19 Dec 2000, 08:21 UTC
Re: Summary of FERC's 12- 15 order on California Markets
- From
- Mary Hain mary.hain@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 19 Dec 2000 00:21:00 -0800 (PST)
The sender added no text of their own; everything below is quoted or forwarded.
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
---------------------- Forwarded by Mary Hain/HOU/ECT on 12/19/2000 08:30 AM --------------------------- Alan Comnes 12/18/2000 04:58 PM To: Mary Hain/HOU/ECT, paul.kaufman@enron.com cc: tbelden@enron.com, smara@enron.com, bob.badeer@enron.com, greg.wolfe@enron.com, steve hall@enron Subject: Re: Summary of FERC's 12- 15 order on California Markets The following are some notes and questions regarding FERC's December 15 Order intended to supplement Mary's notes distributed over the weekend. 1. Penalty on Underscheduled Load a. Penalty threshold The FERC stood by its Nov 1 recommendation to impose a penalty on all SC's that underschedule by more than 5%. The only change relative to November 1 is that the FERC will allow SC's with loads 200 MW or less to have up to 10 MW imbalance without penalty. EPMI as a power marketer, has a highly variable load, I assume. Do we need to seek clarification from FERC or ISO on how ISO will measure the load (annual average, annual peak, monthly peak?) used to determine whether the applicable penalty threshold is 10 MW or 5%? Guidance from traders would be appreciated. b. Estimated bills FERC allows the ISO to implement a blended "automated/manual" process to implement the ISO's load imbalance penalty. To simplify the settlement process, the ISO is allowed to institute estimated billing procedures on a temporary basis. Does EPMI have a serious problem with being billed on an estimated basis? 2. Documenting Incremental Seller Costs, Including Opportunity Costs The FERC order raises important issues with regard to documenting our costs, which will be required on all sales to the ISO or PX effective on 1/1/01. In its discussion of the $150/MWh breakpoint, FERC states: "In recognition of the unworkable complexities that the opportunity cost concept introduces in the ISO real-time imbalance market, we will eliminate it." Enron will undoubtedly raise the impermissibility of opportunity costs in its rehearing request. Among other things, EPMI will argue that opportunity costs are a legitimate economic cost, that such costs are used in transmission pricing, and that without such costs the FERC is essentially taking generator/marketers back to cost-of-service ratemaking This being said, EPMI must operate without the benefit of using opportunity costs as a basis for documenting above-$150/MWh accepted bids effective 1/1/01. As noted in the list of information that must be reported by Enron (see Mary's summary or p. 59 of the FERC order), sellers that have not generated their own power can report "purchase price". Is West Trading prepared to document every above-$150/MWh sale to the ISO or PX with an associated "purchase price?" In addition, other costs that clearly apply to a marketer--such as transmission access costs, transmission losses, expected replacement power costs, start-up/no-load costs--are not allowed on the list. (We should not the omission of these costs in our petition for rehearing.) In several places in the order, the Commission states that sellers should be allowed to earn reasonable profits but little guidance is given. The only concrete guidance I found was in Massey's concurring opinion which identified $25/MWh as a "reasonable capacity adder." Accepted bids below $150/MWh do not require documentation. The preliminary opinion from our discussion today was that such bids are in a &safe harbor8 zone and it appears that refund risk on such transactions is much less.