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18 Jan 2001, 13:52 UTC

Comparison of PA vs CA

From
James D Steffes james.steffes@enron.com
To
David W Delainey, Jeff Dasovich, Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Mary Hain, Mark Palmer, Harry Kingerski, Tim Belden, Kevin M Presto, Janet Dietrich
and 8 more Christopher F Calger, Christi L Nicolay, Jeff Brown, Ron McNamara, Rob Bradley, Margaret Carson, Tammy R Shepperd, Don Black
Date
Thu, 18 Jan 2001 05:52:00 -0800 (PST)
Here is a pretty good comparison of the PA vs. CA markets - and why PA is not 
having the same problems.  Some of the policy recommendations for moving 
forward are "self-serving" (ie, 1000 MW of wind generation - the author is a 
wind advocate).

Jim
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
----- Forwarded by James D Steffes/NA/Enron on 01/18/2001 01:40 PM -----

	"PennFuture" <pennfuture@pennfuture.org>
	01/18/2001 01:12 PM
	Please respond to "PennFuture"
		 
		 To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:@mailman.enron.com;>
		 cc: 
		 Subject: PennFuture's E-cubed - Survivor: Electric Competition



PennFuture's E-cubed is a commentary biweekly email publication  concerning 
the current themes and trends in the energy market. 

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January 18, 2001
Vol. 3, No. 2
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Survivor: Electric Competition
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With rolling blackouts plunging the Golden State into darkness, California  
has reached the point of being voted off the electricity policy island. Will  
other states soon follow California,s footprints in the sand to a collapsed  
electricity system? And how does Pennsylvania,s approach to surviving  
electricity restructuring compare to California,s?
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In electricity policy, California and Pennsylvania have one thing in common  
* in 1996 they both passed state statutes that were advertised as the means 
of  ending electricity generation retail monopolies (and reducing electricity 
prices  for consumers). Yet, that,s where the similarity ends. 
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Pennsylvania believes that the electricity market cannot be competitive,  
unless both the wholesale and retail electricity segments of the market are  
competitive. The supply of electricity is largely a function of the 
wholesale  market, and demand a function of the retail market. For the 
electricity market  to be optimally efficient, supply and demand must respond 
to competitive price  signals by the end of the transition period. 
Consequently, Pennsylvania has  focused on retail market structure and pushes 
for competitive wholesale market  policies like the expansion of the 
wholesale market known as PJM. 
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On the other hand, retail competition was always the sizzle but never the  
steak in California policy-making. Now being scrapped and replaced by 
something  that will again raid consumers, wallets, California,s approach 
assumed that a  successful result would occur if competition were introduced 
only into the  wholesale market, as long as utilities passed this price 
through to their still  captive retail customers. In that assumption * plus 
the desire to pay its  utilities $30 billion of stranded costs on an 
accelerated schedule * lies the  root of California,s disaster. Exploding 
demand and the failure of the federal  government to end the balkanization of 
the nation,s wholesale electric markets  have also played a role in 
aggravating the outcome but have not caused it, as is  proven by the 
continued successful operation of California,s generation-owning  municipal 
utilities.
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Although the chosen paths of Pennsylvania and California have landed them  in 
very different places on the road to surviving and succeeding in electric  
competition, the game,s not over and Pennsylvania still faces challenges 
ahead.  But with the exception of GPU that now suffers from unwise or unlucky 
decisions,  Pennsylvania consumers and utilities are not only surviving but 
also benefiting  from electric competition.
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How,s Pennsylvania Doing?
To date,  Pennsylvania,s consumers have saved $2.84 billion since January 1, 
1997, and  568,000 consumers have switched to a competitive supplier. That 
total will  surpass 900,000 by April as a result of the recent successful 
auction of  competitive default supply in the PECO Energy service territory, 
which will  enable New Power to serve another 300,000 customers and Green 
Mountain an  additional 50,000. This auction wouldn,t have succeeded without 
the commitment  of PECO Energy and without the high residential shopping 
credit of 5.65 cents  per kilowatt-hour. Licensed competitors now supply 
about 25% of the electricity  consumed by Pennsylvania,s families and 
businesses.
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So far, by switching many shopping customers have saved 5% to 15% off their  
total electric bills and have been able to contract for electricity for a 
year  or longer. Competitive retail offers are well below * typically 0.9 to 
3.15  cents per kilowatt-hours * what residential consumers were paying 
utilities for  generation prior to competition, or the utilities, embedded 
generation rate. In  addition, most shopping and non-shopping customers have 
enjoyed guaranteed total  rate cuts of 2% to 8%, and rates for customers of 
Duquesne Light will be slashed  by about 20% in 2002. 
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Renewable and cleaner energy products are available for the first time in  
the state,s history, and 80,000 customers have purchased them. The first two  
wind farms in Pennsylvania are operational and several more are likely to be  
built in 2001. The Commonwealth can realistically act to attract 1,000 
megawatts  of additional new wind generation by 2010. 
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The budgets for Pennsylvania,s substantial Low-Income Usage Reduction  
Program and for its national leading Customer Assistance Programs, which 
reduce  rates by as much as 50% for low-income families, have been 
quadrupled. In fact,  approximately 80,000 low-income families in the PECO 
Energy service territory  alone have received these sharply lower rates. 
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Beyond this impressive record of accomplishment, rates are capped at  January 
1, 1997 levels until at least 2005 and at slightly higher levels until  2010 
in most service territories. The jump in natural gas and oil home heating  
bills by as much as 50% this winter underscores the tremendous value of the 
rate  cap to consumers. Unlike those energy sources, the retail price of 
electricity  hasn,t increased at all. Indeed, the electric rate cap alone has 
probably saved  electricity consumers hundreds of millions of dollars just in 
the last year and  made electricity the only energy bargain in this winter of 
gas and oil price  spikes.
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The Pennsylvania and California Experience: As Different as  Richard and Rudy 
Pennsylvania embarked on its competitive  retail journey by running a large 
pilot program from November 1997 through  December 1998, as required by the 
state electric competition statute. In the  pilot, over 220,000 customers * 
5% of the entire state,s load * switched to a  competitive supplier. The 
total number of customers that switched in California  almost never exceeded 
the number that did so just during Pennsylvania,s pilot  program. 
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The pilot revealed that consumers want to shop for electricity, as more  than 
900,000 customers asked for permission to shop, and would do so if stranded  
costs were not paid to utilities in a manner that destroyed the retail  
competitive market. Just as importantly, the large pilot project proved that  
many companies would enter the retail market to serve all customer classes 
as  long as stranded cost recovery mechanisms didn,t make entry impossible. 
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Of course, whether stranded cost recovery mechanisms kill retail  competition 
depends on the size of what is variously called the shopping credit,  the 
price to compare, or the default rate. These are terms for the amount in  
cents per kilowatt-hour that a switching customer no longer pays for 
generation  service to the local utility once the customer takes his business 
to a  competitor. 
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California set this amount at absurdly low levels and linked it to the  
wholesale price. By doing so, California killed retail competition and 
delivered  San Diego,s customers into the tender mercies of the local 
utility, a  deregulated monopoly that offered a 100% spot market electricity 
product. 
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By contrast, Pennsylvania recognized that, in a truly free market a  shopping 
customer should not pay anything to the utility for electricity no  longer 
purchased. Pennsylvania also recognized that its decision to allow  utilities 
to recover 100% of their documented stranded costs required consumers  to 
continue to pay some amount for some transition period for the electricity  
they were no longer buying from the utility. Pennsylvania responded by trying 
to  make sure that the amount of stranded cost recovery did not eviscerate 
the  consumers, shopping credit. Pennsylvania understood that what was left 
of the  consumers, shopping credit after stranded cost payments were 
considered had to  be sufficiently greater than the prices they would see in 
the market so that  they could save money by shopping * and so that 
competitive suppliers would  enter the market to serve them. 
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Pennsylvania shopping credits are typically 50% to 100% higher than those  in 
California, but still well below every utility,s embedded generation rate.  
Retail competition has worked best for consumers in those parts of 
Pennsylvania  where the shopping credits are highest. In those service 
territories,  principally Duquesne Light and PECO Energy, huge numbers of 
residential and  other customers have switched suppliers and realized savings 
and/or purchased  cleaner energy products. 
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Lessons Learned
The lesson is clear: retail  competition won,t work unless shopping credits 
are set as close as possible to a  utility,s embedded generation rate, given 
the amount of stranded cost recovery  allowed. For retail competition to be 
genuine, the shopping credit must equal  the utility,s embedded generation 
rate if no stranded costs are recovered, or  once recovery is complete. 
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Yet, protecting consumers, shopping credits is not the only necessary  
condition for a competitive market. Other conditions that must be met are a  
liquid, workably competitive wholesale market that includes future contracts 
as  well as spot price trading, and the empowerment of customers through 
time-of-use  meters and appliance control technologies to change their demand 
and profit from  doing so.
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Other Differences
From its pilot experience, a  unique Pennsylvania restructuring model emerged 
that has five major differences  from California,s policies, in addition to 
the shopping credit: length of  transition periods, divestiture of generation 
assets, reliance on spot markets  and requirements to sell and buy from spot 
markets, size and administration of  wholesale markets, and entry of new 
supply.
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Transition
Pennsylvania,s transition periods are  longer, running from at least eight to 
as many as 14 years (1997 to 2010). This  longer transition period gives time 
to correct infirmities in the nation,s  wholesale markets, reduces the per 
kilowatt-hour stranded cost charge and price  distortion by spreading 
stranded costs over more years, and time to create a  true demand-side 
response that can police the wholesale market. 
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Divestiture and spot markets
Pennsylvania allowed but  didn,t require utilities to divest generation 
assets, and two have done so.  Pennsylvania didn,t require utilities to sell 
all power into and buy all power  from a newly created wholesale spot market. 
Pennsylvania utilities are free to  use long-term contracts and any hedging 
instruments that they deem appropriate.  The combination of these policies 
have made utilities and their customers less  dependent upon the volatile 
spot market than those in California. 
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Size and administration of markets
Prior to 1996,  two-thirds of Pennsylvania was part of the largest 
electricity free trade zone  in America * the 58,000 megawatt wholesale 
market governed by the PJM  independent system operator, which stretches from 
Virginia to Northern New  Jersey and includes Maryland, Delaware, NJ, and 
Washington DC. Unlike the  California ISO and Power Exchange (PX) that were 
rushed into operation in 1998,  PJM was founded in 1927 and has been steadily 
transformed from an entity that  once served only member utilities into a 
separate corporation with a board that  is completely independent of market 
participants. The PJM board has the legal  duty of ensuring that the 
wholesale market is genuinely competitive and  reliable. 
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Moreover, unlike the California ISO and PX that serves only portions of  
California, PJM is a multi-state, regional market. It also borders the New 
York  Independent System Operator and is near to the New England System 
Operator. PJM,  NYISO, and New England ISO benefit from their close proximity 
and a common  wholesale market price cap. In fact, independent system 
operators administer  wholesale markets all the way from Maine to Northern 
Virginia. Nowhere else in  America over such a large, connected geographic 
area are the trading rules and  operations of the power grid no longer 
controlled directly by local electric  monopolies. 
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New supply
About 600 megawatts of new supply were added  to PJM,s wholesale market in 
2000; 3,000 megawatts will be added in 2001; and  5,000 megawatts in 2002, 
according to PJM officials. This substantial amount of  new supply should 
preserve reliability and prevent shortages.
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Staying On Track
Although Pennsylvania has a  successful four years of transition to 
generation competition behind it, and has  delivered many benefits, the 
process could still go off track. To avoid  pitfalls, five things must occur.
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First, PJM must be expanded to  the service territories of Allegheny Energy 
and Duquesne Light, and, in fact,  negotiations are underway for these two 
utilities to create PJM-West.  FirstEnergy must also be required to join PJM 
as a condition of its merger with  GPU. Additionally, within five years only 
one Independent System Operator should  operate from Northern Virginia to 
Maine. It,s time to seriously think about one  of those famous &mergers of 
equals8 for the three independent system operators  on the East Coast. 
Expansion of PJM will create a bigger wholesale market, and a  bigger market 
should be more competitive, transparent, and stable.
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Second, customers must be given the ability to change their demand in  
response to price in real times. As a result, customers must have 
time-of-use  meters and control devices installed on appliances like air 
conditioners and  water heaters. Utilities should be required to install this 
equipment over the  next five to 10 years. Only with this equipment can 
customers gain financial  incentives for changing demand. Ensuring that 
demand responds more directly to  price is critical to limiting wholesale 
market prices, to preserving  reliability, and to reducing environmental and 
public health problems caused by  the production and consumption of 
electricity. PJM calculates that a 1%  reduction in peak demand causes a 10% 
reduction in peak price. 
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In addition, energy efficiency should be pursued before a crisis hits.  
Available consumer education money should be used to increase the market  
penetration of fluorescent light bulbs, programmable thermostats, and other  
energy-saving devices.
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Third, Pennsylvania should monitor additions to supply and attract at least  
1,000 megawatts of new wind generation.
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Fourth, the budget for the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) should be  
substantially increased to allow it to monitor and research the operation of 
the  wholesale market, in order to guard against abusive market power. OCA 
must have  the ability to know as much as market participants about outage 
rates,  withholding of power, imports, exports, and so on. A beefed up OCA 
would be the  best deterrent to some business practices that ultimately would 
destroy public  confidence in competitive markets.
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Fifth, distributed generation is a potentially powerful competitor to grid  
power. The Commonwealth needs to ensure that any barriers to entry for 
modern,  clean, distributed generation technologies are removed. A uniform 
statewide law  that addresses issues such as installation standards, net 
metering rules, and  interconnection policies in a manner that will promote 
distributed generation  should be enacted.
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Together these five policies can help Pennsylvania successfully complete  the 
journey to surviving and succeeding in electricity competition. Yet, the  
failure to enact these policies could put at risk all that has been achieved. 
A  successful completion of this transition is vital to our future, as both 
the  benefits achieved so far in Pennsylvania and the ongoing trouble in 
California  make clear. 
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In Pennsylvania, more consumer, business, and environmental benefits are  not 
guaranteed but are in reach. With continuing attention to detail,  
electricity in Pennsylvania by 2010 can be cheaper, cleaner, and a source of  
competitive advantage.
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For other states entering or contemplating electric competition, both  
California and Pennsylvania offer important lessons on how to stay in the 
game  and win.  

E-cubed is available for reprint in newspapers and other publications.  
Authors are available for print or broadcast. Support E-cubed by becoming a  
member of PennFuture * visit our secure online membership page at 
www.pennfuture.org by clicking on &Support  Our Work.8
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PennFuture, with offices in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and  Pittsburgh, is a 
statewide public interest membership organization, which  advances policies 
to protect and improve the state,s environment and economy.  PennFuture,s 
activities include litigating cases before regulatory bodies and in  local, 
state and federal courts, advocating and advancing legislative action on  a 
state and federal level, public education and assisting citizens in public  
advocacy.?
 - Vol3No2_11701.doc