22 Sep 2000, 22:37 UTC
Re: WSJ Article on Enron's Mark to Market Accounting
- From
- saceves@att.net saceves@att.net
- Date
- Fri, 22 Sep 2000 15:37:00 -0700 (PDT)
Greetings Jeff, Thanks. I will make copies and bring it to class. Kindly, Salvador -- Salvador D. Aceves Assistant Professor, Accounting Director, Executive Education School of Business and Management University of San Francisco 2130 Fulton Street San Francisco, CA 94117 Tel (415) 422-6263 fax (415) 422-2502 e-mail: acevess@usfca.edu
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
> Funny thing. Right after we'd discussed my company's mark to market > accounting in class on Monday, this article showed up on Wednesday. > Thought you might be interested. > > TEXAS JOURNAL --- Energy Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math Is Missing ---- > By Jonathan Weil Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal > > Volatile prices for natural gas and electricity are creating high-voltage > earnings growth at some companies with large energy-trading units. But > investors > counting on these gains could be in for a jolt down the road. > > Shares of these companies have been on a tear lately. And some of the > biggest > players are in Houston, the center of the energy-trading industry. Dynegy > Inc.'s > stock is up more than fourfold so far this year at $53.438, and now trades > for > 41 times what analysts project the company's 2000 earnings will be, > according to > First Call/Thomson Financial. Shares of Enron Corp., the largest trader of > gas > and electricity in North America, have nearly doubled this year to $84.875, > or > 60 times earnings. Meanwhile, El Paso Energy Corp.'s stock has jumped 61% > this > year to $62.375, or 24 times earnings. > > Traders at these and other companies are capitalizing on the wild price > swings > and supply fluctuations that have accompanied deregulation in some regional > markets. Natural-gas prices have more than doubled in the past year, while > supplies have tightened. And the rapid price fluctuations for electricity > have > prompted many large businesses to seek price protection through hedging or > fixed-price contracts, generating large premiums for traders. > > But what many investors may not realize is that much of these companies' > recent profits constitute unrealized, noncash gains. Frequently, these > profits > depend on assumptions and estimates about future market factors, the > details of > which the companies do not provide, and which time may prove wrong. And > because > of minimal disclosure standards in these kinds of cases, it's difficult for > investors to assess whose assumptions might be too aggressive, or what > market > changes might invalidate the assumptions -- and force earnings revisions. > > "There could be a quality-of-earnings issue," says Tom Linsmeier, an > associate > professor of accounting at Michigan State University, who co-authored the > U.S. > Securities and Exchange Commission's rules on market-risk disclosures for > financial instruments. "There certainly might be great volatility that > could > cause what now looks like a winning, locked-in gain to not arise sometime > in the > future." > > The companies reject any suggestion that there may be quality problems > with > their earnings. > > But at the heart of the situation is an accounting technique that allows > companies to include as current earnings those profits they expect to > realize > from energy-related contracts and other derivative instruments in future > periods, sometimes stretching over more than 20 years. > > So-called mark-to-market accounting is mandated by accounting-rule makers > when > companies have outstanding energy-related contracts on their books at the > end of > a quarter, such as agreements to sell electricity or buy natural gas over a > period of time at certain prices. Under those rules, companies estimate the > fair > market values of those contracts on their balance sheets each quarter as > assets > or liabilities. Changes in the value of a contract from quarter to quarter > then > are either added to or subtracted from net earnings. > > If, for instance, the market price for natural gas rises above the price > specified in a company's contract to buy gas, generally the company will > record > an unrealized gain. That gain is recognized as income and recorded as an > asset > on the company's balance sheet. At the end of each quarter, the contract is > revalued. The value of the previously recorded asset is increased, and any > increase in unrealized gain is recorded as additional income. Conversely, > if the > market value for gas falls, and the value of the contract has declined, any > change in the contract's value is recorded on the company's balance sheet, > and a > loss is recorded on its income statement. e > > Yet in their financial reports, the companies only vaguely describe the > methods they use to come up with fair-value estimates on the contracts. > Increasingly, quoted market prices offering independent guidance are > becoming > readily available for several years into the future. However, with some > long-term derivative instruments, particularly electricity contracts, > future > market prices don't extend far enough to cover the full life of those > contracts. > And in those cases, companies are allowed to base valuations on their own > undisclosed estimates, assumptions and pricing models. > > "Ultimately they're telling you what they think the answer is, but > they're not > telling you how they got to that answer," says Stephen Campbell, an analyst > at > Business Valuation Services in Dallas. "That is essentially saying `trust > me.'" > > Accounting-rule makers at the Financial Accounting Standards Board have > debated the subject of how to value energy-related contracts extensively in > recent months. "Two companies in similar circumstances might apply > different > methods to estimate the fair value of their energy-related contracts and > may > arrive at widely different values," an FASB task force studying the issue > wrote > in a June report. "Those differences lead to the question of whether some > of the > methods in practice yield estimated amounts that are not representative of > fair > value." > > Despite this concern, FASB isn't inclined to offer any explicit guidance > for > how such contracts should be valued. "There are just too many models and > too > many different types of instruments for us to have a one-size-fits-all type > of > model," explains Timothy Lucas, FASB's director of research in Norwalk, > Conn. > > One way to determine the size of a company's unrealized gains is to > compare > the change in the values of net assets from risk-management activities from > quarter to quarter. Some companies also disclose how much they're adjusting > their cash-flow statements to reflect unrealized gains that have been > booked as > earnings. That's how one can determine the size of the unrealized gains at > Dynegy and Enron, for example, the two companies confirm. > > A reporter's examination of Dynegy's financial filings shows the > company's > earnings are highly dependent on unrealized gains from risk-management > activities. For its most recent quarter, ended June 30, Dynegy reported > earnings > of 38 cents a diluted share -- 71% of which came from unrealized gains, the > company confirms. (The company's per-share earnings would have been 20 > cents > higher if not for a one-time stock dividend.) For all of 1999, Dynegy > recorded > $115 million in unrealized gains, accounting for 51% of its earnings. > > Enron confirms it booked $747 million in unrealized gains from > risk-management > activities during the second quarter, more than the company's total $609 > million > in earnings before interest and taxes. Absent unrealized gains, the company > would have reported a quarterly loss. For the quarter, the company reported > earnings of 34 cents a diluted share, up 26% from a year earlier. > > But not all companies disclose enough information for investors to > calculate > how large their unrealized gains are. El Paso says that's the case with its > own > quarterly reports, which disclose short-term assets and liabilities from > risk-management activities -- but not long-term risk-management assets and > liabilities. > > For the second quarter, El Paso reported that its energy marketing and > trading > unit earned $152 million before interest and taxes, 24 times what it earned > a > year earlier. In an interview, El Paso's chief financial officer, Brent > Austin, > says unrealized gains represented about a third of that total. He says most > of > the cash from those gains will materialize within a year. > > In its financial reports, Dynegy highlights the uncertainties with some > contract valuations. It explains that with some long-term contracts for > which > market-price quotes aren't available, "the lack of long-term pricing > liquidity > requires the use of mathematical models to value these commitments . . . > [using] > historical market data to forecast future elongated pricing curves." Dynegy > cautions that actual cash returns may "vary, either positively or > negatively, > from the results estimated." > > But like Enron, El Paso and others, Dynegy provides scant details about > its > mathematical models -- such as the assumptions they use for market > volatility > and long-term price forecasts for natural gas and electricity. Nor is the > company required to disclose more. > > "The disclosure mentions risks," says John Cassidy, an analyst who tracks > Dynegy for Moody's Investors Service in New York. "But I don't know that > the > disclosure offers enough detail for you to be able to quantify how much > risk > there is." > > El Paso's filings warn that "because the valuation of these financial > instruments can involve estimates, changes in the assumptions underlying > these > estimates can occur, changing our valuation and potentially resulting in > financial losses." Enron cautions that the values it assigns to various > transactions are based on "management's best estimate." > > The companies are required to disclose what they think their maximum > potential > single-day risk-management losses might be, figures that also are based on > various undisclosed market assumptions. But energy traders cite competitive > reasons for not disclosing more. > > "You don't necessarily want to tip off everyone to what you're doing," > says > John Harrison, chief financial officer for El Paso's merchant-energy unit. > > Echoing remarks by executives at other energy traders, Enron's executive > vice > president and chief accounting officer, Richard Causey, says Enron runs a > relatively balanced portfolio and that the estimates factored into his > company's > valuations are conservative. In large part, he says, those estimates are > based > on quoted market prices where available. Where they're not available, Mr. > Causey > says Enron bases its estimates in part on long-term pricing trends, as well > as > the company's own trading experience, which dates to 1990. > > Further, Mr. Causey says, Enron's unrealized gains don't depend heavily > on > gains from long-term contracts that extend beyond the periods for which > market > quotes are available, reducing the potential for significant earnings > revisions. > The average length of Enron's risk-management contracts is just two years, > he > says. To be sure, though, some of Enron's electricity contracts extend for > 25 > years. > > "We're getting the cash in quicker than you might think," Mr. Causey > says. > "They don't stay unrealized very long." > > El Paso says its contracts have an average life of six years, with some > running as long as 20 years. Dynegy says the longest risk-management > contracts > for which it uses mark-to-market accounting are 10 years, though it doesn't > disclose an average length. Dynegy's chief financial officer, Robert Doty, > says > 96% of the company's gas contracts close out by 2002, while 75% of its > power > contracts expire by 2003. "The cash will come in," he says. > > As for why the company doesn't disclose the extent of any bias, bullish > or > bearish, it has in the market, Dynegy executives say that information, like > the > estimates behind its mathematical models, is proprietary. Such disclosures > may > be outdated anyway by the time they could be included in public financial > filings, says Michael Mott, a Dynegy vice president. Mr. Mott further > explains > that Dynegy could be realizing more cash earnings now if it wanted to. But > "we > don't see that would be in the best interests of shareholders," Mr. Mott > says, > because the company figures it can earn more later by leaving much of its > gains > unrealized for now. > > Mr. Linsmeier of Michigan State compares the current situation for energy > traders with the accounting controversies that engulfed subprime automobile > and > residential lenders during the late 1990s, though he emphasizes it's too > far > early to tell whether the consequences will be similar. Using so-called > gain-on-sale accounting (a form of mark-to-market accounting), those > lenders > booked earnings from loans as soon as they were made, rather than having to > wait > for them to be paid off, as banks typically do. > > But as interest rates fell in 1998, many customers paid off their loans > earlier than expected, slashing lenders' profit margins. Compounding > matters, > the market for mortgage-backed securities dried up in the wake of financial > chaos in Russia and other foreign markets, leaving lenders to bear the > higher > risks of many new loans. > > Many investors complained they were blindsided, in part because these > lenders > generally hadn't disclosed their assumptions about prepayment rates and > other > variables. After the crash, subprime lenders routinely began disclosing the > key > assumptions used to value their mortgage portfolios. > > At New York University, accounting professor Baruch Lev says investors > would > be better served if energy traders' financial filings explained the effects > of > hypothetical commodity-price movements on the values of their > risk-management > assets, and disclosed the basic assumptions about future commodity-price > movements ingrained in their mathematical models. Says Mr. Lev, "I would > like to > see much more disclosure, particularly given that this is now becoming a > significant component of their earnings." > > > - - - - - - - - - - - - Document Released on 2000-09-20 02:20:08.0 EST - - > - - - - - - - - - - > >