9 Feb 2001, 12:53 UTC
Asian Credit Watch- AP & P
- From
- Jeffrey A Shankman jeffrey.shankman@enron.com
- Date
- Fri, 9 Feb 2001 04:53:00 -0800 (PST)
Another article from the competitive intelligence group. Jeff
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
----- Forwarded by Jeffrey A Shankman/HOU/ECT on 02/09/2001 12:55 PM ----- Robert Johnston 02/09/2001 12:50 PM To: Jeff Kinneman/HOU/ECT@ECT cc: Paul Pizzolato/HOU/ECT@ECT, Seung-Taek Oh/NA/Enron@ENRON, Brendan Fitzsimmons/NA/Enron@Enron, Gary Hickerson/HOU/ECT@ECT, Darren Delage/AP/Enron@Enron, Kimberly Landry/NA/Enron@Enron, Scott Tholan/Corp/Enron@Enron, Jeffrey A Shankman/HOU/ECT@ECT Subject: Asian Credit Watch- AP & P Per our conversations with most of you this week, Brendan and I have developed the following information on Asian Pulp & Paper and its potential to trigger widescale credit problems in Asia. In the past week, APP has come close to default through complex trigger clauses in a mass of junk bond issues. Prospects of an APP default have already sent tremors through the Asian bond market and could have larger implications for emerging market debt. This week, the Indonesian government further complicated the picture by attaching assets of the Sinar Mas group, including APP, to guarantees of Sinar Mas group,s $1.5 billion debt to Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII), Indonesia,s fifth largest bank and formerly part of a Sinar Mas group. The Wijaya family is likely to postpone payments until the last possible minute, before seeking a workout and corporate restructuring. RJ The Immediate Problem o $1.6 billion in bonds are due in 2001, on top of $1.5 billion owed to the Indonesian government through the Sinar Mas group o Between now and April 30, the APP group must come up with $145 million for nine separate coupon payments coming due. APP itself will owe $87 million in interest payments on four bonds over the next month o APP missed a February 1 deadline for two bond payments of $43 million; one payment has been made but the other, of $13.5 million, is still hanging Risks are formidable, with management playing a cat and mouse game with bond holders in order to maximize their negotiating position in a restructuring: o Assets are encumbered by complex cross-guarantees that make it difficult to impossible to separate out individual properties o The New York Stock Exchange has threatened a de-listing unless APP stock rises above the US$1 level; de-listing will trigger immediate redemption clauses in some classes of bonds o The company,s Indonesian assets are diseased. Despite APP,s apparently sound business model, it is being corrupted by crime that is systemic within the Indonesian forestry and forest products industry o Inventory dumping by APP, particularly in China, has been a major factor depressing paper prices since mid-2000 o APP,s management has failed to offer transparent explanations for their cash shortages. It has not reported third quarter earnings for 2000, due last November, to the US Securities and Exchange Commission (although, as a foreign company it has six months to report earnings, versus one month for US companies). Inter-company transfers may be masking serious problems within the APP group. o Indonesian political instability is worsening with the threatened impeachment of Indonesia,s President Wahid, lowering prospects for a government bailout of APP,s parent company, the Sinar Mas group, and its owners, the Wijaya family. o There are clear prospects for collateral damage to Asian capital markets, with S&P already cutting ratings and a consequent shrinkage of liquidity. APP Risk Profile: APP,s only immediate hope of meeting its debt payments is through asset sales or a sell-off of pulp and paper inventory. Neither has much chance of success. APP,s current strategy is to muscle its bond-holders into a restructuring agreement as soon as possible, most likely before an early March deadline for its next coupon payment falls due. There are significant obstacles to evaluation of assets in a restructuring, from cross-guarantees of bond issues that range across classes of bond holders and various jurisdictions, to inter-company transfers that present a false picture of financial health in some of its operating companies. Such obstacles ensure that a restructuring exercise will be lengthy. APP is the fifth largest issuer of junk bonds in the world, and has been regarded as a benchmark bond for Indonesia. Until the last few months, it was the only bond in the world that traded at a premium to its own government,s bonds, and was the only Indonesian issuer to raise funds successfully from capital markets in the depth of the Asian crisis. A pronounced ripple effect is likely on Asian bonds in the event of a default, as investors wait to see what happens to unsecured creditors who account for 40 percent to 50 percent of APP,s US$12 billion in debt. At the moment, systemic fallout seems likely to be limited to the Asian region, as investors revert to the hostile stance adopted during the Asian financial crisis. APP Key Decision Makers: The key decision makers at APP are CFO Hendrik Tse and CEO Teguh Ganda Wijaya. No others in the company are privy to all the Group,s Affairs, or to corporate strategy. Information is extremely closely held. Sources say that the APP situation is so complex that no one individual has a comprehensive understanding of all the potential ramifications of a decision on any one of the assets of APP or its subsidiaries, so complex are the cross guarantees and trigger clauses in the debt paper issued over the last few years. Tee and Teguh Wijaya are to a large extent playing a bluff game, engaging in brinkmanship with their bond holders. It signaled the market that it could move into a default situation on February 1 when its paper making subsidiary, Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimiah, failed to make payments on two different bond issues worth $43 million. On February 6, APP finally paid the coupon on one of the bonds, a US$600 million note issued by Tjiwi Kimia Finance Mauritius, just within a grace period of five business days. If Tjiwi Kimia had failed to meet the deadline, it would have triggered cross default clauses on a series of other bonds. The second coupon payment, of $13.5 million, for a US$200 million issue of guaranteed senior notes due in 2001, is now late. We expect APP to wait until the last possible moment to make the payment. The group is husbanding its cash in advance of an expected restructuring. The better its cash position is, the more APP will be able to operate from a position of strength in a restructuring negotiation. According to one source: APP is &signaling the market and its bond holders that it is in their best interest to help with a restructuring before everything collapse. The idea is to squeeze the bondholders now, while they still have some negotiating leverage rather than wait until there is nothing left.8 APP is trying to play off one set of bond holders against another because the interests of the bond holders in the operating companies, some of which have significant cash flow, is different from those in the parent. This is obviously a dangerous game, but one in which APP feels it has no choice but to engage. The earlier it can restructure the better of it will be, and the greater its chances of survival in some form. Trying to keep control of the situation so that it doesn,t unravel is the name of the game at this point. Tee and Widjaja are thinking quite far ahead and have targeted their non-core subsidiaries for disposal in a debt restructuring. They have been actively shopping their China assets for several months, and sources indicate that their packaging assets will also go on the block. APP is still hopeful, however, of engineering a debt restructuring so that it is on their terms. One of the issues that adds greatly to the complexity of the situation is that much of the sales from both companies come from within the group, and often these go via another APP company or Sinar Mas. Another source said, &This is a vertically integrated group and one of the worries is that if you start messing with the structure, let,s say one group of bond holders wants to wind up one of the subsidiaries that is a primary customer, you could threaten the whole group.8 The Wijayas are well regarded by foreign investors, and are not in the category of Suharto cronies such as forestry magnate Bob Hassan, who was sentenced this past week to two years in jail for financial wrongdoings and corruption. They are not saints ) the Indonesian government removed the Wijayas from the board of Bank Internasional Indonesia after it was nationalized in 1999, based on evidence that they exceeded the 30 percent cap for lending to affiliates. However, they depend heavily on international capital markets for funding and cannot afford significant steps that would bar future access. At the moment, they have few alternatives to raise cash to meet their debt payments other than through asset and inventory sales. The company has built up substantial paper inventory, and according to one source, it could use inventory sales to meet current cash obligations if it could find a buyer. This is a big if, however, since current prices are depressed and releasing further inventory to the market would only make matters worse. Asset Sales and Other Alternatives to Meet Debt Repayments: An executive from a major international pulp and paper company confirmed that APP was actively trying to sell its Chinese assets. These assets include: o PT Ekamas Fortuna o PT Purinusa Ekapersada o Ningbo Zhonghua Paper o Gold Hongye Paper o Gold Hai Paper (Kunshan) Co. o Jin Yu (Qingyuan) Tissue Paper Industry The executive said that his company had looked at attractive parts of the assets on offer, but had held back because of the impenetrable cross guarantees between companies and reluctance of their bankers to finance an acquisition at a discount that would offer no cover for their equity. The executive believed that all the banks would have to agree to asset sales in the context of a general restructuring before any individual bank would finance an acquisition. Yet another issue is that the financing of the China factories was based on access to Indonesian pulp at intra-company prices. Once the company is broken up into pieces, it will have to rely on the world market and will no longer be able to produce at a profit. Stora Enso made a formal bid for the assets last year but was rejected. It is said to remain interested although the price it is willing to pay will be considerably less. One of the problems with APP,s brinkmanship strategy is that it is lowering the value of its assets. Companies will not be willing to pay book value when it comes time for the company to sell off its non-core assets. Restructuring is imminent, creating opportunities for investors: o A restructuring of the company in the near term seems inevitable and will produce returns for existing bond holders if they bought at low enough prices and if their debt is secured by APP assets outside Indonesia o A restructuring will release some of APP,s assets, which are considered attractive except for those in Indonesia. APP is the world,s low cost producer of pulp and paper, with substantial assets in Indonesia, China, and India. Its Chinese factories are attractive despite current over-capacity in the domestic Chinese market. APP accounts for 20 percent of the Chinese market for printing and fine paper. o Some play is available from price volatility as APP continues to tease investors by keeping them guessing about its actual cash situation