28 Nov 2000, 13:23 UTC
RE: Kahn & Joskow piece
- From
- Alan Comnes alan.comnes@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 28 Nov 2000 05:23:00 -0800 (PST)
Jeff, As best I can tell, this is the paper summarized in the article you forwarded. It is not new but perhaps was attached to a parties filing (SDG&E?). Alan
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
---------------------- Forwarded by Alan Comnes/PDX/ECT on 11/28/2000 03:20 PM --------------------------- "Sabine Schnittger" <Sabine.Schnittger@frontier-economics.com> on 11/28/2000 12:15:08 PM To: <Alan.Comnes@enron.com> cc: Subject: RE: Kahn & Joskow piece You probably have this already, but I am attaching the Harvey/Hogan piece that I was referring to. I haven't seen Dynegy's response, can you tell me where I can find that? Cheers, Sabine. -----Original Message----- From: Alan.Comnes@enron.com [mailto:Alan.Comnes@enron.com] Sent: Tuesday, 28 November 2000 2:54 PM To: Sabine.Schnittger@frontier-economics.com Subject: Re: Kahn & Joskow piece Sabine, Thanks. Did Harvey Hogan update their study or are you refering to the paper we referred to in our comments. If the former, could you send it to me or point to whose comments they were attached to? Thanks, Alan PS For fun and if you have it, see Dynegy's response to Hoeker's Q3. "Sabine Schnittger" <Sabine.Schnittger@frontier-economics.com> on 11/27/2000 10:07:33 AM To: <Alan.Comnes@enron.com> cc: "Seabron Adamson" <seabron.adamson@frontier-economics.com> Subject: Kahn & Joskow piece Alan, Refer to the recent Harvey & Hogan piece for a thorough critique of recent market power studies in the California market. Joskow & Kahn make all the same mistakes that HH have already highlighted in the BBW work and probably more, since a) JK were forced to use more aggregate data and b) JK had to estimate some of their data that BBW have access to. Key criticisms include ignoring the effects of various market efficiencies, one-part bidding, opportunity costs in other markets and a host of data problems. As far as the withholding modeling goes - the discussion is so vague that it is hard to know what data was used/approach taken. Again, forgone opportunities in other market and as a result of water/emissions RTCs shortages are not discussed and can explain what looks like 'withholding'. Sabine. -----Original Message----- From: Alan.Comnes@enron.com [mailto:Alan.Comnes@enron.com] Sent: Thursday, 23 November 2000 8:55 PM To: James.D.Steffes@enron.com Cc: Mary.Hain@enron.com; Joe.Hartsoe@enron.com; smara@enron.com; Jeff.Dasovich@enron.com; Paul.Kaufman@enron.com; Sarah.Novosel@enron.com; rcarroll@bracepatt.com; tim.heizenrader@enron.com; tim.belden@enron.com; bob.badeer@enron.com; Seabron.Adamson@frontier-economics.com; Sabine.Schnittger@frontier-economics.com Subject: Emprical Study on High Prices Attached is a paper that was filed at the FERC by Paul Joskow and Ed Kahn. I assume it was attached to SCE's comments in the FERC price caps proceeding. This study appears to be the most definite analysis so far of the question: did market fundamentals or generator market power cause the price run-ups this summer? Joskow/Kahn conclude that although much of the run up was due to gas prices and NOx costs, that the market was unworkably competitive; i.e., the cost run ups do not fully explain the price run ups. Further, they provide what they claim is evidence that individual generators withheld this summer. Joskow/Kahn state: "Moreover, there is considerable empirical evidence to support a presumption that the high prices experienced in the summer of 2000 were the product of deliberate actions on the part of generators or marketers controlling the dispatch of generating capacity to withhold supply and increase market prices." Biggest withholders in their analysis are: AES/Williams, Reliant, and Dynegy Marketer/traders are largely but not completely spared criticism in their analysis. Joskow/Kahn recommend that FERC staff undertake a study of the entire WSCC data to "Determine the role of marketers in the production and bidding behavior of the California generators." and to find out more why CA imports fell. It will be interesting to see how the CA generators react to this study. My initial read is that this is will be received as an important, influential work. It will fuel the fire for more information release, especially by the UDCs and CA regulators--at least release of physical operational data. I would be interested in your reaction to the study. In terms of potential criticisms: I noticed that their gas prices might be low (used monthly average data rather than daily). They also did not account for generator marginal profit or margin recovery to account for possible outages and noncontiguous schedules. Finally, they do not examine the benefits that would have accrued had additional capacity come on line. Alan Comnes (See attached file: Joskow Kahn Paper 11_21.pdf) - Market power issues in California (Oct 2000).pdf