18 Jan 2000, 13:34 UTC
S&C memo re: EOL Credit Derivatives Procedures (sent to Paul & me today)
- From
- Mark Taylor mark.taylor@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 18 Jan 2000 05:34:00 -0800 (PST)
January __, 2000 Via Facsimile MEMORANDUM TO: Paul Simons (Enron Europe Limited) Mark Taylor (Enron North America Corp.) FROM: Kenneth M. Raisler David J. Gilberg RE: Enron Online/Credit Product This memorandum summarizes the proposed procedures we discussed during our meeting on January 13, 2000 for use in connection with the credit derivatives product (the &Product8) to be offered by Enron Capital & Trade Resources International Corp. and its affiliates (collectively, &Enron8) through &Enron Online8. These procedures, which we will be assisting you in preparing, are designed to reduce Enron,s exposure to those entities on whose credit the Product will be based (the &Reference Entities8) as well as Enron,s exposure to other related types of liabilities. We have previously outlined these areas of exposure in our memoranda dated December 15, 1999 and December 22, 1999. 1. Disclosure * All Reference Entities should be advised, by letter, of the fact that they will be included in the list of entities that will be the subject of the Product. These disclosures will of course be separate from, although related to, the disclosures to be provided to counterparties to transactions in the Product. ? This disclosure should inform the Reference Entity of the introduction of the Product, and describe the general nature of the Product and the manner in which it will be traded (e.g., through Enron Online). ? In general, however, Enron need not request that the Reference Entities consent to or acknowledge their inclusion in the list of the Reference Entities, except as set forth below in paragraph 2. 2. Consent * Enron should, however, obtain the prior consent of certain types of Reference Entities before including them in the list of Reference Entities. ? In particular, consent should be obtained from any Reference Entities with which Enron has a significant trading relationship that includes advice or other services that could result in Enron being considered a fiduciary of the Reference Entity or that could otherwise give rise to common law duties that could be violated if the Reference Entity does not consent to the arrangement. ? Enron need not seek consent from those large and sophisticated counterparties to which Enron merely provides prices and with which Enron trades on an exclusively arms, length basis with no advisory or similar services being provided and with no fiduciary obligations. ? Where consent is sought, Enron should include a request that the Reference Entity acknowledge its receipt of the letter and its consent to being included in the list of Reference Entities. If a Reference Entity fails or refuses to execute the letter, Enron will need to make a determination, on a case-by-case basis, as to whether it is comfortable including that entity on the list of Reference Entities. However, it should be recognized that, by requesting consent, Enron may be limiting its ability to treat an entity as a Reference Entity in the absence of consent. 3. Chinese Wall * We understand that it will not be feasible to construct a complete &Chinese Wall8 between the operations related to the Product and Enron,s other trading activities. This is due primarily to the fact that activities related to the Product will utilize the same credit function as Enron,s other trading activities. However, Enron should implement a modified Chinese Wall between the trading operations. This approach would enhance Enron,s ability to defend successfully against any claims of impropriety or breach of duty by facilitating Enron,s ability to demonstrate that information had not been shared by other traders with those trading the Product. This could be accomplished through a number of procedures. ? First, Enron should maintain the maximum possible degree of physical separation between personnel responsible for pricing and trading the Product, on the one hand, and Enron,s other trading activities, on the other hand. Even if personnel involved in the Product are located on the same floor as other traders, it would be prudent to place them in a separate area of the floor set off by partitions or similar features. ? Second, procedures should be developed to prohibit the flow of information between Product traders and other traders if such information is material to the creditworthiness of trading counterparties and is not in the public domain. In addition, all trading personnel should be instructed with respect to the procedures through training programs. ? Finally, senior supervisory officers of Enron should be assigned to monitor communications between the groups of traders and to review and make determinations on requests by traders to communicate information that would otherwise be prohibited under the procedures. These procedures will be similar to those that have been developed in connection with Enron,s equity trading activities. 4. Restricted List -- Enron should establish and maintain a &restricted list8 of those entities on which Products may not be traded. ? Initially, the list could be used to exclude those entities on which it is not feasible for Enron to offer Products due to the nature of its relationships with such entities; e.g., those entities with respect to which Enron might be considered a fiduciary and which have not consented to their inclusion and those entities about which Enron has or regularly receives material, non-public information. In addition, those entities with which Enron has entered into confidentiality agreements will most likely need to be excluded, depending on the terms of such agreements. ? Enron should also establish procedures to monitor its receipt of information regarding Reference Entities on which Products are listed. Pursuant to these procedures, Enron should suspend the listing of quotations, and therefore the issuance of new Products, with respect to a Reference Entity, if Enron is in possession of material, non-public information regarding such Entity of a type, or in situations, that render suspension necessary or advisable. This would include situations in which Enron is considering an investment in or a joint venture with a Reference Entity. In addition, the procedures should provide for Reference Entities to be excluded or deleted for reasons unrelated to Enron,s possession of information as well; e.g., where Enron has reached or exceeded its credit limits with respect to such Entities. ? The procedures should state that Enron may close out an open position for a Product held by a counterparty, if the counterparty specifically requests Enron to do so. The procedures should also address the pricing of the closing transaction, however, and establish a mechanism for such pricing that minimizes Enron,s potential exposure to liability as a result of its effecting a transaction while in possession of material, non-public information. ? Enron should provide training to the appropriate personnel, which should include instructing such personnel not to furnish Product counterparties with any notification or explanation of a Reference Entity being placed on the restricted list. As noted, we will be assisting you in developing these procedurew, which will need to be integrated into Enron,s existing policies and procedures. In addition, as we have advised you in our prior memoranda, there are no procedures that will fully insulate Enron from the potential liabilities arising in connection with its offering of the Product. However, the implementation of the types of procedures described above should assist Enron in mitigating such risks and defending against claims that might be made by Reference Entities. Please call us if you have questions on these or other issues. K.M.R. D.J.G.