26 Sep 2000, 11:41 UTC
ERC Auctions
- From
- Mona L Petrochko mona.petrochko@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 26 Sep 2000 04:41:00 -0700 (PDT)
Several messages were kicked back, so here goes...
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
---------------------- Forwarded by Mona L Petrochko/SFO/EES on 09/26/2000 09:41 AM --------------------------- Mona L Petrochko 09/25/2000 05:59 PM To: Michael McDonald@ECT, Laird Dyer/SF/ECT@ECT, mday@gmssr.com, David Parquet@ECT, Samuel Wehn@ECT, jbennett@gmssr.com cc: West GA, James D Steffes/NA/Enron@Enron Subject: ERC Auctions The attached memo from Goodin McBride summarizes the regulatory treatment of PG&E's emission credits to date. It is an interesting animal. Basically, PG&E has kept most of the credits, therefore has not divested the credits with the generating assets. However, these assets have been acquired for nothing, therefore they have no "regulatory value". In other words, their costs are not part of PG&E's rate base and are not being recovered from ratepayers. PG&E has issued RFPs for sales (auction) of the credits in the past. The credits have been sold to Duke (Moss Landing) and to Southern and Calpine for Morro Bay and Oakland facilities. They were price-only bids. The after-tax proceeds went to benefit ratepayers through reducing the over-all CTC. All of these sales necessitated an 851 application (transfer of utility asset), but it appears these transfers went without a hitch. ORA supported the mechanism. There was no CEQA requirement on the basis that the credits were associated with an existing facility or that a new or modified facility would acquire appropriate air emissions permits. If PG&E were to keep the ERCs, it would need to file a 377 (utility retention) and show that it is in the public interest for the utility to retain. Considering that the utility appears to have no real use for the credits, it would be a difficult showing. The credits do not appear to be part of PG&E's settlement proposal to transfer the hydro assets to its affiliate. So, PG&E has sold the credits in the past. They have been sold to new owners of PG&E facilities. The big questions is how can we encourage PG&E to initiate another sale. Their shareholders get no real benefit, as it appears likely that PG&E can recover all of their CTCs, pending valuation of their hydro facilities. I would suggest that we approach PG&E on their willingness to auction a portion of these credits on a comparable basis to its other auctions. (I've asked Mike to ascertain the amount of time involved with the previous auctions.) If this cooperative approach does not succeed, we can discuss the possibility of applying some regulatory pressure to the valuation of the remaining credits. We may also want to look at other agencies that may be anxious for the release of "hoarded" credits (like CEC), especially if such hoarding prevents new generation developments from coming on line. Mona ---------------------- Forwarded by Mona L Petrochko/SFO/EES on 09/25/2000 05:10 PM --------------------------- AMO <aozols@GMSSR.com> on 09/25/2000 04:57:52 PM To: "'mpetroch@enron.com'" <mpetroch@enron.com> cc: Subject: ERC Auctions - X16872.DOC ---------------------- Forwarded by Mona L Petrochko/SFO/EES on 09/26/2000 09:41 AM --------------------------- Mona L Petrochko 09/25/2000 06:38 PM To: David Kates/SF/ECT@ECT, David Parquet@ECT, mday@gmssr.com, jbennett@gmssr.com cc: Sandra McCubbin/SFO/EES@EES, jdasovic@.enron.com, Susan J Mara/SFO/EES@EES Subject: Humboldt-Attorney/Client Privilege After a conversation today with Dave Kates, he asked me to outline some process and regulatory avenues as it relates to Humboldt. 1. It appears as though early conversations have the same problems that we encountered with other projects. There appears to be no internal coordination on the project. The estimates for the interconnection study are outrageous. There is no evidence of a commitment from PG&E to work with us cooperatively. Sandi and David Parquet had met several weeks ago with Dede Hapner about various projects and the desire to work more cooperatively on interconnection issues. David indicated at that meeting that if PG&E is not willing to cooperate, we will not abandon some of these projects. After the last meeting, David Parquet contacted Jim Randolph, Sr. V.P. about the possibility of an MOU between PG&E and Enron. This would go toward the intent to work with Enron on interconnection isues. It appears as though there has been a committee formed within PG&E, supposedly to provide internal coordination. However, it is still not clear whether that committee has been given the internal direction to cooperate with us. Obtaining agreement high within PG&E's senior management is key to the success of this project. I like the idea of an MOU. We should ascertain soon PG&E's willingness to pursue such an agreement. Assuming we receive some positive indication from high with PG&E's management, I believe we need to drive the process and establish time lines by which we need information with status check points along the way. This will include points by which we can rightfully stop negotiations if PG&E fails to deliver its obligations in a meaningful way. (Mike/Jeanne, any legal impediments to PG&E entering into an MOU with us for purposes of negotiating an interconnection?) 2. Are there regulatory pressures we can leverage? We have not intervened in the Humboldt application filed by PG&E. I will find out what, if any, protests have been filed and by whom. My guess is that this will be a low level proceeding in terms of interested parties, so leverage opportunities are probably low. PG&E has determined the value of its existing gas-fired facilities at around $6 million. Our project is reliant upon PG&E shutting down those facilities. If PG&E is unwilling to do so, that is essentially the end of the story. If however PG&E would accept a payment from Enron equal to its remaining book value in exchange for shutting down its facilities, then our project has a chance, pending the interconnection study. As there is no transfer of utility facility, I wouldn't think there would be a necessity for additional filings (i.e. Section 851 or 377). (Mike/Jeanne?) PG&E and ratepayers should be neutral. In fact, ratepayers may be better off in the long-run because the new facilities would be much more efficient than the existing facilities. I would assume the new facilities' emissions would be lower. Currently, PG&E's facilities are probably worth more in today's market, than their filing indicates. However, raising the price would not benefit PG&E's shareholders, as they are likely to recover all of their CTCs, subject to hydro valuation. Revenues in excess of net book would go to ratepayers. SUMMARY: We need PG&E's cooperation. I think regulatory leverage is probably low. Will follow-up with any regulatory impediments that I receive from Mike/Jeanne relative to PG&E shutting down its existing facilities.