18 Nov 1999, 10:53 UTC
Re: Enron OnLine/Credit Derivatives
- From
- Paul Simons paul.simons@enron.com
- Date
- Thu, 18 Nov 1999 02:53:00 -0800 (PST)
Louise - thanks for forwarding. Preliminary response as follows (I will need to follow up with Sanjev at Slaughter and May who is co-ordinating the European side): 1. Regulation We agree with the analysis. Securities laws will not be relevant. Insurance is likey to be the main issue. If it emerges from our legal review of the relevant countries that we can avoid the insurance point by making our contracts look like derivatives (swaps/options) that will determine whether the CFTC (commodity) regulations will be relevant. For this reason, it makes sense to complete the survey before drafting the confirms (which in any event will be fairly simple). Note, though, that we will not be using ISDA documentation, since it is unnecessarily complex for the product contemplated (described below) and using the GTCs approach will tie in more neatly with OnLine. Of course we will also need to look at local regulation in each target jurisdiction. SFA, for example, are taking an increased interest in the internet and have recently released a detailed questionnaire which we may need to complete before launch. 2. The Product From my most recent discussions with Bryan, the product will be a simple Bankruptcy only, digital payout. That is, if the reference entity goes bankrupt (probably as defined under the laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation - local counsel will need to draft in each case) the protection seller will pay the buyer a fixed, pre-agreed sum of money (not determined by reference to the value of a bond or anything else). 3. Bankruptcy Please see 2 above. Also note that we are looking for a harder (more certain) definition of bankruptcy which will be relatively easy to ascertain in each case. Early warning type events will probably be out and court based or other formal proceedings which are readily verifiable will be in. In practice, this will make it harder for the buyer to claim than under the ISDA definition (for example) which is a far softer and more sensitive trigger. 4. Confidentiality Ken also raised this important point when we spoke yesterday. There are issues of confidentiality which will be relevant. While as a matter of UK regulation, a Chinese Wall/Restricted List procedure will not be required (since no securities will be involved), contractual duties of confidentiality will need to be considered. The issue is perhaps more a commercial one - We will need to think carefully about the impact our public betting on the bankruptcy of our counterparties will or might have on our business relationships with them. I'll come back with a "legal game plan" once Bryan, Sanjev and I have got together. Best regards Paul
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
Louise Kitchen 11/17/99 10:27 PM To: Paul Simons/LON/ECT@ECT, John Sherriff/LON/ECT@ECT, Bryan Seyfried/LON/ECT@ECT cc: Mark Taylor/HOU/ECT@ECT Subject: Enron OnLine/Credit Derivatives FYI ---------------------- Forwarded by Louise Kitchen/LON/ECT on 17/11/99 22:26 --------------------------- Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. From: "David Gilberg" <GILBERGD@sullcrom.com> 17/11/99 20:06 To: Mark Taylor/HOU/ECT@ECT cc: lkitchen@enron.co.uk, RAISLERK@sullcrom.com (bcc: Louise Kitchen/LON/ECT) Subject: Enron OnLine/Credit Derivatives Following up on our discussion yesterday, this is to summarize the issues and questions that we identified with respect to the trading of credit derivatives through Enron OnLine: 1. The proposal needs to be analyzed more closely from the perspective of three principal regulatory schemes - securities, commodities and insurance. If the credit derivatives are not priced on the basis of or indexed to securities, there should not be any significant securities law issues. With respect to the Commodity Exchange Act, if the derivatives are executed as swaps, they will need to satisfy the CFTC's swap exemption and, if executed as options, they will need to satisfy the trade option exemption. With respect to insurance, there could be an issue as to whether the credit derivatives constitute insurance. This determination as well will depend largely on how the derivatives are structured. For example, how will payment amounts be determined and will payments be tied to losses actually experienced by a counterparty? 2. As a result of the foregoing, it will be necessary to obtain more details regarding the structure of the proposed transactions. Will they be swaps or options? What will the precise terms be (and are there any draft forms of confirms that can be reviewed)? 3. It will also be necessary to determine how bankruptcy events will be defined. This approach is clearly simpler than other forms of credit derivatives that include a variety of triggers (such as those based on defaults under loans, derivatives, securities or other instruments), because bankruptcy should generally be a public and objective event. However, in many jurisdictions, it is possible for third parties to cause an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding to be commenced and even frivolous proceedings can be commenced and maintained for some period. Presumably the definition that is used will need to provide for some period in which the proceeding might be dismissed. Also, the definition will need to take into account the possibility of non-US bankruptcy proceedings. 4. We also should obtain more information on the manner in which the derivatives will be priced and the manner in which such prices will be published or disseminated to clients. This goes to the issue of whether Enron could be found to have breached some duty to a third party or whether that party may have a claim against Enron on some other basis. For example, it is possible that an entity whose "name" is included in the list of those on which derivatives are written will claim that Enron improperly used confidential information that it received about that party through a trading relationship in pricing derivatives on its credit. In addition, such "name" might claim that Enron caused it injury by publishing a price for derivatives on its credit that reflected a weaker credit rating than was warranted. That party might claim that, by publishing such price, Enron caused other parties to suspend trading with it, to declare defaults or to demand collateral. This obviously is not generally a problem with credit derivatives because they are done privately on a one-to-one basis. Please call us if you have any questions or would like to discuss these or other issues further. Best regards. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.