12 Oct 2000, 14:45 UTC
Re: OII into the Operation of Interruptible Load Programs of SDG&E, S CE and PG&E
- From
- Roger Yang roger.yang@enron.com
- Date
- Thu, 12 Oct 2000 07:45:00 -0700 (PDT)
I understand that the decision was made to not comment due to customer relations concerns. This is probably wise. My take on our deals with interruptible customers is that we priced deals assuming that the customer would stay on an interruptible rate schedule and abide by the terms of that schedule and all tariff rules for that schedule through the expiration date of the schedule on March 31, 2002 (per PU Code Section 743.1). These interruptible programs are programs administered by the local distribution company based on decisions to interrupt from the ISO. As I understand, the decisions to interrupt is based on system reliability issues, thereby justifying recovery of the cost of the program from all customers whom benefit from system reliability. The customers decision to contract with the LDC to be on an interruptible schedule, and in some cases contract with an ESP under the assumption that the customer remains on the schedule, is primarily an issue between the customer and the LDC. If a customer elects to not abide by the terms of the rate schedule, the customer should be responsible for the consequences. Hopefully, are contract language specifies that the customer must pay the penalties for defaulting on rules for interruptible service. I don't know how tight are contract language is with respect to the expectation to stay on interruptible service through March 31, 2002 and passing through penalties. If one of customers elect to leave the interruptible schedule before March 31, 2002, I presume this would be grounds for nullifying the contract or renegotiating the contract. In addition to the system reliability reasons for curtailing, it looks like the utilities, ISO, and CPUC, are looking for curtailment programs as demand-responsiveness programs in order to mitigate purported supply-side market power and reduce prices to California. Under the current crisis, this is a good thing. The question is who pays for these programs. I have heard arguments that all loads should pay, since all loads benefit from the externalities of lower prices from lower demands. This is only true for those loads be supplied by the spot market. On the other hand, we have made the argument that only those customers that directly benefit should pay for the cost of the program. In other words, a program for SO customers should be funded by SO customers, because the cost of programs sponsored by ESPs for DA customers are not recovered from SO customers. I think that we need to divide this issue into a 2001 solution and longer-term solution. Arguable, the 2001 and perhaps 2002 solutions are to benefit all load, including DA, so long as the current rate freeze structure is maintained. However, in a post-freeze structure, the policy should probably be that only those who directly benefit should pay. Another long-term policy guideline should be based on participation. In other words, eligibility of participation should also determine whether DA customers should also pay for the program. Direct Benefits Eligible to Participate Who pays LDC Administered Program to address System Reliability All Customers All Customers with the proper metering and telemetry All Customers LDC Administered Program to address economic conditions under current market conditions and current rate freeze structure All Customers so long as the rate freeze is maintained and prices are high? SO customers with proper metering and telemetry If all Customers, must pay, then the program should accommodate participation by DA customers as well LDC in a default provider role administered program to address post-freeze economic conditions SO Customers SO Customers SO Customers ESP Administered Program to address post-freeze economic conditions DA Customer DA Customer DA Customer It is important to make the distinction in what capacity is the LDC administering interruptible programs, as seen above. Also, it is important to understand the role of SCs and the ISO. SCs are just the vehicle by which ESPs and wholesale marketers implement DA curtailment programs and participate in ISO and PX markets for energy and ancillary services. The ISO, like the utilities, wears two hats. The ISO implements directions to the LDCs to curtail based on a last resort need to curtail. The ISO is also trying to develop market solutions involving SCs and the LDC in their role as a default provider, in order to avoid having to issue general directions to utilities to curtail. The utility similarly tries to first use interruptible rate schedules, then as a last resort relies on rolling blackouts. It may be important to determine what category do new LDC programs fit into in the shortrun and the longrun. What are our plans to participate and help California clearly define these issues? Any thoughts? Roger
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
Mona L Petrochko 10/11/2000 06:48 AM To: Harry Kingerski@EES, Roger Yang cc: West GA Subject: OII into the Operation of Interruptible Load Programs of SDG&E, S CE and PG&E ---------------------- Forwarded by Mona L Petrochko/SFO/EES on 10/11/2000 04:47 AM --------------------------- Mona L Petrochko 10/10/2000 09:08 PM To: Douglas Condon/SFO/EES@EES, Martin Wenzel/SFO/HOU/EES@EES, Edward Hamb/HOU/EES@EES, James M Wood/HOU/EES@EES, Greg Nikkel/HOU/EES@EES, Greg Cordell, Chris Hendrix/HOU/EES@EES cc: Subject: OII into the Operation of Interruptible Load Programs of SDG&E, S CE and PG&E The Commission is looking to suspend the termination of interruptible contracts, by requiring existing participating customers to continue in the program. Comments are due on Thursday. ---------------------- Forwarded by Mona L Petrochko/SFO/EES on 10/10/2000 09:06 PM --------------------------- JMB <JBennett@GMSSR.com> on 10/10/2000 04:05:32 PM To: "'smara@enron.com'" <smara@enron.com>, "'mpetroch@enron.com'" <mpetroch@enron.com>, "'jdasovic@enron.com'" <jdasovic@enron.com>, "'smccubbi@enron.com'" <smccubbi@enron.com> cc: MBD <MDay@GMSSR.com> Subject: OII into the Operation of Interruptible Load Programs of SDG&E, S CE and PG&E Sue, Mona, Jeff, and Sandi -- Mike and I wanted to give you a preview of the Commission's latest actions in response to the "crisis" in the California electric market. In short, the Commission has instituted an Investigation in to operation of the interruptible load programs of the three UDCs, and the effect of these programs on energy prices, other demand responsiveness programs, and the reliability of the electric system. The item which has gotten the most "press" from the OII so far is the proposed temporary suspension of the tariff provisions of the three UDCs that allow customers to opt out of their interruptible program contracts during the 30 day window commencing November 1st. The Commission is using its authority under PUC Section 743 ( which gives the Commission specific authority to amend interruptible contracts between the UDCs and qualified heavy industrials) to propose such suspension. Although parties are allowed to comment on the suspension by this Thursday (the 12th), the Commission does have the apparent authority to effect the change and it will most likely proceed with the suspension. Apart from the enforced extension of the interruptible contracts, however, the OII potentially could have broader ramifications. The intent of the OII is to examine all interruptible, curtailable, and demand responsiveness programs being currently offered and/or proposed in California, and to determine how these programs can best be structured and/or reformulated to serve the Commission's goal of ensuring reliable and reasonably priced electric service within California (especially for the summer of 2001). It is hard to tell exactly what the Commission has in mind. However, it is possible that such reformulation of curtailable/demand responsiveness programs could interfere with Enron's (and other ESPs') ability to make interruptible/ demand responsive deals with customers. Moreover, the OII is not merely looking at larger customers. It states as one of the purposes of the rulemaking the identification of if and how smaller customers can participate in curtailable programs. Specifically, the OII states that "we need to examine the ability of smaller customers to participate; the development of rate design and incentive polices of such participation; a cost/benefit analysis of such programs; and the marketing of any such programs." Such investigation and potential implementation of demand responsiveness programs for smaller customers could impact and interfere with ARM's attempts to structure a competitive default provider program. We would like the opportunity to discuss with you the implications of this newest OII for Enron/ARM at your convenience. Jeanne