13 Jul 2000, 16:32 UTC
Western Energy: Power Market Caps: Lower Prices at Higher Risk? - CERA Alert
- From
- Lorna Brennan lorna.brennan@enron.com
- To
- Steven Harris, Jeffery Fawcett, Lorraine Lindberg, Kevin Hyatt, Christine Stokes, TK Lohman, Michelle Lokay, Lindy Donoho, Lee Huber, Susan M Scott
- Date
- Thu, 13 Jul 2000 09:32:00 -0700 (PDT)
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---------------------- Forwarded by Lorna Brennan/ET&S/Enron on 07/13/2000 04:27 PM --------------------------- webmaster@cera.com on 07/07/2000 11:18:52 PM To: Lorna.Brennan@enron.com cc: Subject: Power Market Caps: Lower Prices at Higher Risk? - CERA Alert ********************************************************************** CERA Alert: Sent Fri, July 07, 2000 ********************************************************************** Title: Power Market Caps: Lower Prices at Higher Risk? Author: Zenker, Mortizburke E-Mail Category: Alert Product Line: Western Energy , URL: http://www.cera.com/cfm/track/eprofile.cfm?u=5526&m=1264 , Recent events in California, culminating in new market rules established for the energy and ancillary services markets, indicate that legislators and regulators are dissatisfied with the performance of the markets they established. The hot weather in California during June triggered high electricity demand, corresponding record-breaking power prices, and rolling blackouts in the San Francisco area. Although the economic impact of both the outages and the concurrent price spikes is significant, a recent decision by California's Independent System Operator (ISO) to intervene in the markets by lowering price caps through the summer of 2000 from $750 to $500 per megawatt-hour (MWh) may prove to be the most important product of the market events.* Ironically, the proclivity to continue to change the market rules, whatever the intention, could create market distortions that delay the addition of new generating capacity by discouraging plant developers and driving away needed capit! al. This would only prolong the state's supply shortage and resultant high prices. Although the record-setting weather that prompted the rolling blackouts in the San Francisco area is not likely to be repeated, the West as a whole will experience higher coincident peak demand under normal weather conditions this summer. CERA expects that supplies will be sufficient to meet peak demand this year, but the high price levels of June will be repeated during peak demand conditions not only this summer but during the summers of 2001 and possibly 2002. The Pressure Builds The blackouts were not spawned by a statewide supply shortfall, but instead by a transmission constraint that limits the ability to import sufficient quantities of power to the San Francisco area. The quantity of generating capacity out of service in the West was near average levels, despite a nuclear unit outage in Washington. Although the blackouts were brief and wholesale power prices decreased with the temperatures, the intense scrutiny over the events and resultant changes to the market rules indicate that legislators and regulators are dissatisfied with the performance of the markets they designed. The market's architects assumed that competition would lower wholesale prices in the state. However, prices in June have been roughly eight times higher than in 1997's prerestructured California market, leading many regulators and legislators to conclude that the markets are flawed, requiring additional caps and market rules. Although some state officials strongly favored lo! wering the price caps, many within the ISO's Board of Governors strongly opposed intervening in what they consider to be normal market reactions to tight supply and demand fundamentals. The current tight supply situation in California and the West as a whole is a product of recent strong economic growth throughout the region coupled with the slow process of permitting new power plants. Owing to strong economic growth in California in 1998 and 1999 (5.2 and 5.5 percent, respectively*), capacity margins have shrunk from 12 percent in 1997 to 7 percent in 2000. Demand growth throughout the West has reduced the amount of energy available for export from the Pacific Northwest and Southwest to California. As a result, even with optimistic levels of energy imports and the curtailment of approximately 2,800 megawatts (MW) of interruptible load within the state, California capacity margins will fall well below North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) reliability criteria (roughly 15 percent) this summer. The West is the only region in North America that will experience a tightening of capacity margins relative to levels in 1999 under normal weather conditions. CERA anticipates peak demand growth to continue to outpace new capacity additions through 2001, with slightly growing capacity margins in 2002. At these levels, an unusual amount of either plant capacity or transmission line capacity out of service during peak demand conditions would require the ISO to mandate blackouts of a portion of the state's load to maintain the overall stability of the grid. Thus, the tight capacity situation in the state will continue to pressure prices to high levels, which may provoke legislators and regulators to attempt to extend the price caps or implement additional market rules. Market Distorting Effects Under tremendous pressure from some legislators, regulators, and market participants, the California ISO Board of Governors lowered the current price caps on energy from $750 to $500 per MWh in a special meeting conducted June 28.** Owing to the interconnectedness of western markets, the decision to lower the caps and the apparent willingness of regulators to continue to change the rules governing California's electricity markets will affect power market participants throughout the West. * Profitability of existing and future generators degraded. High power prices and volatility levels in June, although detrimental to most buyers, provide strong encouragement to plant developers. Limiting the level of price fly-ups degrades the ability of plant owners to recover capital costs plus earn a return on that capital. In most periods of the year, competition drives prices to levels that provide little opportunity for a return on capital. Generators therefore seek to recover their investments with higher bids in California's energy and ancillary services markets during periods of supply scarcity. Existing merchant generators are at increased risk to recover the investments they made based on cash flow outlooks developed prior to the imposition of caps. * Supply shortfall prolonged. The process of siting and permitting power plants in California is cumbersome, requiring as long as five years from plant proposal to synchronization with the grid. The California Energy Commission (CEC), the state agency charged with approving new plants, has repeatedly expressed concerns about the chronic tight supply situation in the state. Price-dampening market intervention indicates to plant developers that California officials may continue to reengineer the state's power markets to the detriment of generator profitability and, when added to the difficult permitting process, potentially delaying the introduction of new capacity to meet rapidly growing state demand. Prominent plant developers have recently indicated that markets outside of California may provide a more stable market and a better environment for deploying scarce resources and generating equipment such as turbines. * Trading positions affected. Lowering price caps reduces the degree of price volatility and the level of overall average prices. Market participants have executed market positions based on the outlook for prices under the previous, higher price cap. By lowering the price cap, not only are the value of existing physical (e.g., power plant) and financial (e.g., forward contracts) positions significantly affected, but market participants must also incorporate the uncertainty of possible future adjustments to the cap into their trading.* * Circumventing market rules. The variety of energy and capacity markets in California, as well as the bilateral markets outside of the state, provides opportunities to circumvent the intent of the new market rules, further distorting the markets in the West. Although lowering price caps in California will likely temporarily reduce price levels, the new power plant capacity ultimately needed in the state to reduce price levels and improve reliability on a sustainable basis could be discouraged by prolonged and repeated intervention in the market. **end** Follow URL for PDF version of this Alert. Note: Should the above URL not work, please use the following: http://www.cera.com/client/ce/alt/070700_16/ce_alt_070700_16_ab.html ********************************************************************** Account Changes To edit your personal account information, including your e-mail address, etc. go to: http://eprofile.cera.com/cfm/edit/account.cfm This electronic message and attachments, if any, contain information from Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Inc. (CERA) which is confidential and may be privileged. Unauthorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this message or any attachments, in whole or in part, is strictly prohibited. Terms of Use: http://www.cera.com/tos.html Questions/Comments: webmaster@cera.com Copyright 2000. Cambridge Energy Research Associates