3 Apr 2001, 09:38 UTC
rate design
- From
- Harry Kingerski harry.kingerski@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 3 Apr 2001 02:38:00 -0700 (PDT)
Some ideas for Friday's comments - Two of the Commission's stated goals in the ACR were: Reduce the disparity in prices paid for energy among customer classes: Enron suggests a restatement of this goal. Energy prices should be an accurate indication of the costs imposed on the system. For example, the average cost of 1 kW @ 100% load factor is much different than 1 kW used at 30% load factor, all on-peak, and much different than 1 kW used at 70% load factor, all off-peak. In practice, each customer class has a mixture of customers leaning toward each of these extreme. True equity requires that customers with similar load patterns pay non-disparate energy prices, regardless of which class the customer is in. A more proper statement of this goal is: reduce the disparity between prices paid for energy and costs imposed on the system across all customer classes. Tier rates to promote conservation: Enron suggests a restatement of this goal. Traditionally, the California Commission has favored rate designs that reflect marginal costs. Marginal cost pricing, in and of itself promotes efficient use of energy because of the many reasons the CPUC itself has cited over the years. In the situation at hand, the indicators of marginal cost in the wholesale power market are CDWR's purchase cost in hours when the CDWR is covering the net short, and the hourly wholesale spot market price (the wholesale on-peak forward curve, as a proxy) in hours when the CDWR is not filling the net short. Conservation will be incented with use of price signals that reflect market conditions. A more proper statement of this goal is: To provide customers with the motivation to respond appropriately, design marginal rates within the rate classes to reflect marginal wholesale costs. Regarding these goals, it will take time for the commission and parties to do this - which plays to EES URM and the idea of keeping the 3 cents as an interim rate design while a 6 month rate design case can take place. I think it is inconceivable, however, that the CPUC does not have strong price signals in place for this summer. So I think we use the "equal percent of marginal costs" idea to get price signals in place, but much flatter ones than in the ACR. (for a variety of reasons, I don't think the 2-part real time pricing being pushed by Mr. Stoness can fly without some radical modifications, but let's talk). About the residential increase, we may want to weigh in on whether residentail usage above 130% of baseline gets the full brunt of the total residential increase or just 3 cents. Let's talk about the politics. We also will want to say 1) DA is exempt from the increase 2) any increase prior to the effective date of the new rate design should be 3 cents across the board.