4 Dec 2000, 10:36 UTC
New MSC Committee Report
- From
- Alan Comnes alan.comnes@enron.com
- Cc
- Paul Kaufman
- Bcc
- Paul Kaufman
- Date
- Mon, 4 Dec 2000 02:36:00 -0800 (PST)
All: I just downloaded the attached from the ISO's website. It is dated 12/1/00. To boil it down, the MSC comes down against "soft" caps and recommends the "get market-based rates in return for selling forward" proposal that the ISO staff is pushing. Forward contracts would need to at rates that "approximate" competitive prices. Based on my quick read that does not mean market prices; it means somthing more akin to cost of service. MSC also wants there to be a penalty on generators for underscheduling. They also claim there proposal will not exacerbate reliability problems. I would be interested in people's opinion if Enron should be responding to this report. Given the date of the report, I am not sure if/how the ISO would file this at the FERC. G. Alan Comnes (GAC) Here's the list of recommendations from the report. (1) The PX &must-buy8 requirement would become a &must-schedule8 requirement. IOUs would be required to schedule all forward energy through the PX, but would be free to purchase it from any source. (2) California generators and entities that sell to any California purchaser (not limited to the PX and ISO) could continue to be eligible for market-based rates (and would be free of refund obligations) only if they offer a substantial portion of their sales in the form of two-year contracts at rates that approximate competitive prices. The details of such a proposal are outlined in this report. The volume offered by sellers, in the aggregate, would be sufficient to cover the all three IOUs, residential and small commercial customer load using an average load profile for weekdays and weekends for each month. (3) Any market participant that does not offer these two-year market-power-mitigation forward contracts would be subject to cost-of-service rates for all of their sales of energy and ancillary services into the California market for at least the two-year market power mitigation period. (4) The CPUC would be encouraged to set a default rate for IOU residential and small commercial customers based on projected wholesale energy costs under the 2-year contracts described above. (5) The under-scheduling penalty should be even-handed. The MSC recommends a real-time trading charge that is applicable both to load and generation and, more important, does not distinguish between instructed and uninstructed deviations from schedule.