21 Sep 2000, 15:25 UTC
PG&E Strategy to End the Rate Freeze Early and Potential Book Impact
- From
- Roger Yang roger.yang@enron.com
- Date
- Thu, 21 Sep 2000 08:25:00 -0700 (PDT)
Attached is an e-mail that I sent to my management earlier this week. A also have a couple of questions and observations. First, do we have anything in writing from PG&E when they refused to comply with our request to revise their Roll-off Matrix? Also, I spoke with Jeff who informed me of the various variables that the market has to work with to negotiate with PG&E. I agree with the following variables: extend the rate freeze beyond 2001, but no later than the end of 2004. a $3.5 to $4.0 billion hydro valuation on January 1, 2002 to cover TRA and TCBA undercollections at that point in time, with future payments based on a revenue requirement calculation and a fixed rate of return. These fixed payments will be offset by the wholesale market revenues for the hydro output. Ratepayers will have to make up the difference in the future through a balancing account and fixed surcharge or surcredit; in financial derivative terms this is is the equivalent of a negative index (fixed revenue requirement - market revenues presumed to be the PX). This essentially NPVs the cashflows to payoff shortfalls today at the risk of creating shortfalls in the future to the extent that the value is too high. increase the level of the frozen rate at some modest amount. Keep in mind, a $10 per mWh increase in PG&E's rates beginning January 1, 2001, translates to a $155 million hit to the book for 2001 through 2010, so we would need an offsetting benefit. We could probably offset this hit if the rate freeze was extended through March 31, 2002. allow PG&E to hedge procurement costs for the extended frozen time period. it is critical that the rate freeze does not end before July 1, 2001 for all customers, including large and small and DA and SO. Preferably the rate freeze would end no earlier than December 31, 2001 or 2002. They can also extend the rate freeze for a longer period of time for small customers or change the freeze to an SDG&E type of mechanism beyond December 31, 2001. The following is PG&E's situtation. As you can see that they will be trying to cut their losses, even though they have still not fully collected all outstanding undercollections. Undercollections are projected to grow through next year. What PG&E will be looking for is a way out or a swaption to switch customers from the fixed to index asap. I don't think they will be so quick to do give up $500 million at this point and will be interested in some type of settlement that would protect this amount. There is still the political hot potato about rolling off early and selling out customers and the only way they could do this is with a quick valuation of hydro. Maybe they would be willing to take some loss even in a settlement to avoid upsetting politicians and customers. If the process is delayed, PG&E's exposure will probably be over $1 billion by the end of the year and possible $2 billion by the end of 2001. So you see, there would be a need for some combination of a slight increase in rates, extension of the freeze to capture the backwardation in commodity price, and a higher hydro valuation with ratepayers incurring the risk for the higher valuation in the future, in exchange for a deal that insulates ratepayers from volatility and rate shock today. It is key that the extended Rate Freeze equitably treats DA customers in the form of today's rate freeze with a PX credit that is not capped. Roger
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
---------------------- Forwarded by Roger Yang/SFO/EES on 09/21/2000 01:52 PM --------------------------- Roger Yang 09/19/2000 10:28 PM To: Dennis Benevides/HOU/EES@EES, Scott Stoness/HOU/EES@EES cc: Marty Sunde/HOU/EES@EES Subject: PG&E Strategy to End the Rate Freeze Early and Potential Book Impact PG&E filed Advice Letter 2010-E-A on September 15 requesting to revise its hydro value estimate of a $1.0 billion previously filed in June to $2.8 billion, retroactively effective on June 23, 2000. Although PG&E does not state the intent to end the rate freeze, effective July 1, 2000, it is clear that PG&E will claim that the $2.8 billion interim valuation will render the rate freeze as having ended retroactively on July 1, 2000 if the CPUC approves this advice letter. Our estimates show that this is viable; however, PG&E will be undercollected by $682 million in its Transition Revenue Account. It is unclear whether PG&E is willing to forego this undercollection in order to avoid incurring higher undercollections from the run-up in electric commodity prices under a rate freeze, or if PG&E has some other plan to recover this undercollection as a post-freeze rate adder. Even though Decision Nos. 00-02-048 and 00-06-004 adopt ratemaking methodologies to establish an interim valuation that triggered PG&E's Advice Letter filings, this decision states that "[the CPUC] will address the impact of this accounting on the end of the rate freeze at the appropriate time and in the appropriate proceeding." (p. 10) Hence, there is no conclusive decision that states that this interim valuation should be used to end the rate freeze. In fact, the utilities had argued the contrary, it could not be used in this manner. Since PG&E has already sent out bills for August and should alreay wdy have sent out bills for September by the final resolution of this Advice Letter, I believe the earliest implementation date for ending the rate freeze would be October 1, 2000. In addition, I would have to believe that allowing PG&E to implement an end to the rate freeze effective July 1 would violate codes on retroactive ratemaking since it would result in an immediate increase to PG&E's customers. The book impact to EESI for a termination date of October 1 would be a $127 million loss. A delay to an October 1 end date would result in an undercollection for PG&E greater than $1.2 billion. PG&E will try to recover this undercollection in future rates if the end date is October 1. To the extent that such recover is delayed and recovered over an extended period of time, the impact on the book could be minor due to the expiration of many of our contracts in 2002. AB1890 Section 368.a states, "These [frozen] rate levels for each customer class, rate schedule, contract, or tariff option shall remain in effect until the earlier of March 31, 2002, or the date on which the commission-authorized costs for utility generation-related assets and obligations have been fully recovered. The electrical corporation shall be at risk for those costs not recovered during that time period." I interpret this to mean that the utility does not have the option to artificially end the rate freeze earlier. However, PG&E may be trying to end the rate freeze early through an interim valuation of hydro assets. AB1890 Section 367.a.5 states, "For those assets subject to valuation, the valuations used for the calculation of the uneconomic portion of the net book value shall be determined not later than December 31, 2001, and shall be based on appraisal, sale, or other divestiture. The commision's determination of the costs eligible for recovery and of the valuation of those assets at the time the assets are exposed to market risk or retired, in a proceeding under Section 455.5, 851, or otherwise, shall be final, and notwithstanding Section 1708 or any other provision of law, may not be rescindeded, altered or amended. PG&E's original position was an interim valuation could not end the rate freeze when PG&E had thought it could overcollect CTCs before the run-up in market prices. Now PG&E is trying to rewrite history after the fact by using an interim valuation that is higher than their original estimate. Per Decision No. 99-10-057, PG&E and SCE were ordered to "file an advice letter three months prior to the earliest forecasted date that the rate feeze will end or Sepetmeber 2001 if the rate freeze does not end early....The Advice Letter implementing rate changes shall become effective within 30 days of the end of the rate freeze subject to Energy Division determining the Advice Letter is in compliance." (Ordering Paragraph 1) To the best of my knowledge, PG&E has yet to file an advice letter providing 3 months notice of an end to the rate freeze. This demonstrates that PG&E is taking desperate actions. In that same decision, the CPUC ordered that "PG&E and SCE shall provide to interested parties estimates of the date the rate freeze will end and file advice letters to effectuate the end of the rate freeze as set forth herein." (Ordering Paragraph 2) To date, every estimate filed with the CPUC showed that the rate freeze would end no earlier than January 1, 2001. In fact, Enron has notified PG&E on prior occasions of the possibility of a potential earlier end date and PG&E dismissed our concerns about the misinformation perpetrated by PG&E's filings. This demonstrates a willful act on PG&E's part to commit fraud if they were to end the rate freeze before 2001. This would not be the first time that PG&E has manipulated the regulatory process. In its General Rate Case, PG&E was communicating an expectation of 35 to 40% rate drops at the end of the freeze, which were later revised to 20% drops. The effect was to paralyze customers from choosing an alternate supplier, which turns out was not in the customers best interest. Finally, the decision states, "the end of the rate freeze shall not occur before the generation assets of each utility have been market-valued except as the law or the Commission determine otherwise." (Ordering Paragraph 2) This provision clearly demonstrates that despite all of PG&E's acts, it will be the final decision of either the Legislature or Commission as to whether they will allow PG&E to end the rate freeze retroactively without any advance notice and causing an immediate increase in utility bills to half of the customers of investor-owned utilities in California. If the Legislature or Commission is willing to commit this type of political suicide, then PG&E's grip on these bodies is tighter than we could ever imagine. As opposed to PG&E's desperate plans that would negatively impact California customers, we willl pursue a win-win strategy. Amongst various strategies would be to extend the rate freeze up to December 31, 2004. A freeze ending any period between July 1, 2001 and December 31, 2004, will have a positive impact on our book. Estimates from a month ago showed a positive impact in the ballpark of $156 million if the rate freeze were to end on December 31, 2004. Of course our preference would be to end earlier than 2004 so as to avoid a potential negative impact on future sales; however, we believe this PG&E would require at least this time frame in order to mitigate its undercollections that it would incur for the next few years. PG&E will benefit by the opportunity to maximize recovery, especially given an opportunity to now hedge this risk and with the hedge funded by ratepayers. ENA will have the opportunity to sell to PG&E. Customers get a reprieve and will have an additional four years to prepare for the new market structure, knowing what they may expect from the scare from this summers. With a better informed customer, we may even be able to still sell in California. The Governor, Legislature, and Regulators, can defer the concerns to someone else's term in office. At a minimum, we should try to negotiate some joint proposal with PG&E that would extend the rate freeze to December 31, 2001 or March 31, 2002, with guaranteed recovery of undercollections for PG&E for some time period beyond those dates. If adopted by CPUC, PG&E would get the P&L protection they need and customers can benefit from the reprieve from higher rates. I think the key is to preserve the current AB1890 rate freeze mechanism versus a mechanism similar to that enacted by the Legislature for SDG&E, because that legislation does not adequately protect all customers and competitors equally. The only solution will be a win-win solution. The Wall Stree Journal speculates that PG&E will be reluctant to be too aggressive in selling out customers and may be positioning itself to negotiate a win-win solution. We need to make sure we are part of that winning solution, if not influence that solution. Moody's Investor Services Inc. issued a negative outlook on PG&E and PG&E's stock price has dropped $4 from $30 to $26 in the last week. Government Affairs is on top of this issue. Roger