25 Jul 2001, 16:21 UTC
RE: Power & Natural Gas : Power Curve 6: Crossing the Mountaintop; Lower Outlook, Ratings
- From
- Vince J Kaminski j.kaminski@enron.com
- To
- Eric Scott
- Date
- Wed, 25 Jul 2001 09:21:08 -0700 (PDT)
Eric, Thanks. Vince
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
-----Original Message-----
From: Scott, Eric
Sent: Wednesday, July 25, 2001 10:48 AM
To: Kaminski, Vince J
Subject: FW: Power & Natural Gas : Power Curve 6: Crossing the Mountaintop; Lower Outlook, Ratings
Attached is the report I mentioned to you as one of the reasons for the ENE decline.
Eric
-----Original Message-----
From: SSMB-GEO-Alert@geo2.sbi.com@ENRON [mailto:IMCEANOTES-SSMB-GEO-Alert+40geo2+2Esbi+2Ecom+40ENRON@ENRON.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2001 10:37 AM
To: undisclosed-recipients:;@ENRON
Subject: Power & Natural Gas : Power Curve 6: Crossing the Mountaintop; Lower Outlook, Ratings
SSMB Global Equities Online(GEO) Profile Alert
The following generated an alert in your portfolio:
Power & Natural Gas : Eric
ENE : Eric
Power Curve 6: Crossing the Mountaintop; Lower Outlook, Ratings
Salomon Smith Barney
Analyst Raymond Niles
Date 07/24/2001
Industry Power & Natural Gas
Company The AES Corporation Allegheny Energy Constellation Energy
Group CINERGY Corporation Calpine Corporation DTE Energy Company
DYNEGY Inc. Enron Corporation El Paso Energy Corporation
Exelon Corporation FPL Group Inc. Mirant NRG Energy, Inc. PG&E
Corporation Public Service Enterprise Group Inc. Progress Energy
PPL Corporation Reliant Energy Inc. TECO Energy Inc.
_________________________________________________________________
Power Curve 6: Crossing the Mountaintop; Lower Outlook, Ratings
SUMMARY VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION DATA
* We reduce earnings estimates, ratings and price
targets for a number of our companies who are "long"
power. In all, we are lowering ratings on seven
companies, price targets on thirteen, and earnings
estimates on sixteen.
* This follows our call (Power Curve 4, published
May 2) where we established a more cautious outlook
for Power Producers versus Energy Merchants.
* Since our last Power Curve analysis on May 31, we
have seen the continued deterioration of both
forward power prices and spark spreads.
* June was the first period in which we have seen
year/year declines in power prices and spark
spreads. We had expected to see these signs first
in 1Q:02.
* We maintain a bullish outlook on those companies
that are not leveraged to power prices, whether
through strong risk management skills or through a
lack of generation. Our top two picks are ENE and
DYN.
Earnings Per Share
Company (Ticker) Price FYE Rating Target LTGR Current Yr Next Yr
The AES Corporation- $35.72 Dec Curr 2H $43.00 25% $1.80E $2.20E
(AES#) Prev 1H $75.00 30% $1.90E $2.30E
Allegheny Energy- $44.76 Dec Curr 2H $50.00 8% $3.80E $4.20E
(AYE#) Prev 1H $60.00 10% $3.90E $4.30E
Constellation Energy- $32.40 Dec Curr 2H $40.00 8% $2.65E $3.10E
Group (CEG#) Prev 2H $40.00 10% $2.65E $3.10E
CINERGY Corporation- $32.10 Dec Curr 2M $38.00 8% $2.80E $2.95E
(CIN) Prev 2M $38.00 8% $2.80E $3.00E
Calpine Corporation- $39.66 Dec Curr 2H $48.00 30% $1.95E $2.30E
(CPN#) Prev 1H $70.00 35% $2.00E $2.60E
DTE Energy Company- $43.50 Dec Curr 1M $54.00 8% $3.50E $4.20E
(DTE#) Prev 1M $54.00 8% $3.50E $4.24E
DYNEGY Inc. (DYN#) $45.61 Dec Curr 1H $70.00 23% $2.00E $2.55E
Prev 1H $70.00 20% $2.00E $2.55E
Enron Corporation- $48.16 Dec Curr 1H $75.00 23% $1.80E $2.15E
(ENE#) Prev 1H $75.00 20% $1.80E $2.15E
El Paso Energy Corpo- $52.43 Dec Curr 1H $65.00 15% $3.35E $3.70E
ration (EPG#) Prev 1H $85.00 15% $3.35E $3.80E
Exelon Corporation- $60.55 Dec Curr 1M $70.00 9% $4.50E $4.95E
(EXC#) Prev 1M $80.00 10% $4.60E $5.05E
FPL Group Inc. (FPL) $57.01 Dec Curr 3M $60.00 7% $4.70E $4.95E
Prev 3M $65.00 7% $4.70E $5.10E
Mirant (MIR) $33.30 Dec Curr 1H $42.00 23% $1.90E $2.20E
Prev 1H $42.00 25% $1.90E $2.20E
NRG Energy, Inc.- $22.90 Dec Curr 2H $27.00 22% $1.37E $1.65E
(NRG#) Prev 1H $40.00 25% $1.37E $1.70E
PG&E Corporation- $15.00 Dec Curr 3S $17.00 8% NA $1.90E
(PCG) Prev 3M $29.00 8% $2.70E NA
Public Service Enter- $46.18 Dec Curr 2M $52.00 7% $3.75E $4.00E
prise Group I (PEG#) Prev 1M $60.00 8% $3.75E $4.05E
Progress Energy- $41.65 Dec Curr 2M $47.00 7% $3.40E $3.60E
(PGN#) Prev 2M $47.00 8% $3.40E $3.60E
PPL Corporation (PPL) $49.25 Dec Curr 2H $60.00 12% $4.00E $4.40E
Prev 2H $65.00 15% $4.10E $4.50E
Reliant Energy Inc.- $29.40 Dec Curr 2H $42.00 9% $3.20E $2.90E
(REI#) Prev 2H $42.00 11% $3.20E $2.90E
TECO Energy Inc.- $29.80 Dec Curr 3M $33.00 8% $2.30E $2.50E
(TE#) Prev 3M $33.00 10% $2.30E $2.50E
POWER PRICES HAVE PEAKED; WE ARE CROSSING THE MOUNTAINTOP AND NOW EXPECT A
DECLINING PRICE ENVIRONMENT
June is the first month that we have seen negative year-on-year comparisons in
the commodity drivers that underlie earnings. Based on work in our last Power
Curve report (Power Curve 5, 5/31/01), we had not expected the commodity
drivers of earnings to turn negative until 1Q:02. Instead, we see commodity
comparisons turning negative in June, and on a full quarterly basis, 3Q:01.
June 2001 June 2000 % Change
Power Prices ($/MWh) $50.21 $83.25 (40%)
Spark Spread ($/MWh) $23.77 $56.93 (58%)
In our view, the most important measure for earnings, particularly for Power
Producers, is the Spark Spread, which shows the gross margin potential for
power generation in the spot market. Hedging, trading, and the sale of other
services such as capacity availability and spinning reserves offsets the impact
of a decline in this number. Most companies with generating capacity are at
least 85% hedged for 2001, 60% hedged for 2002, and 40% hedged for 2003.
NEGATIVE QUARTERLY COMMODITY DRIVERS BEGINNING 3Q:01, TWO QUARTERS AHEAD OF
EARLIER EXPECTATIONS
Forward power and gas markets suggest that 3Q:01 will be the first full quarter
of negative commodity comparisons. Earlier, in PC5, we had expected this would
not occur until 1Q:02. What has surprised us is the swiftness and breadth of
the decline in the power pricing environment. Unlike 2Q:01, which had two good
months -- April and May -- to buoy earnings, forward markets suggest year/year
declines in power prices and the spark spread for all of 3Q:01 and continuing
into 4Q:01. June is an important "swing" month in what is normally a
relatively volatile earnings quarter. So far, because of lower realized prices
and a declining power price outlook, a number of companies have either pre-
announced or guided to reduced earnings expectations, including: PPL, PNW,
PNM, NRG, KSE and CEG.
Quarterly Comparisons, Power Prices and Spark Spreads
DOWNGRADING STOCKS; DECLINING POWER PRICES ARE NOT GOOD FOR EARNINGS
In a declining power pricing environment, investors should take a more cautious
stance on companies who are "long" the commodity -- i.e., companies who,
because of their business model, are making a long bet on commodity prices.
Within this constraint, we look for signs that mitigate this exposure.
Furthermore, we are positive on the long-run case for aggressive companies who
are building newer, more efficient power plants and replacing the aging plant
that has built up under 70 years of regulation. As long-run bets, companies
such as Calpine (CPN, downgraded to 2H from 1H) offer an excellent play on
deregulation, although we temper our outlook due to declining power prices.
Certain other Power Producers are better positioned than others, and when we
add the valuation component to this discussion (the stock prices of many
Producers peaked in late April/early May), we think a number still offer
attractive value.
However, our broad thrust is to recommend companies who are not long power (or
have small exposure), whether because of strong trading and risk management
skills or a lack of generating capacity. In Power Curve 4 (5/1/01), when we
first wrote about the declining price curve, we suggested a more cautious
stance towards Power Producers versus Energy Merchants. We stand by that
advice. We are downgrading the rating on only 1 Merchant vs. 4 Producers and
Integrated Utilities who are exposed to power prices. In terms of estimates,
only 2 Merchants are being reduced, while we are reducing 14 Power Producers
and Integrated Utilities. Our top 3 growth-oriented picks for investors who
want to avoid the impact of declining power prices are Energy Merchants ENE,
DYN and ILA. For dividend or total-return investors, we recommend Integrated
Utilities EXC, ETR, and AEP.
MACRO VIEW: WHY ARE POWER PRICES DECLINING?
Figure 1. The Forward Power Curve ($/MWh) --U.S.
1998 1999 2000 2001F 2002F 2003F
$/MWh $36.22 $40.53 $67.61 $73.44 $41.72 $36.81
The forward curve for power shows a rapid decline from peak levels achieved in
2000 and 2001E. Rapid growth in construction of new generating capacity is the
primary cause of the decline in forward price expectations (with the slowing
economy an additional factor in the near-term). See Figure 2. Additionally,
we cite two reasons why plant builds tend to over-shoot (either on the upside
or the downside) changes in the demand for power. These are because
electricity is capital intensive and a commodity, each of which creates cycles
of over- and under-development.
(1) Incremental Capacity Exceeds Incremental Demand. The cause of
the current decline in prices is the rapid addition of new generating capacity,
in all regions of the country. Additions to capacity are exceeding increases
in demand for power, by a wide margin, in most regions. This has caused the
supply and demand balance to shift from a shortage to a growing surplus.
Additional factors have hastened the decline in prices. A slowing economy has
reduced demand, as has the absence of last year's hotter-than-normal weather.
So far this summer, weather has been approximately normal.
(2) Capacity additions exceeded incremental demand in 2000. We
think 2000 was the first year when incremental capacity exceeded incremental
demand. We still have an underlying power shortage, which has lasted well into
2001. However, the market is adding capacity in a manner which should
relentlessly lessen its severity and even potentially create over-capacity
within the next several years. In 2000, 27,000 megawatts (MW) of capacity was
added, up from 11,000 in 1999, and less than 10,000 MW during most of the
1990's. We expect approximately 45,000 MW of capacity will be added in 2001,
and a similar number in 2002. Since this amount exceeds the amount required to
meet growth in demand, we project a rising "reserve margin." The reserve
margin is the best fundamental indicator of the balance between supply and
demand, with a high reserve margin indicating over-capacity (falling power
prices), and a low reserve margin indicating under-capacity (rising power
prices). We tentatively project a bottoming of the electricity commodity price
cycle in 2003, if enough developers scale back their plans to build new plants.
Figure 2. U.S. Capacity Additions and Reserve Margin
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000P 2001E 2002E 2003E
MW Additions 8,900 4,400 1,000 11,000 27,000 47,000 43,000 35,000
Reserve Margin 15% 13% 12% 10% 13% 16% 18% 18%
TWO REASONS FOR BOOM AND BUST CYCLES IN POWER
(1) Electricity is a cyclical commodity industry. We have reached the peak
of the "first-ever" cycle in the history of the industry. We put "first" in
quotes because we think the cycles were always there, except they were hidden
by regulation. With deregulation of the wholesale power market in 1996,
market-clearing prices reveal the balance between supply and demand. From 1996
until mid 2001, we were climbing the mountaintop of the electricity cycle. Now
we are on the downside.
(2) Electricity production is capital-intensive. We think the cycles will last
a number of years, 4-6 years in the current cycle (we put the first year as
1998, when enough liquidity existed in the newly deregulated market; we see the
bottom as 2003), driven by the capital-intensive nature of the industry. Power
plants take a long time to build. Planning decisions must be made between 1
and 5 years in advance of the actual day when power will be produced. This is
a much slower process than the market, and pricing expectations at the time of
planning will have no doubt changed by the time plants are up-and-running. We
think it is difficult for individual company executives to fully anticipate the
development plans of their competitors and, in the quest for market share, the
tendency is to build in a manner which is often too aggressive when viewed on
an industry-wide basis years later.
GUIDE TO INVESTORS: INDUSTRY-LEVEL
TRACK THE SPARK SPREAD. A primary metric for investors to track is the
"spark spread". The spark spread measures the difference between power prices
(revenues) and natural gas prices (cost). This is the critical metric for
tracking earnings power of generating companies. The gross margin of Power
Producers in the spot market will be determined by the spark spread, and when
these companies hedge, they will have to hedge using the forward spark spread
available at that time. Thus, a declining spark spread affects the earnings
power of all companies, even those who are well hedged. Only if they could
hedge 100% would their earnings be unaffected by declining prices. No company
we are aware of has been able to hedge 100% of their output.
The forward spark spread actually suggests a worse commodity price environment
in the 2002/3 period than existed in 1998/9, prior to the run-up in prices in
2000/1.
Figure 3. The Forward Spark Spread -- U.S.
1998 1999 2000 2001F 2002F 2003F
$/MWh $21.36 $23.04 $41.28 $40.65 $14.15 $9.28
GUIDE TO INVESTORS: COMPANY-LEVEL
STOCKS THAT CAN WEATHER THE STORM
The following factors will help companies weather the storm, from most to least
importance:
Trading and risk management skills. A strong trading desk acts as the "eyes
and ears" to the market, often providing advance warning of changes in the
commodity price outlook. Companies with generating plant portfolios can use a
strong trading desk to lock in power and gas prices earlier than their
competitors. The pure play Energy Merchants derive the bulk of their profits
from trading and risk management activities, own little if any generating
capacity, and are characterized by a commodity price-neutral earnings model.
All of our Energy Merchants have trading and risk management skills that help
their overall activity. Our top pick and a pure play Energy Merchant is Enron
(ENE-1H). We do not see their earnings being affected by a declining price
environment. Other companies with strong trading/risk management operations
include Dynegy (DYN-1H) and Aquila (ILA-1H). Duke Energy (DUK-1H) and Mirant
(MIR-1H) also have strong operations. In terms of vulnerability to power
prices, we think ENE and ILA have the strongest positions, owing to the lack or
near-lack of generating capacity owned.
Contracting/hedging activity. The more aggressive a company's moves were to
lock in power prices earlier this year, the better positioned they are.
Nevertheless, the unhedged portion of capacity can have a significant affect on
earnings, particularly in the long-run. We note that Calpine (CPN-2H), which
we have downgraded to 2H from 1H, has aggressively stepped up its hedging
activity in recent weeks, signing a 3,000 MW deal with Shell, a 1,000 MW deal
with Reliant Resources (RRI-NR). This activity appears to coincide with the
rapid declines in the forward curve we have seen over the past two months.
Offsetting "short" positions. This is a characteristic typical of electric
utilities, who in many cases offset their long positions in generation with the
short obligation to sell power to their customers. Utilities that are well-
positioned in this regard include: EXC and AEP. Utilities that are most
vulnerable are those who have aggressively developed generating capacity in an
effort to capture some of the earnings and growth visibility of the pure play
Power Producers. These include: AYE, CEG, and PPL. We are particularly
concerned about companies that have invested in peaking capacity, or,
separately, relatively inefficient plants that require a lot of capital dollars
to upgrade. These plants are often the "marginal" unit, providing earnings in
tight pricing environments, but having significantly less value as prices
decline.
Backlog of plant development. We also think that companies with significant
plant development backlogs can "muscle" their way through a weakened commodity
price environment. In particular, we note CPN, whose plants in operation grow
as follows:
Figure 4. Calpine Earnings Metrics, 2000-2003E
2000 2001 2002 2003 CAGR
Y/E MW in operation 5,883 11,705 21,266 30,463 73%
% of portfolio hedged 85% 71% 61%
EPS $1.11 $1.95 $2.30 $3.00 39%
They have hedged aggressively their output from their plants, so even though
future plants have lower margins, overall EPS growth can still be impressive.
Nevertheless, we have also lowered our EPS estimates for CPN, reflecting the
impact of lower spark spreads on the unhedged portion of output. Our revised
"Outperform" rating for CPN reflects the likely strong visibility of EPS growth
over the 2000-2003 period.
SUMMARY OF RATINGS/ESTIMATES/PRICE TARGET CHANGES
REVISED VALUATION TABLE
RISKS TO OUR MORE CAUTIOUS STANCE
We see four principal risks to our more cautious stance.
Some horses are already out of the barn. Power Producers and selected
Energy Merchants (those with exposure to power prices) are down 26% since
peaking on May 1. Some of the risk of declining forward power prices is now
reflected in the stocks. However, we do not think all of the horses are out of
the barn, and advise cautiously shutting the barn door on selected stocks at
this time. The next leg that could drive stocks downward is declining EPS
estimates. We think this is likely, particularly for 2002 and 2003, if power
prices continue their decline. We think when this happens, stocks are likely
to go down further.
Hotter Weather. So far in 2001, weather across the country has been near-
normal vs. hotter-than-normal weather last year. The year-on-year moderation
has affected the forward curve. Should August become hotter relative to last
year, the forward curve could temporarily strengthen, boosting power price and
earnings expectations near-term. Ultimately, we think the principal cause of
the decline in power prices is the dramatic build in power plants. Even if the
curve temporarily strengthens due to weather, we still expect it will be
downward sloping for the next several years.
A Rebound in the Economy. A weak economy has certainly affected power
demand, which, in turn, has affected the forward curve. When the economy
eventually rebounds, which some are predicting by 4Q:01 or early 2002, the
forward curve should strengthen. We will watch for these signs and adjust our
outlook accordingly.
Cancellations of plant development plans. This factor is a wildcard for the
group in our opinion. We expect to see a number of weaker developers begin to
cancel plant development plans. So far, sources such as turbine manufacturer
GE has not given any indication turbine orders are being canceled. If/when
they occur, the cancellation of development plans will have two effects.
First, it will confirm the increasingly difficult industry environment, and
would likely be perceived as negative. Then, following the cancellation of
enough development plans, it will sow the seeds for the recovery of power
prices in the future. This is why we think power prices will bottom in 2003.
The mechanism for rebuilding the forward curve will, in part, be driven by
cancellation of plant development plans and the restoration of a tighter
supply-demand balance.
SUMMARY: BECOMING MORE CAUTIOUS ON GROUP.
We are lowering ratings, price targets and/or estimates on 11 companies with
exposure to the declining trend in power prices. We advise investors to be
more cautious on the group. However, we continue to advise a shift toward
Energy Merchants, who have little or no commodity price exposure, and away from
Power Producers, who are long power, as well as those Integrated Utilities who
are long power. Additionally, we see several factors that also merit a
cautious outlook, apart from the declining trend in power prices and its
adverse effect on earnings:
(1) Utilities as a defensive play may become less valuable if the broad market
begins to recover and/or tech stocks begin to outperform.
(2) Growth Energy stocks have benefited from strong earnings visibility at a
time when many other S&P 500 sectors have "rolled over." The resumption of
earnings growth in any of these other sectors could draw growth capital away
from our Growth Energy names, particularly if their earnings is now under
challenge.
QUARTERLY ESTIMATES PER SHARE DATA
Current Year* Next Year Next Year + 1
Ticker Period Current Previous Current Previous Current Previous
AES# 1Q $0.42A $0.42A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.30E $0.30E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.51E $0.55E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.60E $0.66E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.80E $1.90E $2.20E $2.30E NA NA
AYE# 1Q $0.90E $0.90E NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.75E $0.75E NA NA NA NA
3Q $1.30E $1.35E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.85E $0.90E NA NA NA NA
Year $3.80E $3.90E $4.20E $4.30E NA $4.75E
CEG# 1Q $0.68A $0.68A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.46A $0.46A NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.95E $0.95E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.56E $0.56E NA NA NA NA
Year $2.65E $2.65E $3.10E $3.10E $3.35E $3.35E
CIN 1Q $0.75A $0.75A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.50E $0.50E NA NA NA NA
3Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
4Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
Year $2.80E $2.80E $2.95E $3.00E NA NA
CPN# 1Q $0.30A $0.30A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.35E $0.35E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.90E $0.90E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.45E $0.50E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.95E $2.00E $2.30E $2.60E $3.00E $3.10E
DTE# 1Q $0.97A $0.97A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.40E $0.40E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.93E $0.93E NA NA NA NA
4Q $1.20E $1.20E NA NA NA NA
Year $3.50E $3.50E $4.20E $4.24E NA $4.41E
DYN# 1Q $0.41A $0.41A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.40E $0.40E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.80E $0.80E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.40E $0.40E NA NA NA NA
Year $2.00E $2.00E $2.55E $2.55E NA NA
ENE# 1Q $0.47A $0.47A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.45A $0.45A NA NA NA NA
3Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
4Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
Year $1.80E $1.80E $2.15E $2.15E NA NA
EPG# 1Q $0.96A $0.96A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.78E $0.78E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.76E $0.76E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.85E $0.85E NA NA NA NA
Year $3.35E $3.35E $3.70E $3.80E NA NA
EXC# 1Q $1.19A $1.19A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.90E $0.90E NA NA NA NA
3Q $1.56E $1.61E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.85E $0.90E NA NA NA NA
Year $4.50E $4.60E $4.95E $5.05E NA NA
FPL 1Q $0.76A $0.76A NA NA NA NA
2Q $1.30E $1.30E NA NA NA NA
3Q $1.98E $1.98E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.66E $0.66E NA NA NA NA
Year $4.70E $4.70E $4.95E $5.10E NA NA
MIR 1Q $0.51A $0.51A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.45E $0.45E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.54E $0.54E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.40E $0.40E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.90E $1.90E $2.20E $2.20E NA NA
NRG# 1Q $0.19A $0.19A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.22E $0.22E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.69E $0.69E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.27E $0.27E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.37E $1.37E $1.65E $1.70E NA NA
PCG 1Q $0.67E $0.67E NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.75E $0.75E NA NA NA NA
3Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
4Q NA NA NA NA NA NA
Year NA $2.70E $1.90E NA NA NA
PEG# 1Q $1.25A $1.25A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.74E $0.74E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.75E $0.75E NA NA NA NA
4Q $1.01E $1.01E NA NA NA NA
Year $3.75E $3.75E $4.00E $4.05E NA $4.30E
PGN# 1Q $0.77E $0.77E NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.75E $0.75E NA NA NA NA
3Q $1.18E $1.18E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.70E $0.70E NA NA NA NA
Year $3.40E $3.40E $3.60E $3.60E NA NA
PPL 1Q $1.52A $1.52A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.71E $0.71E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.92E $1.02E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.85E $0.85E NA NA NA NA
Year $4.00E $4.10E $4.40E $4.50E NA $4.40E
REI# 1Q $0.94A $0.94A $0.80E $0.80E NA NA
2Q $0.75E $0.75E $0.70E $0.70E NA NA
3Q $1.28E $1.28E $1.20E $1.20E NA NA
4Q $0.23E $0.23E $0.20E $0.20E NA NA
Year $3.20E $3.20E $2.90E $2.90E NA NA
TE# 1Q $0.54A $0.54A NA NA NA NA
2Q $0.52E $0.52E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.74E $0.74E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.50E $0.50E NA NA NA NA
Year $2.30E $2.30E $2.50E $2.50E NA $2.75E
_________________________________________________________________
# Within the past three years, Salomon Smith Barney, including its
parent, subsidiaries and/or affiliates, has acted as manager or
co-manager of a public offering of the securities of this
company.Salomon Smith Barney ("SSB"), including its parent,
subsidiaries and/or affiliates ("the Firm"), usually makes a market in
the U.S.-traded over the counter securities recommended in this report
and may sell to or buy from customers, as principal, securities
recommended in this report. The Firm or employees preparing this
report may have a position in securities or options of any company
recommended in this report. An employee of the Firm may be a director
of a company recommended in this report. The Firm may perform or
solicit investment banking or other services from any company
recommended in this report. Securities recommended, offered, or sold
by SSB: (i) are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; (ii) are not deposits or other obligations of any insured
depository institution (including Citibank); and (iii) are subject to
investment risks, including the possible loss of the principal amount
invested. Although information has been obtained from and is based
upon sources SSB believes to be reliable, we do not guarantee its
accuracy and it may be incomplete or condensed. All opinions and
estimates constitute SSB's judgment as of the date of the report and
are subject to change without notice. This report is for informational
purposes only and is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the
purchase or sale of a security. Investing in non-U.S. securities,
including ADRs, by U.S. persons may entail certain risks. Investors
who have received this report may be prohibited in certain U.S. states
from purchasing securities mentioned in this report from SSB. Please
ask your financial consultant for additional details. This report has
been approved for distribution in the United Kingdom by Salomon
Brothers International Limited, which is regulated by the Securities
and Futures Authority. The investments and services contained herein
are not available to private customers in the UK. This report was
prepared by SSB and, if distributed in Japan by Nikko Salomon Smith
Barney Limited, is being so distributed under license. This report is
made available in Australia through Salomon Smith Barney Australia
Securities Pty Ltd. (ABN 64 003 114 832), a Licensed Securities
Dealer, and in New Zealand through Salomon Smith Barney New Zealand
Limited, a member firm of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. This report
does not take into account the investment objectives or financial
situation of any particular person. Investors should obtain advice
based on their own individual circumstances before making an
investment decision. The research opinions herein may differ from
those of The Robinson-Humphrey Company, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary
of SSB. Salomon Smith Barney is a service mark of Salomon Smith Barney
Inc. (c) Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 2001. All rights reserved. Any
unauthorized use, duplication or disclosure is prohibited by law and
may result in prosecution.
_________________________________________________________________
This information compiled: July 24, 2001 10:10:02 AM EDT
- SBD45381.pdf << File: SBD45381.pdf >>