1 Aug 2000, 13:25 UTC
(no subject)
- From
- Linda L Lawrence linda.lawrence@enron.com
- Date
- Tue, 1 Aug 2000 06:25:00 -0700 (PDT)
Per Mr. Steven Kean, of Enron Corp. please see below ( Appendix C - Order 888
"Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission
Dominance).
APPENDIX C
Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission Dominance
I. Examples From Proceedings Before Administrative Law Judges
These are examples of allegations that various public
utilities have refused to provide comparable service, either
through refusals to wheel, dilatory tactics that so protracted
negotiations as to effectively deny wheeling, refusals to provide
service priority equal to native load, or refusals to provide
service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own use.
A. American Electric Power Service Corp. (AEP)
In 1993, AEP filed, on behalf of its public utility
associate companies, an open access tariff that offered only firm
point-to-point service with very limited flexibility. It did not
offer network service, flexible point-to-point service, or non-
firm service. Thus, it did not provide customers with the same
flexibility that AEP itself has. Nor did it provide a service
priority equivalent to that enjoyed by native load. The
Commission set AEP's tariff for hearing and, on rehearing, held
that in order not to be unduly discriminatory, the tariff had to
offer comparable service. American Electric Power Service Corp.,
64 FERC 4 61,279 (1993), reh'g, 67 FERC 4 61,168 (1994).
At hearing, Raj Rao of Indiana Michigan Power Agency (IMPA)
(Ex. IMPA-1, Feb 23, 1994) and Kenneth Hegemann of American
Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. (AMP-Ohio) (Ex. AMPO-1, Feb 23, 1994),
both senior management officials, testified concerning AEP's
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alleged discriminatory practices. 1/ AMP-Ohio is an
association of municipalities in Ohio, some of whose members
depend on AEP for transmission and partial requirements service.
IMPA is an association of municipalities in Indiana, and many of
IMPA's loads are captive to the AEP transmission system. The
witnesses alleged as follows:
1. In anticipation of high peak demands, AEP would
contract for large blocks of available short-term power,
withhold sale of short-term power, refuse to transmit third
party short-term power, and require purchases from AEP at
the emergency rate (100 mill/kwh) when an emergency might
not exist. Ex. AMPO-1 at 6.
2. In December 1989, AMP-Ohio negotiated a 20 MW
purchase of short-term power from Louisville Gas & Electric
Company (LG&E). AEP refused to wheel because LG&E had
earlier that day told AEP it had no power to sell to AEP.
AEP then bought the power from LG&E and offered to resell it
to AMP-Ohio. Ex. AMPO-1 at 6-7.
3. In January 1990, AMP-Ohio solicited bids for
February power purchases from a number of utilities
including AEP. AEP was not the winning bid. AMP-Ohio made
arrangements to purchase the power from four winning bidders
and sought transmission through AEP. When AMP-Ohio gave AEP
1/ After the Rehearing Order expanding the scope of the
proceeding, AMP-Ohio and IMPA withdrew this testimony as no
longer necessary. This withdrawal does not change the fact
that the testimony was sworn to under oath.
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the schedule for delivery, AEP refused to transmit the
power, matched the average price of the winning bids, and
made the sale itself. Ex. AMPO-1 at 7.
4. In August 1993, an AMP-Ohio member (Columbus, Ohio)
was purchasing 10 MW of hourly non-displacement power from
AEP and, after AEP raised its price to 60 mills/kwh, sought
another source for the next hour. Consumers Power Company
and Detroit Edison Company both offered non-displacement
power at 40 mills. AEP refused to transmit, saying it had a
600 MW unit out and could not resell power from another
source. 2/ Columbus cancelled the transaction and had to
buy 10 MW of power from AEP at 100 mills/kwh. Ex. AMPO-1 at
7-8.
5. In July 1993, two AMP-Ohio members (Columbus and
St. Mary's) had been buying hourly non-displacement power
from AEP when the price rose to 35 mills. Dayton Power &
Light Company (DP&L) offered to sell at 23 mills and AEP
agreed to transmit for one hour. But for the next hour, AEP
said it had problems with its system, refused to transmit
the power, kept the power from DP&L for itself and offered
to sell power to AMP-Ohio for Columbus and St. Mary's at 100
2/ AEP generally limited its offer of short-term transmission
to buy/sell transactions; that is, AEP would buy the power
from the seller and resell it to the purchaser.
Supplemental testimony of AEP Witness Baker (Ex. A-73) at
27-29. Often, the terms of the buy/sell transaction
required transmission dependent utilities (TDUs) to maintain
reserves and meet contractual commitments for at least a
year. Id.
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mills. Columbus increased its local generation, but St.
Mary's purchased 8 MW at 100 mills. For the next hour, AMP-
Ohio arranged with DP&L for another 8 MW, hoping AEP would
transmit under the 24 hour buy-sell agreement. AEP did
transmit this power. Seven hours later in the day, St.
Mary's Greenup Hydro project power was available and the 8
MW from DP&L was no longer needed. If St. Mary's had been
receiving the hourly power that AEP had refused to transmit,
St. Mary's could have switched to Greenup power. But
because AMP-Ohio had changed to daily service, St. Mary's
had to pay a demand charge for the entire day, even though
it used the power only 7 hours and would have paid less
under the hourly rate. Ex. AMPO-1 at 8-9.
6. In January 1994, AMP-Ohio sought to transfer power
from one member with generation to other members, which
required transmission over AEP and Toledo Edison lines.
Toledo Edison said yes, AEP said no. AMP-Ohio's northern
members purchased emergency power from Toledo Edison. AMP-
Ohio then reminded AEP that it had agreed not to deny
transmission and AEP agreed to transmit. Ex. AMPO-1 at 9.
7. IMPA arranged to buy 80 MW of short-term power from
LG&E and have it wheeled, using buy-sell arrangements,
through Public Service Company of Indiana (PSI) and AEP to
serve IMPA's load at Richmond (an IMPA member). The
delivered price was $.292 per kW-day plus a 1 mill adder.
At the same time AEP arranged to buy 300 MW from PSI at $.30
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per kW day plus out-of-pocket energy costs. Hence, PSI was
shipping a total of 380 MW to AEP with 80 MW of that amount
to be delivered to IMPA's load at Richmond. Then, on a day
when IMPA should have received the 80 MW, AEP told IMPA that
PSI had sold everything to AEP and that IMPA would have to
buy from AEP at $.63 per kW day plus the cost of energy from
AEP. IMPA purchased from AEP under protest. AEP used its
control over transmission to intercept the 80 MW at a lower
price and resell it as short-term power to IMPA. AEP
claimed that PSI had terminated its sales to AEP on that
day. But the 80 MW was independent of PSI's other sales to
AEP and would not have been interrupted if AEP had not
interrupted it. IMPA-1 at 7.
8. IMPA has combustion turbines owned by and located
at one member, which IMPA would like to connect to the Joint
Transmission System owned by IMPA, CINergy and Wabash Valley
Power Association. To do so, IMPA needed a metering
agreement with AEP, to which AEP would not agree. IMPA-1 at
6.
9. In January 1994, IMPA had power to sell from its
turbines when AEP and others needed power. IMPA offered
power to AEP but AEP it said could not purchase the power
without an existing contract. Moreover, since there was no
short-term tariff, IMPA could not sell the power to another
utility. IMPA-1 at 6.
10. Another example of the utility engaging in
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dilatory tactics that raised the customer's transaction
costs and effectively denied transmission is the "sham
transaction" provision proposed by AEP. As filed, AEP's
tariffs permitted it to deny service merely because a
portion of the transmitted power might be used to serve a
former retail customer of AEP. See, e.g., Ex. BR&WVP-1 (J.
Bertram Solomon testimony, February 23, 1994). (As part of
a settlement AEP filed the pro forma tariff and withdrew
this provision.)
11. Finally, AEP's originally filed tariff contained a
"prodigal customer" provision. Under this provision,
transmission customers who sought to convert back to
requirements service had to give AEP five years' notice, in
which case AEP and the customer would enter into
negotiations to determine whether AEP will provide service
at all and if so under what rate, terms, and conditions.
Ex. S-39 at 1 (Staff testimony). AEP did not require notice
from all new customers, only from prodigal customers. Id.
at 2. That a potential customer was previously served by
AEP is not a reason to treat the customer differently. (AEP
withdrew this provision when it filed the pro forma tariff.)
B. Entergy Services, Inc. (Entergy)
Entergy filed a partial settlement largely adopting the NOPR
pro forma tariffs except for two provisions (headroom and
ancillary services). Because the settlement predated the filing
date for customer testimony before the ALJ, the customers did not
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address the need for Entergy to file a tariff. However,
customers did make allegations of discriminatory practices, as
follows.
1. Customers alleged that Entergy flat-out refused to
wheel. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority (LEPA) witness
Sylvan J. Richard testified that LEPA's predecessor systems
could not obtain interconnections from Entergy. Ex. SJR-1
at 50.
2. Customers also alleged that Entergy refused to
provide service priority equal to native load and refused to
provide service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own
use. For example, LEPA witness Richard testified that even
after state commissions ordered interconnections and other
coordination services, LEPA's predecessors were still not
able to obtain coordination services because Entergy was not
willing to coordinate and because the transmission service
it did offer was inflexible, unidirectional point-to-point
service, which prevented economic coordination with others.
Id. at 50-51.
3. South Mississippi Electric Power Association
(SMEPA) witness J. Bertram Solomon testified that Entergy's
original "open access" tariff was restricted to point-to-
point service, proposed separate charges for each operating
company, and required the cancellation of existing
agreements in order to take service under the proposed
tariff. Ex. SMEPA-10 at 28. Entergy eventually filed a
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network tariff, but proposed different local facilities
charges for the various Entergy public utility operating
subsidiaries. Id. at 29. Since these local facilities
charges were higher than the transmission component of the
subsidiaries' bundled rates, Entergy obtained a competitive
advantage. Id.
4. The Arkansas Cities and Cooperatives (ACC) is a
group of cities and cooperatives that own or operate
electric generation or distribution systems in Arkansas.
ACC Witness Steven Merchant testified that Entergy has
segregated the wholesale market between two of its
subsidiaries, Arkansas Power & Light Copmpany (APL) and
Entergy Power, Inc. (EPI). Ex. SMM-1 at 16. In marketing
power and energy in Arkansas, EPI is subject to an Arkansas
Commission order that bars EPI from competing with APL for
wholesale loads without first obtaining a waiver. Id.
Recently, EPI requested this waiver for all wholesale
transactions in Arkansas except for wholesale customers
currently served by an Entergy subsidiary; in other words,
EPI requested the Arkansas Commission to expand competition
for all wholesale customers except where EPI might compete
with APL. Id. ACC witness Merchant concluded that, since
EPI does not compete with APL, Entergy insulates APL's
wholesale business from competition and denies those
wholesale customers access to EPI as a source of power,
thereby limiting alternative generation sources available to
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ACC. Id. at 17-19. (Entergy's witness Kenney stated that
Entergy has recently filed a joint motion with ACC to the
Arkansas Commission seeking to extend the waiver and permit
EPI to sell to APL's wholesale customers. Ex. JFK-11 at 14-
15.)
C. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E)
Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) attached several
documents to its 1988 complaint in Docket No. EL89-4. These
documents were provided to support NCPA's claim that PG&E's
unreasonable practices under the PG&E/NCPA Interconnection
Agreement (IA) effectively denied NCPA access to transmission
properly requested under the IA. Although the parties eventually
settled and the Commission terminated the docket with a letter
order dated May 18, 1988, these documents provide allegations of
PG&E using dilatory tactics that so protracted negotiations as to
effectively equal a refusal to wheel. 3/
1. PG&E stated that since transmission was not
currently available, it was entitled to wait 72 months
before providing transmission; that is, transmission access
could not be granted before the passing of the 72-month
notice period. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 3. However, the IA
3/ All of these incidents are related to and examples of PG&E's
conduct described in the NOPR (FERC Stats. & Regs. 4 32,514
at 33,073 n.151), that is, the history of PG&E's attempt to
avoid its commitments made to the California owners of the
California Oregon Transmission Project (COTP). However,
these incidents are not exactly the same as the incidents
described in the NOPR, because NCPA is not one of the owners
of the COTP.
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provided that transmission be provided when it becomes
actually available. PG&E also requested substantial
additional information, which NCPA considered beyond that
reasonably necessary for a study, but still provided. PG&E
then determined that transmission was not available,
reasoning that transmission was unavailable unless all the
transmission requested could be provided 8760 hours per year
without restrictions or limitations, extending through the
expiration of the agreement in 2013. NCPA 1988 Complaint at
9.
2. On November 27, 1987, NCPA made a new transmission
request to PG&E, seeking 50 MW of bi-directional
transmission at Midway. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 5. On
January 28, 1988, PG&E filed an interconnection agreement
with Turlock Irrigation District (TID) that provided TID
with 50 MW of bi-directional transmission at Midway.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 42 FERC 4 61,406, order on
reh'g, 43 FERC 4 61,403 (1988). On February 22, 1988, PG&E
advised NCPA that all firm transmission service available at
Midway had been fully subscribed. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex.
6. Then, on March 29, 1988, PG&E filed with the Commission
an interconnection agreement with Modesto Irrigation
District (MID), that provided MID with 50 MW of bi-
directional transmission at Midway. Pacific Gas & Electric
Company, 44 FERC 4 61,010 (1988). At about the same time
(in the last week in March 1988), PG&E advised NCPA that the
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allocations of transmission to TID, MID, and others,
including a not yet finalized allocation to Sacramento
Municipality Utility District, had used all the transmission
available at Midway. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Exs. 7 and 8.
D. Northeast Utilities Service Company (NU)
This is the case where Northeast Utilities acquired Public
Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) (Docket No. EC90-10). New
England Power Company (NEP) witness Robert Bigelow's direct
testimony expressed concern over the "relatively restrictive
transmission policies of both" NU, on behalf of Northeast
Utilities' public utility subsidiaries, and PSNH. Bigelow Direct
Testimony at 21 (filed May 25, 1990). In his cross rebuttal
testimony, Mr. Bigelow testified that "NU has a poor track record
as a provider of transmission service" and "PSNH also has an
abhorrent track record as a provider of transmission services."
Bigelow Cross Rebuttal Testimony, at 3 (filed June 20, 1990).
Mr. Bigelow described both NU's and NEP's (his own company)
failure to provide service flexibility equivalent to their own
use. Except for NEP's TDUs, both NEP and NU historically
provided only point-to-point transmission, which required
separate scheduling for each transaction. Bigelow Cross Rebuttal
at 4.
E. Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and
Electric Company
The evidence in this merger proceeding (Docket No. EC89-5)
included testimony from a number of witnesses describing
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instances of Edison's conduct. Richard Greenwalt was the power
supply supervisor for the City of Riverside, California. He was
responsible for scheduling all purchases of energy for Riverside
and for the cities of Azusa, Banning and Colton, California.
Greenwalt testimony at 1 (November 1989). (These four cities and
Anaheim, California, are collectively referred to as the Southern
Cities or Cities.) Joseph Hsu was the Director of Utilities for
Azusa. Hsu testimony at 1 (November 1989). Gale Drews was the
electric utility director of Colton. Drews testimony at 1-2
(November 1989). Bill Carnahan was the director for Riverside.
Carnahan testimony at 1 (November 1989). Gordon Hoyt was the
general manager of the Anaheim power department. Hoyt testimony
at 1 (November 1989). Dan McCann was the power coordination
supervisor for Anaheim. He supervised Anaheim's load scheduling
and is a former Edison employee, having worked for Edison for 20
years. McCann Testimony at 1-2 (November 1989). These witnesses
testified that Edison refused to wheel as follows.
1. Edison's policy was to curtail the Cities any time
it could be justified using any of a list of acceptable
reasons to deny interruptible transmission service. Id. at
22-23.
2. Edison would not generally provide transmission
service when Edison could save money by itself purchasing
the economy energy that would be wheeled. McCann testimony
at 19. The Cities called Edison every hour to request
interruptible transmission service. Id.. Edison often
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refused to sell energy available in the Western Systems
Power Pool to the Cities and then made available higher cost
contract energy or partial requirements service. Id. at 19-
20.
3. When Anaheim requested Edison provide firm
transmission of power from neighboring states, Edison would
often agree to provide non-firm service but would not
integrate the capacity for many years in the future, saying
that its control area did not need capacity at that time.
Hoyt testimony at 9. Since the selling utility was
interested in a sale of capacity, not just energy, the
transaction would not occur. Id. Edison repeatedly used
its control over transmission to deny Anaheim access to low-
cost firm power. Id. at 9-10.
4. While Edison provided short-term firm transmission
service to the Cities, it would only provide long-term firm
service for three specific resources: the SONGS nuclear
plant, a specific IPP, and Hoover Dam power. Hoyt testimony
at 20. One of Edison's reasons for denying long-term
transmission was that Edison desired to reserve the
transmission for its own future (unspecified) needs. Id.
5. In the 1970s, Edison refused to allow the Cities
access to the Pacific Intertie. Hoyt testimony at 21; Drews
testimony at 7-8.
6. In 1988, Edison refused to provide transmission
service for a Cities power purchase from Public Service
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Company of New Mexico (PSNM) from Palo Verde Nuclear
station. Hoyt testimony at 21.
7. Edison has refused to provide requested firm
transmission from
- California-Oregon border to Midway Station
- Nevada-Oregon Border to Sylmar Substation
- Palo Verde Switchyard to Vista
- SONGS Switchyard to Vista.
Carnahan testimony at 15.
8. Riverside requested transmission from Palo Verde
and was told that such service was not available. Carnahan
testimony at 16. Edison offered Riverside only 12 MW of
curtailable transmission entitlement to provide Riverside's
share of Palo Verde. Id. This service was neither large
enough or long enough, and Edison insisted on
unreasonable terms and conditions. Id.
9. Azusa, Banning and Colton had a contract with
Edison that entitled them to use their Palo Verde firm
transmission path to schedule energy to meet their contract
energy obligation. Edison refused to permit the three
cities to use that path. Edison did not contest that the
contracts allowed this use, but said that the scheduling of
such small amounts of energy for the three cities would be
too burdensome. Greenwalt testimony at 14.
10. Edison would not respond in a timely manner to the
Cities' requests, routinely taking months to respond. Drews
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testimony at 15.
11. During the 1980s, Edison provided Colton with some
transmission service to allow the Cities to reach certain
suppliers, but limited the choices available to the Cities
and imposed terms and conditions that increased the Cities'
costs and placed Colton at a disadvantage against Edison.
Drews testimony at 9. Arranging alternative generation
sources was difficult because the Cities always had to first
get Edison to state whether it would provide transmission.
12. During 1988 and 1989, a dispute arose between
Edison and the Cities concerning the Hoover Uprating
Project. Drews testimony at 16. Edison argued that for the
months when units were out of service for uprating, and
Southern Cities capacity was reduced to zero, Southern
Cities would not receive an energy credit, even though
energy was still available and used by Edison. But the
contracts allowed a participant who did not have capacity to
still schedule its energy as non-firm energy on the capacity
of another participant. Id. at 16-17.
13. In 1986, Azusa negotiated a power purchase
contract with the California Department of Water Resources
in increments of first 5 MW and then 2 MW (for a total of 7
MW). Hsu testimony at 14. First Edison assured Azusa that
the transmission for the additional 2 MW would not be a
problem. Id. Then Edison would not agree to amend the
transmission service agreement for the additional 2 MW. Id.
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14. In 1986, Azusa notified Edison of Special
Condition 12 4/ purchases from PG&E and requested firm
transmission service. Id. Two months before service was to
begin, Edison notified the Cities of a problem with the
transmission lines. Id. Transmission was eventually
granted, but only after a four-month delay and substantial
losses to the Cities. Id. Then Edison decided there was no
problem with its transmission facilities. Id. at 14-15.
15. In 1986-87, the Cities purchased 20 MW from PG&E
and 80 MW from Deseret G&T Cooperative. Hoyt testimony at
7-8. Edison stated that without reinforcement of its
transmission system, Edison would not provide the
transmission. Id. There was a five-month delay during
which the Cities were forced to purchase from Edison at a
higher cost. Id. at 8-9. Then Edison decided that the
transmission system did not need reinforcement. Id. at 8.
16. Edison also refused to provide a service priority
equal to that of native load. It would curtail the Cities
in order to purchase more economy energy for itself. McCann
testimony at 28. If Edison could make the purchase, it
would curtail the City and use the energy for itself. Id.
When Edison curtailed the Cities, they were not able to
4/ Special Condition 12 of the Integrated Operations Agreement
between Edison and the Southern Cities defined certain
Special Condition 12 resources and allowed the Cities to
make certain uses of those resources, subject to certain
restrictions.
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purchase economy energy and instead purchased energy from
Edison. Id. at 24.
17. According to Edison, the interruptible
transmission it provided the Cities was interruptible for
any reason. Id. at 20. A purchase could be terminated the
hour after it is begun or even during the hour. Id. As a
result, the Cities lost opportunities to make advantageous
economy purchases. Id. at 20-21.
18. Edison also refused to provide customers
flexibility similar to the flexibility Edison provided
itself. Edison's refusal to provide bi-directional
transmission service restricted the Cities' abilities to
purchase hydroelectric energy from the Pacific Northwest.
Hoyt testimony at 22. Because most contracts with Northwest
utilities require a return of power, the Northwest utilities
would not deal with the Cities without transmission to
return energy. Id. at 22-23. Edison did provide bi-
directional transmission to the Los Angeles Department of
Water & Power (LADWP) to accommodate flows to and from
Arizona. Id.
19. Riverside was unable to obtain non-firm service
more than two hours in advance of need. Carnahan testimony
at 18.
20. Riverside and Colton were both served out of
Edison's Vista substation. Although the two cities were on
the same 69 kV bus, Edison would not allow them to sell
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energy to each other. Greenwalt testimony at 17.
21. Riverside's agreement with Edison allowed
Riverside to purchase a block of energy through the WSPP and
divide it up among the four Cities (Azusa, Banning, Colton
and Riverside). Greenwalt testimony at 17. When Riverside
had excess energy from other sources, Edison would not
permit it to sell that energy to the other three cities.
Id. For example, Riverside attempted to sell Deseret energy
transmitted by LADWP to the Edison system. Id. at 17-18.
LADWP would not break out the Cities' shares of that energy,
and Edison would not accept the energy as a delivery for all
four cities. Id. at 18. Edison argued that because this
energy was excess energy that Riverside could not use,
Riverside did not have transmission rights to bring it into
the control area. Id. As a result, Riverside paid for the
energy delivered by LADWP to the Edison control area, but
could not sell it to the other three cities, and gave it to
Edison itself, which consumed the energy without making any
payment for it. Id. Riverside tried a number of
alternative paths, including using WSPP transmission where
Riverside paid Edison 5 mills to connect to Azusa, 5 mills
to connect to Banning, and 5 mills to connect to Colton for
each megawatthour. While this approach was successful for a
while, eventually Edison refused to permit these sales.
22. Edison claimed that the Cities only have
transmission rights to bring in enough Special Condition 12
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energy to satisfy the Cities' load. Greenwalt testimony at
18.
23. Edison contended that the Cities' load
requirements were satisfied first by integrated resources
and then by Special Condition 12 and economy energy
purchases. Id. at 19. When the Cities' integrated
resources exceeded their load, any Special Condition 12
resources became excess. Under Riverside's Deseret
contract, the Cities were required to take a minimum of 35
MW each hour. Id. Edison acknowledged that it was
obligated to buy, or allow the Cities to sell, any excess
energy from Riverside's integrated resources. Id. However,
Edison refused to give the Cities credit for excess Special
Condition 12 energy brought into the area, claiming that the
Cities could not have brought it in because they did not
have transmission rights. Id.
II. Other Examples of Transmission Disputes
Disputes over transmission are not uncommon, contrary to
EEI's suggestion. Some recent examples taken from pleadings and
other documents and from Commission orders reveal that it has
been very difficult for various entities in the electric power
industry to agree on transmission rights. These examples also
reveal that even after issuance of AEP and the Open Access NOPR
with its proposed pro forma tariffs, there has been considerable
controversy over whether various utilities' "open access" tariffs
deviate from those tariffs. (The Commission has allowed
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utilities that adopt tariffs that match or exceed the non-rate
terms and conditions in the NOPR pro forma tariffs to obtain
certain benefits.)
A. In a letter of February 3, 1995 to Mr. Gerald
Richman of the Commission's Enforcement section in the
Office of the General Counsel, Steven J. Kean, Vice
President, Regulatory Affairs, Enron Power Marketing, Inc.
(Enron) alleged that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NiMo)
refused to wheel power from Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E)
to Enron under RG&E's transmission contract with NiMo;
however, when Enron revealed the buyer, NiMo did wheel power
for RG&E to the buyer. Mr. Kean alleged that this was not
an isolated incident. NiMo argued that the contract did not
require it to provide RG&E with transmission to Enron. It
also said that the principle of comparability does not
require the service. Letter of November 21, 1994 from NiMo
representative A. Karen Hill to Gerald Richman.
B. The Commission's Task Force Hot Line (Hot
Line) received a complaint that a member of the New
York Power Pool (NYPP) refused to transmit power that
another member bought from a power marketer. In a
letter of November 17, 1994, from Chair Moler to Mr.
William J. Balet, Executive Director of NYPP, Chair
Moler explained that the Commission's enforcement staff
had investigated and found the allegation to be true.
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C. In Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency
v. Northern States Power Company (Minnesota), 73 FERC 4
61,350 (1995), NSP and SMMPA had a contract under which
NSP agreed to provide transmission service. However,
the parties had numerous disputes over the service.
The Commission found that NSP had misinterpreted the
contract in several ways. For, example, SMMPA argued
that it should be able to directly schedule its
deliveries of energy out of the NSP control area and
that it should not be limited to particular points of
delivery. NSP argued that only it was entitled to
control the physical operation of scheduling. The
Commission found that the clear language of the
contracts gave SMMPA the authority to schedule its own
power.
D. Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, 72 FERC 4 61,223
(1995), involved MAPP's membership criteria, which made it
impossible for a power marketer to join MAPP and obtain the
benefits of certain transmission services available only to
MAPP members. The Commission found that the membership
criteria may be unreasonable, particularly since there may
be less burdensome ways of setting up membership criteria
for non-traditional entities.
,