11 Dec 2000, 13:29 UTC
Bullet Summary of the ISO's Amendment No. 33 (December 8 Filing)
- From
- Alan Comnes alan.comnes@enron.com
- To
- Tim Belden, Christian Yoder, Jeff Richter, Robert Badeer, John M Forney, Greg Wolfe, Mary Hain, Marcus Wood, Elizabeth Sager, Steve C Hall
- Date
- Mon, 11 Dec 2000 05:29:00 -0800 (PST)
After I wrote this I was forwarded Steve Hall's summary. There's some redundancy but hopefully, this provides a few more details. Also, Mary H. and I are informed that on Friday the FERC issued an order that appears to approve the ISO,s request in full. Bullet Summary of the ISO's Amendment No. 33 (December 8 Filing): The following is a summary of the filing made by the ISO. 1) ISO,s $250/MWh Soft Cap a) Summarized: ISO Claims its proposal is identical to the FERC proposed soft cap but raises the soft cap level to $250 from the $150/MWh proposed by the FERC: &The ISO would replace the current cap on Imbalance Energy bids with an interim &soft8 price cap based on the price mitigation proposal in the Commission,s November 1 Order. The ISO,s scheduling system will not reject Energy bids priced in excess of the $250/MWh price cap, but will evaluate those bids in price merit order. However, if the ISO issues Dispatch instructions to Scheduling Coordinators for Energy that has been bid in excess of the $250 soft cap, those bids will not set the Market Clearing Price for Imbalance Energy. Rather, those Scheduling Coordinators will be paid in accordance with their bids.8 b) Refund risk and cost documentation above $250. &Imbalance Energy above the level of the soft price cap would be subject to refund, based on subsequent review by the Commission. It also should require Scheduling Coordinators that submit such bids to supply supporting cost information to the Commission, as well as to the ISO and to the California Electricity Oversight Board so that they may bring questionable bids to the Commission,s attention. i) Appears to imply that the proposed reporting requirement is supplemental to what was requested by the FERC. See p. 8 ii) Regarding production costs: fuel, taxes, emission credits, startup costs are all listed as costs. However, no mention of noncontiguous scheduling costs or reasonable profit. iii) Quasi safe harbor on opportunity costs: In a footnote to cover letter, ISO states it will particularly scrutinize any opportunity costs in excess of 10% of the production costs or $25/MWh, whichever is lesser. c) Useful quote: &In light of current fuel prices and the ISO,s recent experience in receiving less than a thousand MW of Imbalance Energy bids at prices of $150 or less in many hours, the ISO believes that a $150 soft cap would be tantamount to procuring all Imbalance Energy on an as-bid basis.8 d) Effective date: 4 p.m. PST 12/8/00. e) Term of this soft cap: lesser of 3 mo (3/8/01) or whenever the Commission supercedes it by its own order. f) Applicable tariff sections. Section 2.5.23.2 and .3. See attachments A1/B1 to the filing. 2) Participating Generator Penalties a) Summary: &the ISO proposes in Amendment No. 33 to assess penalties against Participating Generators that refuse to operate in response to an ISO Dispatch instruction during a System Emergency or when the ISO is acting to avoid an imminent or threatened System Emergency. They would be charged an amount equal to twice the highest price that the ISO paid for Energy for each hour in which the Participating Generator failed to respond. In addition, if, during that hour, the ISO curtailed Load to manage a System Emergency other than Load that has not been designated by agreement or regulation as interruptible, the Participating Generator would pay an additional penalty of $1000/MWh for the Energy that it failed to deliver.8 b) Allowed excuse: The penalties would not apply if the Participating Generator has notified the ISO (within the hour of instruction), and subsequently demonstrates (documentation within 72 hours) , that its Generating Unit, System Unit or System Resource was physically unable to operate or that operation would violate a legal restriction that could not be waived. c) Applicable tariff sections. Amends portions of 5.6.1 .2 and .3. See attachments A2/B2 to the filing. d) Effective date: Same as the ISO,s new soft cap: 4 p.m. PST 12/8/00 e) Term: I did not see any sort of sunset provision. 3) Load Imbalance Penalties a) Summary: &Scheduling Coordinators who rely on that market to serve their Loads the ISO,s costs of obtaining Energy through bids above the proposed soft price cap or through out-of-market Dispatches when bids are insufficient. Specifically, those costs would be allocated to Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their Demand that appears unscheduled in real-time (underscheduled Load) and Generation that is scheduled but does not appear in real-time, except to the extent that the underscheduled Load or undelivered Generation is balanced within the Scheduling Coordinator,s portfolio.8 The costs of dispatching units that have bid above the Market Clearing Price for Energy to Scheduling Coordinators in proportion to their Net Negative Uninstructed Deviations (in essence, the amount by which their metered Demand exceed their metered Generation). Cover letter, p. 10. b) Net Negative Uninstructed Deviation (NNUD) defined: &The real time change in Generation or Demand associated with underscheduled Load (i.e., Load that appears unscheduled in real time) and overscheduled Generation (i.e., Generation that is scheduled in forward markets and does not appear in real time). Deviations are netted for each BEEP Interval, apply to a Scheduling Coordinator,s entire portfolio, and include Load, Generation, Imports and Exports8 c) Applicable tariff sections. Amends portions of 11.2.4.2.1. See attachments A3/A3/B3 to the filing. d) Effective date: For loads scheduled for 12/12/00. (Essentially, loads scheduled on 11/11 for next day). e) Term: I did not see any sort of sunset provision. 4) Useful Info from the Detmers Declaration a) &During the recent 7-day period from December 1, 2000 through December 7, 2000, planned Generating Unit outages have averaged roughly 4,000 MW. During this same 7-day period, forced or unplanned outages of generating have be very high, averaging approximately 7,000 MW. & b) &For example, for the last four days (December 4, 2000 to December 7, 2000) we have purchased 255,000 MWh of OOM Energy. The cost of these purchases were approximately $167 million. MWh.8 (Equivalent to an average OOM cost of $655/MWh.)