with FERC by the end of the year evaluating the effectiveness of the program. Changes to PJM's Reliability Assurance Agreement (RAA): FERC also approved PJM's proposed changes to its RAA, effective June 1. PJM had requested FERC authorization to change the RAA by i) adjusting the time period over which an LSE must commit generation resources to PJM to meet its capacity obligations under the RAA, from a daily to a seasonal commitment; ii) adjusting the deficiency charge provisions to provide for a seasonal, rather than a daily, penalty for LSEs; and iii) requiring generation owners to commit excess capacity to PJM seasonally, rather than daily, in order to participate in any distribution of revenues from capacity deficiency charges paid by LSEs. EPMI supported PJM's changes, stating that although the ICAP requirement should be eliminated entirely, the proposed changes are a step in the right direction in resolving the delisting problem. In approving the changes, FERC stated that moving from daily to seasonal deficiency charges discourages generators from delisting capacity during the summer and gives LSEs the incentive to meet their capacity obligations, thereby helping PJM to meet its short-term and long-term reliability goals. FERC also said that PJM's Market Monitoring Unit will be able to monitor generator gaming behavior and take appropriate action if necessary.