20 Nov 2000, 15:56 UTC
POWER Working Paper on FERC Proposed Soft Cap
- From
- Jeff Dasovich jeff.dasovich@enron.com
- To
- Tim Belden, Robert Badeer, James D Steffes, Mary Hain, Joe Hartsoe, Sarah Novosel, Paul Kaufman, Susan J Mara, Mona L Petrochko, Alan Comnes
- Date
- Mon, 20 Nov 2000 07:56:00 -0800 (PST)
FYI.
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
----- Forwarded by Jeff Dasovich/NA/Enron on 11/20/2000 03:54 PM -----
pwpens <pwpens@socrates.Berkeley.EDU>
11/20/2000 01:11 PM
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Subject: POWER Working Paper Email Notification Service (PWPENS)
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N E W P O W E R W O R K I N G P A P E R
Working Paper Series of UCEI
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"Soft Price Caps and Underscheduling Penalties: How Would the FERC Plan
Affect California Electricity Markets?" (November 2000)
PWP-079 by Steven Stoft
FERC proposes three short-run stabilization "remedies" in its Market Order
Proposing Remedies for California Wholesale Electrics, issued November 1,
2000. The first allows the IOUs to purchase power outside the PX. The
second sets a penalty that will frequently reach $100/MWh on unscheduled
power in excess of 5% of a purchaser's total load. The third is a $150
"soft" price cap on the ISO and PX. On the infrequent occasions when the
cap is effective, it will exacerbate the scheduling problem. Generally,
when needed, it will be subverted by exemptions for opportunity costs.
Because the soft cap is applied to the PX, but not to other scheduling
coordinators, it will drive suppliers away from the PX. Allowing more
forward contracting of net suppliers will reduce market power, but it will
be very expensive without an effective bid cap. To be effective, a bid cap
must allow no exceptions and must also be a regional cap to avoid causing
reliability problems for California.
Download this paper in Adobe Acrobat
format: http://www.ucei.org/PDF/pwp079.pdf
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