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29 May 2001, 10:16 UTC

Order Clarifying April 26, 2001 Order on MMP

From
Ray Alvarez ray.alvarez@enron.com
To
Tom Alonso, Robert Badeer, Tim Belden, Sean Crandall, michael.driscoll@enron.com, Mark Fisher, Mark Guzman, Tim Heizenrader, Chris Mallory, Susan J Mara, Matt Motley, Phillip Platter
and 6 more Jeff Richter, Diana Scholtes, Stephen Swain, Mike Swerzbin, Bill Williams III, Phillip K Allen
Cc
Steve Walton, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Leslie Lawner, Rebecca W Cantrell, Donna Fulton, Jeff Dasovich, Christi L Nicolay, James D Steffes, Jeffrey C. Alexander, Phillip K Allen, Linda J Noske
and 5 more Dave Perrino, Don Black, Robert Frank, Stephanie Miller, Barry Tycholiz
Bcc
Steve Walton, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Leslie Lawner, Rebecca W Cantrell, Donna Fulton, Jeff Dasovich, Christi L Nicolay, James D Steffes, Jeffrey C. Alexander, Phillip K Allen, Linda J Noske
and 5 more Dave Perrino, Don Black, Robert Frank, Stephanie Miller, Barry Tycholiz
Date
Tue, 29 May 2001 03:16:00 -0700 (PDT)
Late in the afternoon on Friday May 25, FERC issued an order providing 
clarification and preliminary guidance on implementation of the mitigation 
and monitoring plan for the California wholesale electric markets that it 
adopted on April 26. The order is limited to clarifying four critical issues 
prior to the Mitigation Plan's May 29 (today) effective date: (1) treatment 
of generators who did not supply heat and emission rates; (2) calculation of 
a natural gas proxy price; (3) price mitigation in the ISO's spot markets 
other than Imbalance Energy; and (4) creditworthiness.  The order does not 
resolve the rehearing requests, nor does it accept or reject the ISO's 
proposed tariff amendments for filing.  These pleadings are still under 
review and FERC will address them in a separate order.  

Treatment of Generators Who Did Not Supply Heat and Emission Rates

FERC accepts the ISO,s proposal for generating units within California 
(including non-public utility generating units) that have not supplied heat 
and emission rates in compliance with the April 26 Order:

For the generating units that have not provided the requisite data or whose 
data the ISO believes to be inadequate, the ISO will use data from a viable 
alternative source (e.g., either current or pre-existing Reliability Must-Run 
Contracts).  If an alternative source of data does not exist and the 
generating unit continues to refuse to supply the requisite information, the 
ISO will treat the non-compliant generators as price-takers, i.e., the ISO 
will assume a $0/MWh bid for all available capacity from these units.  These 
generators, if dispatched, will be paid the market clearing price.  

The FERC finds that to the extent a non-compliant seller does not wish to be 
treated as a price-taker, the ISO's approach will provide such entities with 
an incentive to provide the ISO and the Commission with the requisite data.

Calculation of a Natural Gas Proxy Price

FERC rejects the ISO proposal to calculate a proxy natural gas cost based 
upon the simple average of Gas Daily index prices for Malin, PG&E CityGate, 
and Southern California Border (Kern River Station).  The ISO is directed to 
calculate the natural gas proxy price using the published daily prices for 
Malin, PG&E CityGate, Southern California Border (Kern River Station), 
SoCalGas large packages, and PG&E large packages.  The Commission will 
consider whether any changes should be made to the California delivery points 
during rehearing of the April 26 Order.      

Price Mitigation in the ISO's Spot Markets other than Imbalance Energy

The FERC finds that the ISO erred in its interpretation- that it does not 
intend to apply any price mitigation to its Ancillary Services spot markets 
or Adjustment Bids. The April 26 Order did not explicitly address the issue 
of price mitigation in any market other than that for Imbalance Energy, the 
order nonetheless noted that "this proceeding was established . . . to 
address whether a price mitigation plan was needed to replace the $150/MWh 
breakpoint methodology."  The $150/MWh breakpoint methodology applied to the 
ISO's Ancillary Services markets.  Therefore, the ISO must replace the 
$150/MWh breakpoint methodology in those markets with the superseding 
methodology adopted in the April 26 Order.  The Commission further clarifies 
that the April 26 Order did not replace the ISO's current methodology for 
mitigating Adjustment Bid prices.

With respect to calculating the market clearing price for Ancillary Services, 
FERC directs the ISO to use each relevant average hourly mitigated Imbalance 
Energy price.  If the Ancillary Services markets clear below the average 
hourly mitigated Imbalance Energy price for that hour, then the ISO will pay 
the Ancillary Services clearing price for that market.  If the Ancillary 
Services markets clear above the average hourly mitigated Imbalance Energy 
price, then the ISO will use that price to clear the market and will pay 
as-bid for all Ancillary Services that are needed above the mitigated price.  
Bids accepted above the mitigated price will be subject to refund and 
justification.  

Creditworthiness

As of May 29, 2001, FERC expects the ISO to ensure the presence of a 
creditworthy buyer for all transactions made with all generators who offer 
power in compliance with the must-offer requirement in the Mitigation Plan. 


 - EL00-95.1.WPD