6 Sep 2000, 18:53 UTC
Re: Rick's Panel on Wholesale/Retail Market Power Issues
- From
- Lara Leibman lara.leibman@enron.com
- Bcc
- Richard Shapiro
- Date
- Wed, 6 Sep 2000 11:53:00 -0700 (PDT)
Jeff, Thanks again for your help. I appreciate it. Regards, Lara
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
Jeff Dasovich 09/06/2000 03:02 PM To: Lara Leibman/HOU/EES@EES cc: Subject: Rick's Panel on Wholesale/Retail Market Power Issues Lara: I have rather hastily put this list together. For that I apologize. Hope it is helpful. The things on the list are ones that you've likely already considered. Nevertheless, some of the issues we face in California include: 1. POWER PLANTS The utilities' subs are building power plants; competitors (like Enron) are also trying to develop plants to sell power into both wholesale and retail markets. The utilities control the interconnection of plants to the grid. The interconnection rules are currently so vague and ambiguous, that the utility could quite easily favor its generation sub over competitors. This would have an effect on prices at both the wholesale and retail level (i.e., how do we know we've gotten the best generation deal if the utility can favor its subs plants via interconnection?). 2. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION And the same goes for DG: in California many are pointing to DG as a viable solution to the price spikes. If the utility loses sales because a customer has installed DG on her premises as a hedge against price spikes, the utility will have an incentive to thwart interconnection of the DG unit. (Recall that in many places, recovery of distribution costs is derived from kwh sales; and if sales go down, so can recovery of the utilities' distribution-related costs). In addition, if someone attempts to install DG at the grid level (as opposed to on-site DG) and sell the DG power in wholesale and retail markets, the utility has the ability to frustrate the DG project via interconnection. This permits the utility to retain bundled service customers. Utility control of DG Interconnection can also permit the utility to favor its DG subs. 3. INTERCONNECTION/VOLTAGE BUY-UP And the same goes for the retail level---remember how SDG&E used interconnection to thwart our deal with South West Marine in San Diego. (Obviously, we're not doing these deals any more, but the interconnection caused us ultimately to lose the commodity deal, too.) 4. TRADING PG&E and Sempra have developed significant trading units. Now that the utilities have been granted authority to buy outside the PX, the trading subs are getting more aggressive and vocal about the opportunity to sell the utility power via short and long term power contracts. Again, any sort of favoritism could do considerable harm to consumers and competition (through the shareholders of the utilities' parent would surely profit). 5. DISTRIBUTION In general, the utilities control over distribution is complete and it's a problem (see DG, above, for example). Shouldn't state and federal policy makers at least consider doing the equivalent of FERC Order 888 (i.e., open access) at the distribution level? Right now, distribution is a real black box. 6. RETAIL In California, the utility effectively controls customer sign-up, switching, information, and turn back. The problems have been significant. 7. MARKET INSTITUTIONS Finally, a big mistake in California was to replace one monopoly--the utility--with another--the PX. Because the utility has been forced to buy from the PX, and because the market structure in California gives customers no incentive to switch, the utility continues to control the overwhelming majority of the load in California. This gives the utilities monopsony power. With that power, they can influence PX prices. Solution: 1) Don't make the PX a monopoly. 2) Create a system that provides customers with the incentive to switch. If you have any questions, or if there's anything else I can do to help, don't hesitate. Best, Jeff