27 Sep 2000, 14:58 UTC
CA-ISO REPORT BLAMES CALIFORNIA'S JUNE PRICE SPIKES ON THE LACK OF HEDGING
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- Miyung Buster miyung.buster@enron.com
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- Steven J Kean
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- Wed, 27 Sep 2000 07:58:00 -0700 (PDT)
CA-ISO REPORT BLAMES CALIFORNIA'S JUNE PRICE SPIKES ON THE LACK OF HEDGING, SUGGESTS THAT LOWERED PRICE CAPS HAVE DONE LITTLE TO STOP UNRELENTING, HIGH WHOLESALE POWER PRICES 09/20/2000 Foster Electric Report Page 3 (c) Copyright 2000, Foster Associates, Inc. The California Independent System Operator, Inc.'s (CA-ISO's) market surveillance committee (MSC) has found that utility reluctance to use hedging tools and a market design that continues to be faulty despite the implementation of reforms were the main reasons for the sustained price increases that hit California's wholesale markets in June 2000. According to an MSC report -- An Analysis of the June 2000 Price Spikes in the California ISO's Energy and Ancillary Services Markets -- the exercise of market power in California's wholesale power markets remains rampant. In fact, the MSC insisted that market rule changes implemented since last summer "have enhanced the ability of market participants to exercise market power in the California electricity market." And while the CA-ISO lowered its wholesale buyers' price cap from $750 to $250 following California's June price spikes, the MSC said the lowered cap has had little impact. Monthly average energy prices during June 2000 when the price cap was $750/MWh were lower than those during August 2000 when the price cap was $250/MWh although roughly the same amount of energy was consumed during these two months, the MSC reported. The MSC was also critical of existing regulatory constraints on forward contracting for energy and ancillary services by California's three utility distribution companies (UDCs) --Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison Co., and San Diego Gas & Electric --and the failure of the UDCs to use the limited rights they had in this regard. "The June 2000 price spikes can be attributed to several factors," the report stated. The primary cause, however, "was the lack of sufficient forward energy and ancillary services purchases for the month of June 2000 by the UDCs." The failure to enter these contracts then enhanced the ability of generators in and outside the ISO control area to exercise market power during high-demand conditions. "Had California's three utility distribution companies (UDCs) signed forward financial contracts equal to their expected net demand for energy and ancillary services during each hour of the months of May and June 2000, average prices in the PX and ISO markets during these months would have been significantly lower," the report stated. "Even if the June 2000 price spikes had still occurred, the UDCs would have been largely insulated from this spot market price volatility, because of their forward hedges." Still, the MSC noted that the UDCs are not solely at fault, having been severely limited by the California Public Utilities Commission. Before last month, the UDCs could only make limited forward purchases in the CA-PX's block forward market, for only certain times of the day and little flexibility. "The CPUC restrictions on forward contracting through the CA-PX were especially pernicious because the PX was granted a monopoly over forward trading by the UDCs," the report declared. And while the CPUC on August 3 gave SoCal Edison and PG&E more authority to enter long-term bilateral contracts, the MSC criticized the move because trading levels are still restricted. Similarly, SDG&E has little incentive to enter forward contracts because it can pass through its purchased power costs to its customers, no matter how high the price. Besides forward contracts, the report said other causes of the June price spikes were the inability of consumers to adjust their demand in response to high prices, and the CA-ISO's new method for allocating replacement reserve costs. All the above factors allowed generators to exercise more market power in May 2000 than any of the summer months of 1999, the report said, and this market manipulation increased even further in June 2000. The MSC then took special aim at market rule changes recently adopted (such as a new replacement reserve policy ) or under consideration to enhance system reliability that can increase the market power exercised in California's energy and ancillary services markets. "The CA-ISO operators must recognize that they are running markets for energy and ancillary services," the report explained. "For that reason, they must carefully consider the incentives for market participant behavior created by any market rule changes designed to enhance system reliability. Failing to do so can result in unnecessarily high prices in the energy and ancillary services markets and can exacerbate system reliability problems." So what's the solution? While the construction of new generation and transmission facilities in California would naturally increase the competitiveness of the CA-ISO's energy and ancillary services markets, the MSC believes fundamental market reforms are also needed. "The California electricity market is not so structurally competitive that market outcomes are invariant to market rules," it stated. "The industry is composed of a relatively small number of firms, some of which own a sizable fraction of the total electricity generating capacity located in the CA-ISO control area. The geographic distribution of generation unit ownership can allow some owners to exercise locational market power during certain system conditions. In addition, the amount of generating capacity owned by some market participants allows them to exercise market power during high-load conditions, when there is not a physical scarcity of available generating capacity to serve this load. Furthermore . . . demand for wholesale electricity in California is extremely insensitive to price. Consequently, the structure of the California electricity market, at least for the near term, is one where market outcomes are very sensitive to market rules." As a short-term solution, the MSC support the retail rate freeze (see related story, this REPORT) recently signed into law for SDG&E's customers. However, it also suggested that the CPUC allow SDG&E broad freedom to engage in forward contracting, and that the retail rate ceiling be coupled with a requirement that SDG&E "offer rate schedules that encourage retail customers to alter their demand in response to hourly wholesale electricity prices." Of two possible long-term solutions, the MSC dismissed the reimposition of cost-of-service regulation for all but the larger industrial, commercial and governmental customers. "This scheme would simply continue the proposed short-term solution indefinitely," the report reasoned. Further, the option may prove unworkable now that the UDCs own little of their own generation. The MSC said, "This solution would continue to leave unanswered the fundamental question of cost-of-service regulation: What is the regulated firm's minimum-cost mode of production and how should output prices be set to provide the strongest possible incentives for the firm to produce in this manner? . . . Under this market structure, the CPUC would have to determine the prudency of the energy purchasing decisions made by UDCs across the many energy and capacity markets and purchasing time horizons available. A perceived inability of regulatory processes around the world to cause firms to produce in a least-cost manner in the former vertically integrated monopoly regime led to the widespread introduction of competition in generation and supply. It is difficult to see how regulating the UDCs' retail rates under the current regime will be less complex than regulating them under the former vertically integrated monopoly regime when the UDCs owned significantly more generation and also operated the bulk transmission grid in their service territories." A second approach that the MSC supports and first outlined last year is to separate the distribution side of the UDC's business from the retail supply side. Under this arrangement, the price for delivering power anywhere in the UDC's service territory would be set by the CPUC. The supply side of the UDC's business would be unregulated, except the requirement that it offer a fixed default retail rate for each customer class. The report noted that the MSC's plan is not new, having been recently put in place in the England and Wales electricity market. The major advantage "is that it does not require the CPUC to make a determination of the prudency of the wholesale energy purchasing decisions of the UDC," the report continued. Further, the supply side of the UDC's business can forward contract or purchase on any of the CA-PX and CA-ISO markets in any manner they find profitable. Finally, among other things, the MSC recommended (1) replacement of the current CA-ISO replacement reserve policy with a real-time trading charge, a penalty for the oversupply of real-time energy, and the cost of out-of-market calls being assigned to the over-consumption of real-time energy; (2) a greater emphasis on the market-power implications of proposed market rule changes, including reconsideration of the current out-of-market payment mechanism, the CA-ISO's 10-minute settlement market, and PG&E hydro divestiture agreement with the CA-ISO; and (3) expedited siting and construction of new or expanded transmission and generation capacity in California.