18 Jan 2001, 13:52 UTC
Comparison of PA vs CA
- From
- James D Steffes james.steffes@enron.com
- To
- David W Delainey, Jeff Dasovich, Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Mary Hain, Mark Palmer, Harry Kingerski, Tim Belden, Kevin M Presto, Janet Dietrich
- Date
- Thu, 18 Jan 2001 05:52:00 -0800 (PST)
Here is a pretty good comparison of the PA vs. CA markets - and why PA is not having the same problems. Some of the policy recommendations for moving forward are "self-serving" (ie, 1000 MW of wind generation - the author is a wind advocate). Jim
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
----- Forwarded by James D Steffes/NA/Enron on 01/18/2001 01:40 PM ----- "PennFuture" <pennfuture@pennfuture.org> 01/18/2001 01:12 PM Please respond to "PennFuture" To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:@mailman.enron.com;> cc: Subject: PennFuture's E-cubed - Survivor: Electric Competition PennFuture's E-cubed is a commentary biweekly email publication concerning the current themes and trends in the energy market. ? January 18, 2001 Vol. 3, No. 2 ? Survivor: Electric Competition ? With rolling blackouts plunging the Golden State into darkness, California has reached the point of being voted off the electricity policy island. Will other states soon follow California,s footprints in the sand to a collapsed electricity system? And how does Pennsylvania,s approach to surviving electricity restructuring compare to California,s? ? In electricity policy, California and Pennsylvania have one thing in common * in 1996 they both passed state statutes that were advertised as the means of ending electricity generation retail monopolies (and reducing electricity prices for consumers). Yet, that,s where the similarity ends. ? Pennsylvania believes that the electricity market cannot be competitive, unless both the wholesale and retail electricity segments of the market are competitive. The supply of electricity is largely a function of the wholesale market, and demand a function of the retail market. For the electricity market to be optimally efficient, supply and demand must respond to competitive price signals by the end of the transition period. Consequently, Pennsylvania has focused on retail market structure and pushes for competitive wholesale market policies like the expansion of the wholesale market known as PJM. ? On the other hand, retail competition was always the sizzle but never the steak in California policy-making. Now being scrapped and replaced by something that will again raid consumers, wallets, California,s approach assumed that a successful result would occur if competition were introduced only into the wholesale market, as long as utilities passed this price through to their still captive retail customers. In that assumption * plus the desire to pay its utilities $30 billion of stranded costs on an accelerated schedule * lies the root of California,s disaster. Exploding demand and the failure of the federal government to end the balkanization of the nation,s wholesale electric markets have also played a role in aggravating the outcome but have not caused it, as is proven by the continued successful operation of California,s generation-owning municipal utilities. ? Although the chosen paths of Pennsylvania and California have landed them in very different places on the road to surviving and succeeding in electric competition, the game,s not over and Pennsylvania still faces challenges ahead. But with the exception of GPU that now suffers from unwise or unlucky decisions, Pennsylvania consumers and utilities are not only surviving but also benefiting from electric competition. ? How,s Pennsylvania Doing? To date, Pennsylvania,s consumers have saved $2.84 billion since January 1, 1997, and 568,000 consumers have switched to a competitive supplier. That total will surpass 900,000 by April as a result of the recent successful auction of competitive default supply in the PECO Energy service territory, which will enable New Power to serve another 300,000 customers and Green Mountain an additional 50,000. This auction wouldn,t have succeeded without the commitment of PECO Energy and without the high residential shopping credit of 5.65 cents per kilowatt-hour. Licensed competitors now supply about 25% of the electricity consumed by Pennsylvania,s families and businesses. ? So far, by switching many shopping customers have saved 5% to 15% off their total electric bills and have been able to contract for electricity for a year or longer. Competitive retail offers are well below * typically 0.9 to 3.15 cents per kilowatt-hours * what residential consumers were paying utilities for generation prior to competition, or the utilities, embedded generation rate. In addition, most shopping and non-shopping customers have enjoyed guaranteed total rate cuts of 2% to 8%, and rates for customers of Duquesne Light will be slashed by about 20% in 2002. ? Renewable and cleaner energy products are available for the first time in the state,s history, and 80,000 customers have purchased them. The first two wind farms in Pennsylvania are operational and several more are likely to be built in 2001. The Commonwealth can realistically act to attract 1,000 megawatts of additional new wind generation by 2010. ? The budgets for Pennsylvania,s substantial Low-Income Usage Reduction Program and for its national leading Customer Assistance Programs, which reduce rates by as much as 50% for low-income families, have been quadrupled. In fact, approximately 80,000 low-income families in the PECO Energy service territory alone have received these sharply lower rates. ? Beyond this impressive record of accomplishment, rates are capped at January 1, 1997 levels until at least 2005 and at slightly higher levels until 2010 in most service territories. The jump in natural gas and oil home heating bills by as much as 50% this winter underscores the tremendous value of the rate cap to consumers. Unlike those energy sources, the retail price of electricity hasn,t increased at all. Indeed, the electric rate cap alone has probably saved electricity consumers hundreds of millions of dollars just in the last year and made electricity the only energy bargain in this winter of gas and oil price spikes. ? The Pennsylvania and California Experience: As Different as Richard and Rudy Pennsylvania embarked on its competitive retail journey by running a large pilot program from November 1997 through December 1998, as required by the state electric competition statute. In the pilot, over 220,000 customers * 5% of the entire state,s load * switched to a competitive supplier. The total number of customers that switched in California almost never exceeded the number that did so just during Pennsylvania,s pilot program. ? The pilot revealed that consumers want to shop for electricity, as more than 900,000 customers asked for permission to shop, and would do so if stranded costs were not paid to utilities in a manner that destroyed the retail competitive market. Just as importantly, the large pilot project proved that many companies would enter the retail market to serve all customer classes as long as stranded cost recovery mechanisms didn,t make entry impossible. ? Of course, whether stranded cost recovery mechanisms kill retail competition depends on the size of what is variously called the shopping credit, the price to compare, or the default rate. These are terms for the amount in cents per kilowatt-hour that a switching customer no longer pays for generation service to the local utility once the customer takes his business to a competitor. ? California set this amount at absurdly low levels and linked it to the wholesale price. By doing so, California killed retail competition and delivered San Diego,s customers into the tender mercies of the local utility, a deregulated monopoly that offered a 100% spot market electricity product. ? By contrast, Pennsylvania recognized that, in a truly free market a shopping customer should not pay anything to the utility for electricity no longer purchased. Pennsylvania also recognized that its decision to allow utilities to recover 100% of their documented stranded costs required consumers to continue to pay some amount for some transition period for the electricity they were no longer buying from the utility. Pennsylvania responded by trying to make sure that the amount of stranded cost recovery did not eviscerate the consumers, shopping credit. Pennsylvania understood that what was left of the consumers, shopping credit after stranded cost payments were considered had to be sufficiently greater than the prices they would see in the market so that they could save money by shopping * and so that competitive suppliers would enter the market to serve them. ? Pennsylvania shopping credits are typically 50% to 100% higher than those in California, but still well below every utility,s embedded generation rate. Retail competition has worked best for consumers in those parts of Pennsylvania where the shopping credits are highest. In those service territories, principally Duquesne Light and PECO Energy, huge numbers of residential and other customers have switched suppliers and realized savings and/or purchased cleaner energy products. ? Lessons Learned The lesson is clear: retail competition won,t work unless shopping credits are set as close as possible to a utility,s embedded generation rate, given the amount of stranded cost recovery allowed. For retail competition to be genuine, the shopping credit must equal the utility,s embedded generation rate if no stranded costs are recovered, or once recovery is complete. ? Yet, protecting consumers, shopping credits is not the only necessary condition for a competitive market. Other conditions that must be met are a liquid, workably competitive wholesale market that includes future contracts as well as spot price trading, and the empowerment of customers through time-of-use meters and appliance control technologies to change their demand and profit from doing so. ? Other Differences From its pilot experience, a unique Pennsylvania restructuring model emerged that has five major differences from California,s policies, in addition to the shopping credit: length of transition periods, divestiture of generation assets, reliance on spot markets and requirements to sell and buy from spot markets, size and administration of wholesale markets, and entry of new supply. ? Transition Pennsylvania,s transition periods are longer, running from at least eight to as many as 14 years (1997 to 2010). This longer transition period gives time to correct infirmities in the nation,s wholesale markets, reduces the per kilowatt-hour stranded cost charge and price distortion by spreading stranded costs over more years, and time to create a true demand-side response that can police the wholesale market. ? Divestiture and spot markets Pennsylvania allowed but didn,t require utilities to divest generation assets, and two have done so. Pennsylvania didn,t require utilities to sell all power into and buy all power from a newly created wholesale spot market. Pennsylvania utilities are free to use long-term contracts and any hedging instruments that they deem appropriate. The combination of these policies have made utilities and their customers less dependent upon the volatile spot market than those in California. ? Size and administration of markets Prior to 1996, two-thirds of Pennsylvania was part of the largest electricity free trade zone in America * the 58,000 megawatt wholesale market governed by the PJM independent system operator, which stretches from Virginia to Northern New Jersey and includes Maryland, Delaware, NJ, and Washington DC. Unlike the California ISO and Power Exchange (PX) that were rushed into operation in 1998, PJM was founded in 1927 and has been steadily transformed from an entity that once served only member utilities into a separate corporation with a board that is completely independent of market participants. The PJM board has the legal duty of ensuring that the wholesale market is genuinely competitive and reliable. ? Moreover, unlike the California ISO and PX that serves only portions of California, PJM is a multi-state, regional market. It also borders the New York Independent System Operator and is near to the New England System Operator. PJM, NYISO, and New England ISO benefit from their close proximity and a common wholesale market price cap. In fact, independent system operators administer wholesale markets all the way from Maine to Northern Virginia. Nowhere else in America over such a large, connected geographic area are the trading rules and operations of the power grid no longer controlled directly by local electric monopolies. ? New supply About 600 megawatts of new supply were added to PJM,s wholesale market in 2000; 3,000 megawatts will be added in 2001; and 5,000 megawatts in 2002, according to PJM officials. This substantial amount of new supply should preserve reliability and prevent shortages. ? Staying On Track Although Pennsylvania has a successful four years of transition to generation competition behind it, and has delivered many benefits, the process could still go off track. To avoid pitfalls, five things must occur. ? First, PJM must be expanded to the service territories of Allegheny Energy and Duquesne Light, and, in fact, negotiations are underway for these two utilities to create PJM-West. FirstEnergy must also be required to join PJM as a condition of its merger with GPU. Additionally, within five years only one Independent System Operator should operate from Northern Virginia to Maine. It,s time to seriously think about one of those famous &mergers of equals8 for the three independent system operators on the East Coast. Expansion of PJM will create a bigger wholesale market, and a bigger market should be more competitive, transparent, and stable. ? Second, customers must be given the ability to change their demand in response to price in real times. As a result, customers must have time-of-use meters and control devices installed on appliances like air conditioners and water heaters. Utilities should be required to install this equipment over the next five to 10 years. Only with this equipment can customers gain financial incentives for changing demand. Ensuring that demand responds more directly to price is critical to limiting wholesale market prices, to preserving reliability, and to reducing environmental and public health problems caused by the production and consumption of electricity. PJM calculates that a 1% reduction in peak demand causes a 10% reduction in peak price. ? In addition, energy efficiency should be pursued before a crisis hits. Available consumer education money should be used to increase the market penetration of fluorescent light bulbs, programmable thermostats, and other energy-saving devices. ? Third, Pennsylvania should monitor additions to supply and attract at least 1,000 megawatts of new wind generation. ? Fourth, the budget for the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) should be substantially increased to allow it to monitor and research the operation of the wholesale market, in order to guard against abusive market power. OCA must have the ability to know as much as market participants about outage rates, withholding of power, imports, exports, and so on. A beefed up OCA would be the best deterrent to some business practices that ultimately would destroy public confidence in competitive markets. ? Fifth, distributed generation is a potentially powerful competitor to grid power. The Commonwealth needs to ensure that any barriers to entry for modern, clean, distributed generation technologies are removed. A uniform statewide law that addresses issues such as installation standards, net metering rules, and interconnection policies in a manner that will promote distributed generation should be enacted. ? Together these five policies can help Pennsylvania successfully complete the journey to surviving and succeeding in electricity competition. Yet, the failure to enact these policies could put at risk all that has been achieved. A successful completion of this transition is vital to our future, as both the benefits achieved so far in Pennsylvania and the ongoing trouble in California make clear. ? In Pennsylvania, more consumer, business, and environmental benefits are not guaranteed but are in reach. With continuing attention to detail, electricity in Pennsylvania by 2010 can be cheaper, cleaner, and a source of competitive advantage. ? For other states entering or contemplating electric competition, both California and Pennsylvania offer important lessons on how to stay in the game and win. E-cubed is available for reprint in newspapers and other publications. Authors are available for print or broadcast. Support E-cubed by becoming a member of PennFuture * visit our secure online membership page at www.pennfuture.org by clicking on &Support Our Work.8 ? PennFuture, with offices in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, is a statewide public interest membership organization, which advances policies to protect and improve the state,s environment and economy. PennFuture,s activities include litigating cases before regulatory bodies and in local, state and federal courts, advocating and advancing legislative action on a state and federal level, public education and assisting citizens in public advocacy.? - Vol3No2_11701.doc