19 May 2000, 23:47 UTC
Rebuttal Testimony
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Attached please find, in ASCII text format, the Rebuttal Testimony of R.
Thomas Beach on behalf of the Indicated Electric Generators.
Please contact me if you have any questions.
Christa Goldblatt
Office Manager
Crossborder Energy
christag@crossborderenergy.com
510-649-9790
"There is hope, but not for us." -- Franz Kafka
- att1.htm
Exhibit No. 18
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to )
Consider the Costs and Benefits of Various Promising )
Revisions to the Regulatory and Market Structure ) I. 99-07-003
Governing California's Natural Gas Industry and to )
Report to the California Legislature on the )
Commission's Findings. )
)
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF R. THOMAS BEACH
ON BEHALF OF INDICATED ELECTRIC GENERATORS
IN SUPPORT OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
R. Thomas Beach
Principal
Crossborder Energy
2560 Ninth Street, Suite 316
Berkeley, California 94710
Telephone: 510-649-9790
Facsimile: 510-649-9793
E-mail: tomb@crossborderenergy.com
On behalf of
Indicated Electric Generators
May 5, 2000, Subject Index
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
SCGC / TURN EXAGGERATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PG&E AND
SOCALGAS SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
The Commission Should Focus on a Statewide, Consistent Structure for the
Gas Utilities
Moving Forward, Not on Whether PG&E and SoCalGas Have Had Similar
Problems in the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
SoCalGas' Backbone System Serves the Same Function as PG&E's, and Can Be
Unbundled in a Manner Similar to the PG&E Gas Accord .3
The Benefits of the Gas Accord's City-Gate Market Have Been Substantial
for Electric
Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Customers Have Not Had to Hold Capacity or Pay Demand Charges to Realize
These
Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
SCGC'S AND TURN'S COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION UNBUNDLING
IGNORES THE BENEFITS AND OVERSTATES THE COSTS . . . . . . .4
SCGC / TURN Fail to Recognize the Benefits of Transmission Unbundling4
Unbundling will provide competitive benefits in the city-gate
market4
The Comprehensive Settlement reduces rates for EG customers6
The Comprehensive Settlement reduces risks for EG customers6
SCGC / TURN Greatly Overstate the Impact of Demand Charges.7
, BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Investigation on the Commission's Own Motion to )
Consider the Costs and Benefits of Various Promising )
Revisions to the Regulatory and Market Structure ) I. 99-07-003
Governing California's Natural Gas Industry and to )
Report to the California Legislature on the )
Commission's Findings. )
)
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF R. THOMAS BEACH
ON BEHALF OF INDICATED ELECTRIC GENERATORS
IN SUPPORT OF
THE COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
My name is R. Thomas Beach. I am principal consultant with the firm
Crossborder
Energy. My business address is 2560 Ninth Street, Suite 316, Berkeley,
California 94710. My
experience and qualifications are described in Attachment RTB-1 to the direct
testimony that I
served in this proceeding on May 4, 2000.
I. INTRODUCTION
This rebuttal testimony responds to the direct testimony of the Southern
California
Generation Coalition (SCGC) and The Utility Reform Network (TURN) in support
of their "Post-
Interim Settlement Agreement" (PISA), which was submitted to the Commission
on April 3,
2000. The sponsors of this rebuttal testimony include past, present, and
future electric generation
customers of the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) and San Diego Gas
and Electric
(SDG&E). The sponsors of this testimony are all signatories to and
supporters of the
Comprehensive Settlement Agreement that over 20 parties filed on April 17,
2000. For the
reasons set forth below, the sponsors of this testimony do not support the
SCGC / TURN PISA
to the extent that it fails to unbundle intrastate transmission, a step that
is one of "the most
promising options" that the Commission has identified for the restructuring
of the SoCalGas
system. I recommend, instead, that the Commission adopt the Comprehensive
Settlement
Agreement, which moves forward on all of the Commission's "most promising
options," including
unbundling intrastate transmission. The Comprehensive Settlement Agreement
enjoys broad
support from the full range of stakeholder interests in the southern
California gas market.
II. SCGC / TURN EXAGGERATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PG&E
AND SOCALGAS SYSTEMS.
In D. 99-07-015, at page 14, the Commission identified the creation of a
system of firm,
tradeable intrastate transmission rights as one of its "most promising
options" for the further
restructuring of the SoCalGas system. A significant element in that
determination was the
Commission's desire to follow the model of the PG&E Gas Accord, and thus to
encourage
statewide consistency in its gas restructuring program. The SCGC / TURN PISA
now asks the
Commission to re-consider that finding, and to defer any further unbundling
of intrastate
transmission service on the SoCalGas system. In support of that aspect of
the PISA, the
witnesses for SCGC / TURN testify (1) that the unbundled transmission system
adopted for
PG&E under the Gas Accord responded to a unique set of problems that have not
been present in
southern California, (2) that there are significant structural and
operational differences between
the PG&E and SoCalGas systems, and (3) that the Gas Accord structure has not
benefitted end-
use customers in northern California. None of these assertions are correct.
A. The Commission Should Focus on a Statewide, Consistent Structure
for the
Gas Utilities Moving Forward, Not on Whether PG&E and SoCalGas Have
Had Similar Problems in the Past.
SCGC / TURN witness Mr. Florio describes at length the problems that led
to the
adoption on transmission unbundling for PG&E in the Gas Accord settlement.
He views PG&E's
difficulties as far more extensive than those that SoCalGas now faces, thus
justifying more
"extreme measures" such as the unbundling of intrastate transmission. SCGC /
TURN Testimony,
at Section 2.1.1.2.
In my view, both PG&E and SoCalGas have faced the same types of
problems, even if the
economic distortions on the PG&E system have been greater. On both systems,
shippers have not
had a system of firm capacity rights, allocated by non-discriminatory, open
access procedures, to
govern who had access to what receipt point. On the PG&E system, the attempt
to discriminate
against PGT Expansion volumes that sought to use PG&E's Line 400 resulted in
the "crossover"
problems at Malin. Similarly, SoCalGas' "windowing" procedures have not
provided firm, non-
discriminatory access at SoCalGas' receipt points. "Windowing" has
restricted the access of
competitive gas supplies to receipt points such as Wheeler Ridge, just as the
"crossover ban"
limited the competition to sell gas at Malin onto PG&E's Line 400.
Furthermore, SoCalGas has also faced the same sort of "conflict of
interest" charges as
PG&E. SoCalGas' core procurement department has been criticized for
monopolizing the Hector
Road receipt point, to the benefit of SoCalGas' shareholders through the Gas
Cost Incentive
Mechanism. See D. 99-07-015, at pages 15 - 18.
However, the Commission should not decide the future structure for
California's gas
industry on the basis of whether SoCalGas' past problems have resembled
PG&E's past
difficulties. For electric generators, what is important is that the
structures that the Commission
adopts in both parts of the state should solve these problems and should be
consistent on a
statewide basis. The new electric market is a statewide market. There are
already at least two
merchant electric generators (Dynegy and Duke) and a number of QF projects
under common
ownership that operate in more than one gas utility service territory.
Another merchant plant
developer (Calpine) has made no secret of its intent to operate plants
statewide. This trend
promises to increase competition in the electric market. To encourage this
trend, the Commission
should focus on carrying through on D. 99-07-015's promise to increase the
statewide consistency
of California's natural gas restructuring program. The unbundling of
intrastate transmission was a
key element of the PG&E Gas Accord, and should be a foundation of the further
restructuring of
the SoCalGas system, as well.
B. SoCalGas' Backbone System Serves the Same Function as PG&E's, and
Can
Be Unbundled in a Manner Similar to the PG&E Gas Accord.
Mr. Florio claims that the "network" nature of the SoCalGas system
argues against
following the Gas Accord model for unbundling backbone transmission service
for SoCalGas.
Yet Mr. Florio concedes that SoCalGas' mainline facilities that extend from
the Los Angeles basin
to the interstate pipelines on the California / Arizona border do resemble
interstate pipelines.
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.1.1.3. SoCalGas' lines running north from the L.A.
Basin to the
Wheeler Ridge interconnects also are clearly backbone facilities similar to
PG&E's. With respect
to local transmission, SoCalGas' network of local transmission lines inside
the L.A. Basin is
similar to PG&E's network of local transmission lines in its load centers in
the Bay Area and
Central Valley. Indeed, both the PG&E and SoCalGas systems can be considered
to be "spokes"
of backbone lines transporting gas from the interstate pipeline receipt
points to "hubs" of
networked local transmission facilities. The two systems differ in the
length and number of the
"spokes" (SoCalGas' are shorter and more numerous), but operationally these
components serve
the same function. In my view, there is just as strong an operational basis
for unbundling
SoCalGas' backbone and local transmission facilities and services as there
was for unbundling
PG&E's.
C. The Benefits of the Gas Accord's City-Gate Market Have Been
Substantial
for Electric Generators.
Mr. Weil downplays the benefits that the Gas Accord has produced through
competition
among suppliers in the PG&E city-gate market that the Gas Accord created.
First, he appears to
cite the existing data as showing "average benefits of around 2 cents or more
per MMcf/d."
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.2.2. As cited in my direct testimony, the actual
benefits have been
more than 2 cents per mmcf/d $0.03 to $0.08 per Dth. Mr. Weil opines that
such savings are
not significant for core customers. Ibid., at Section 2.2.2. Regardless of
whether one agrees with
him, such competitive reductions in transportation costs are very important
for electric
generators, whose total transportation rate is likely to be roughly $0.35 per
Dth, and who, as Ms.
Yap states, "sell into a highly competitive PX market." SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.4.1. For an
electric generator, a 10 to 20% reduction in gas transportation charges is
well worth pursuing, as
shown by SCGC's active participation on SoCalGas BCAP issues that would lower
SoCalGas'
EG rates by far smaller amounts.
D. Customers Have Not Had to Hold Capacity or Pay Demand Charges to
Realize These Benefits.
Mr. Weil also asserts that the fact that relatively few end use
customers hold backbone
transmission capacity on the PG&E system shows that unbundling under the Gas
Accord has not
benefitted customers. He opines that this is due to the high transaction
costs associated with
holding capacity. SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.2.3. Ms. Yap also describes at
length how the
transaction costs associated with managing transmission capacity tends to
force end users to buy
from marketers. Ibid., Section 2.3.1. She concludes that unbundling has been
"great for
marketers" but "not good for customers." Ibid., at Section 2.3.1.
This testimony ignores the fact that marketers do not exist independent
of their customers.
If a marketer's services do not add value for the customer, then that
marketer will not remain in
business for long. Under the Gas Accord, most noncore end users in northern
California have
been buying gas from marketers in the PG&E city-gate market. However, the
available data on
PG&E city-gate gas prices discussed above show that end users have
realized significant
savings from these purchases, compared to the option of buying gas at the
California border and
managing their own transportation to the city-gate. These city-gate
purchases have not involved
paying demand charges or incurring transaction costs associated with managing
capacity.
Competition among marketers has assured that customers benefit from
marketers' efficiencies in
managing transportation costs.
III. SCGC'S AND TURN'S COST / BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION
UNBUNDLING IGNORES THE BENEFITS AND OVERSTATES THE COSTS.
SCGC and TURN attempt to present a cost / benefit analysis of
transmission unbundling,
largely through the testimony of Ms. Yap, in an effort to show that the costs
outweigh the
benefits. Ms. Yap ignores several significant benefits from unbundling,
greatly exaggerates the
possible costs, and presents unsubstantiated assertions about the impacts of
unbundling on
generators in the Los Angeles basin.
A. SCGC / TURN Fail to Recognize the Benefits of Transmission
Unbundling.
1. Unbundling will provide competitive benefits in the city-gate
market.
The experience with transmission unbundling under the PG&E Gas Accord has
demonstrated that end use customers realize competitive benefits from the
creation of a city-gate
market. The city-gate market moves gas-to-gas competition between suppliers
closer to the
customer, and allows the customer to avoid risks associated with paying
demand charges or
managing backbone transportation. Those customers who believe they can
achieve greater profits
by managing their own transportation have that option, and since not all
transportation rights on
the PG&E system are held by marketers, it is obvious that such customers do
exist.
Mr. Weil doubts that the city-gate benefits seen on the PG&E system will
materialize, due
to "Southwest supply dominance" at SoCalGas receipt points. SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.2.2. Presumably this refers to the fact that gas prices tend to
trade within a narrow range of a few
cents per Dth at all of the receipt points into the SoCalGas system. Ibid.,
at Section 2.3.1. The
price differentials at the SoCalGas receipt points are much lower than the
significant price
differentials that have existed between Topock, Arizona, and Malin, Oregon,
the two major
receipt points into the PG&E system. However, recently the Malin / Topock
price difference has
been due almost entirely to the $0.10 to $0.12 per Dth transportation rate
differential between
PG&E's Redwood and Baja paths. Over the most recent year for which data is
available, Malin
prices have been essentially equivalent to Topock prices, when adjusted for
the downstream
transportation rate differences. This integration of the Malin and Topock
markets has been the
result of rising Canadian prices relative to U.S. markets, which has produced
a competitive
equilibrium between Canadian and domestic supplies serving northern
California. Yet over this
year the benefits of PG&E city-gate purchases has actually increased, even
though there was very
little difference between Malin and Topock prices delivered to the end user.
From May 1999
through April 2000, PG&E city-gate prices have been $0.05 per Dth to $0.11
per Dth lower than
the comparable cost of border purchases plus PG&E's full backbone
transportation rates. This
data is summarized in my Table 1. Contrary to the SCGC / TURN testimony,
this recent
experience suggests that the price benefits from competition at a new
SoCalGas city-gate may be
just as large as those actually observed on the PG&E system.
Table 1
Natural Gas Market (May-99 through Apr-00) $/MMBtu
Gas Prices
Malin
Topock
PG&E City-gate
California Border:
2.44
2.56
City-gate Market:
2.71
PG&E Transportation:
Redwood
Baja
Firm:
0.32
0.22
As-Available:
0.38
0.26
Price of Border
Purchases at City-gate
Firm:
2.76
2.78
As-Available:
2.82
2.82
Benefits of City-gate overBorder Purchases
Firm:
0.05
0.07
As-Available:
0.11
0.11
Data Source: Natural Gas Intelligence
2. The Comprehensive Settlement reduces rates for EG
customers.
Transmission unbundling, as proposed in the Comprehensive
Settlement, will result in a
modest reduction in transportation rates for electric generators. My direct
testimony discussed
how transmission unbundling under the Comprehensive Settlement will reduce EG
rates by $3
million per year in 2002, or about $0.01 per Dth, compared to the SoCalGas
rates adopted in the
recent BCAP decision, D. 00-04-060. In addition, the Comprehensive
Settlement unbundles
transmission rates on an embedded cost basis, removing roughly half of the EG
rate from
SoCalGas' complex, contentious long-run marginal cost rate design. This will
enhance the
certainty and stability of SoCalGas' EG rate a particularly important
factor to EG customers
that may seek to build new gas-fired capacity on the SoCalGas system.
3. The Comprehensive Settlement reduces risks for EG
customers.
Ms. Yap comments at length on how "if a generator's fundamental
risk increases, investors
demand more net income from the operation to compensate them for that
increased level of risk."
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.3. In my view, the Comprehensive Settlement
reduces a number
of important risks for electric generators, compared to the SCGC / TURN PISA,
as follows:
0 SoCalGas shareholders will assume 100% risk for the recovery of
unbundled backbone
transmission costs. This protects electric generation customers
from bearing higher
backbone transmission costs if SoCalGas discounts backbone rates or
if declining
throughput leads to reduced backbone transmission revenues.
0 The Comprehensive Settlement prices transmission services on an
embedded cost basis
through August, 2006. This removes the calculation and allocation
of marginal transmission
costs as an issue in the next SoCalGas BCAP case.
0 The Comprehensive Settlement uses a defined 79% load factor to
price backbone
transmission service through the term of the settlement. This
removes the risk that declining
throughput on the SoCalGas system could raise backbone transmission
rates in the next
SoCalGas BCAP case.
0 The Comprehensive Settlement reduces customers' risk for revenues
from unbundled
storage services to 25% in the second year (beginning in April,
2002), while the SCGC /
TURN PISA maintains the 50% risk adopted in D. 00-04-060 through
2002.
0 The Comprehensive Settlement unbundles SoCalGas' transmission,
storage, and balancing
services. This will offer electric generators a number of new
opportunities to reduce their
costs, including (1) city-gate gas purchases, (2) self-balancing or
competitive balancing
services, and (3) new, competitive storage services. In my
opinion, these opportunities
reduce the risk that generators in the Los Angeles Basin will be
caught in a "price squeeze"
between their gas costs and their electric revenues, because they
will have more ways in
which to reduce their gas costs.
B. SCGC / TURN Greatly Overstate the Impact of Demand Charges.
The use of demand charges for backbone transmission service appears
to be the focal point
of SCGC / TURN's opposition to transmission unbundling. Throughout their
testimony, SCGC /
TURN overstate the impact of demand charges:
0 Ms. Yap's Figure 1, showing the impact of a customer's load factor
on its average
transportation rate, assumes that the customer's entire rate is
collected in a demand charge.
SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.1. She fails to note that the demand
charge for firm backbone
transmission under the Comprehensive Settlement will be only about
22% of the total EG
rate under the SFV rate option, and just 12% of the rate under the
alternative backbone rate
with a 50% demand component.
0 Ms. Yap presents the results of "a study of more than half of the
generators in the Los
Angeles basin" that purports to show that "SFV-style" demand
charges could increase
annual fixed costs by "as much as 20 percent." SCGC / TURN, at
Section 2.4.2. I have
examined the workpapers for this study, obtained in by Southern
California Edison in
discovery, and it is based on wholly unrealistic assumptions for
how generators will buy gas
under the Comprehensive Settlement. First, the study assumes that
each generator will
contract at the SFV rate proposed in the Comprehensive Settlement
for a quantity of firm
backbone capacity based on the generator's theoretical maximum gas
use in a day (that
is, its generating capacity in MW, times its average heat rate,
times 24 hours). Apparently,
this assumption is made regardless of whether the plant has
actually ever used that much gas
in a single day. The plants studied are mostly intermediate-load
or peaking units, and almost
certainly never operate at anything approaching full capacity for
all 24 hours of a day. As a
result of this assumption, the plants studied are assumed to
contract for 1,426 MDth per day
of backbone capacity. According to the study, these units
represent 43% (i.e. less than one-
half) of the gas-fired capacity in the Los Angeles Basin. If all
generators in the basin
contracted for capacity in this way, electric generators alone
would demand 3,316 MDth per
day of capacity, or 93% of SoCalGas' total receipt point capacity!
There is obviously no
such demand today for firm service to electric generators on the
SoCalGas system. Second,
the study assumes that the generators will make no effort to
broker, release, or sell the
massive amount of excess capacity that they have bought and will
derive no revenues from
such off-peak capacity sales.
Thus, the study's dire picture of the impact of demand charges on
low-load factor
generators assumes that such generators massively over-contract for
capacity, and fail to
take advantage of the numerous means available under the Comprehensive
Settlement to
reduce or eliminate their demand charge risks:
The Comprehensive Settlement offers an optional backbone rate with
a 50% demand
charge that almost halves the demand charge risk, but offers the
same firm priority as the
SFV demand charge.
Under the comprehensive settlement, interruptible service at
volumetric rates is always
available at no more than a 20% premium over firm backbone rates,
and may even be
available at less than the firm backbone rates, particularly during
low-demand periods.
With a backbone rate of $0.0719 per Dth, this premium is no more
than $0.0144 per Dth.
Ms. Yap observes (in Section 2.3.1) that the interstate pipelines
supplying SoCalGas have
at least 1,000 MMcf/d (or 30%) more capacity than SoCalGas'
intrastate system. She
does not recognize that SoCalGas' backbone system also has more
than 900 MMcf/d of
excess capacity, plus substantial excess storage capacity. Due to
this excess intrastate
capacity, it is difficult to imagine a scenario, for the
foreseeable future, in which a low-
load factor generator would ever have to pay more than the maximum
interruptible rate
for "virtually firm" backbone service.
I have re-calculated the results of the SCGC / TURN study, under
the assumption that
generators in the Los Angeles basin take interruptible service, in
order to avoid demand
charges, at the full $0.0144 per Dth premium for interruptible
service. In this case, the
generators' annual fixed costs increase by just six-tenths of one
percent (0.6%). In
reality, I expect that interruptible or released firm service will
be available for much of the
year at all-volumetric rates that are much less than the maximum
interruptible rate.
The Comprehensive Settlement will establish an active market for
the trading of
backbone capacity on the SoCalGas system. This will provide a
means for electric
generators to rationalize their holdings of intrastate capacity,
and may be a source of firm
capacity at volumetric rates. Again, the SCGC / TURN study of the
impact of demand
charges assumes that generators do not use this secondary market.
Ms. Yap fails to recognize that low-load factor generators will be
able to avoid paying
demand charges (and save money on intrastate transportation, as
well) by buying gas in
the city-gate market. Ms. Yap's primary concern with the city-gate
market appears to
be the fear that marketers will be able to charge a significant
premium for city-gate sales
during periods of capacity constraints. SCGC / TURN, at Section
2.3.1. Ms. Yap's
testimony fails to explain her assertion that the city-gate market
could become a
"bottleneck" on the SoCalGas system. Upstream of the city-gate
market, SoCalGas will
have over 900 MMcf/d of excess backbone capacity, plus significant
amounts of unused
storage capacity.
Ms. Yap's "bottlenecks" and marketer-manipulated high prices have
not materialized in
two years' of experience with the PG&E city-gate market, even
though PG&E has less
excess transmission capacity and far less storage capacity than
SoCalGas. PG&E city-
gate prices did experience one brief spike, due to very high demand
during the cold snap
just prior to Christmas in 1998, but on average PG&E city-gate
prices have provided
significant benefits to end users, compared to purchases at the
California border. In
addition, the data that Mr. Weil cites on the parties holding
capacity on the PG&E system
shows that 75 parties hold capacity on the Redwood path alone, and
does not suggest any
undue concentration of capacity holdings on the PG&E backbone
system. Ibid., Table 1,
Section 2.2.3.
Furthermore, the Comprehensive Settlement has numerous provisions
to ensure that any
one marketer will be unlikely to accumulate a dominant share of
capacity to the SoCalGas
city-gate market. First, noncore end use customers will have the
initial two open seasons
in which to subscribe to up to 50% of the available backbone
capacity, without
competition from marketers. This should ensure that end users that
are interested in
holding capacity will be able to acquire the capacity that they
desire, and is likely to lead
to an even greater number of holders of capacity than resulted from
the Gas Accord open
season, in which end users and marketers competed together.
Second, the Comprehensive
Settlement limits any one party from holding, at the end of the
open season process, more
than 40% of the intrastate capacity from any individual SoCalGas
receipt point. Third, if
any party attempts to withhold firm intrastate capacity, in an
effort to drive up prices, that
capacity will be available for SoCalGas to sell as interruptible
service, and SoCalGas will
have a strong incentive to market such capacity, because it is 100%
at risk for the
recovery of backbone transmission costs.
The SCGC / TURN testimony tries to portray low-load factor generators as
caught in a
"price squeeze" between capped PX prices and increased fixed operating costs
due to the
imposition of demand charges for intrastate transmission. SCGC / TURN,
Section 2.4.3. The
testimony paints a grim picture of plants closing, and jobs lost, in the Los
Angeles Basin.
However, there are a number of elements in this picture that simply do not
add up:
0 The testimony appears to assume that low-load factor generators pay the
SFV demand
charges, and take none of the steps discussed above to mitigate or
eliminate the impact of
demand charges.
0 The testimony does not recognize that there will be a $3 million dollar
reduction in rates to
the EG class as a result of the Comprehensive Settlement.
0 The testimony asserts that the increases in operating costs as a result
of demand charges will
be serious enough to force plants to close. Even accepting SCGC /
TURN's inflated figure
of a 20% increase in fixed costs, SCGC / TURN provide no financial data
that substantiates
their assertion that an increase of this magnitude is likely to force a
significant number of
plants to close.
0 SCGC / TURN fail to appreciate the logical way to avoid the "price
squeeze" that they so
fear: buy gas in the SoCalGas city-gate market. City-gate buyers will
avoid paying demand
charges, so their fixed operating costs will not increase. In addition,
the SoCalGas city-gate
market is likely to be the gas market that is most tightly linked to
electric prices in southern
California, because it will be the closest market to the generators'
point of consumption and
because almost 60% of noncore loads on the SoCalGas / SDG&E system are
electric
generators. As a result, generators buying gas in the SoCalGas
city-gate market will have
the highest assurance that changes in their gas costs will be reflected
in changes in electric
prices, thus reducing the risk of a "price squeeze between gas and
electric prices. This has
certainly been the case in northern California. Straightforward
statistical analyses that I have
performed show that the PG&E city-gate gas price is more highly
correlated to PX electric
prices than are gas prices in any other market in the state, presumably
because electric
generators in northern California use that market and because it is the
closest market to the
generators' burner tips.
0 SCGC / TURN attempt to argue that the closure of low-load factor plants
in the Los
Angeles Basin, due to the imposition of demand charges, will have
serious implications for
electric reliability. SCGC / TURN, at Section 2.4.5. At the same time,
SCGC / TURN argue
that generators will not be able to recover demand charges because less
than 20% of the
capacity in the basin is under Reliability Must-Run (RMR) contracts and
that there is
"intense competition" for available RMR contracts. Yet the lack of RMR
contracts in the
basin is due to the fact that there is enough capacity in the basin to
provide more-than-
adequate reliability and to assure that few generators can exercise
local market power. If
some generators in the Los Angeles Basin go out of business due to
demand charges, a more
likely scenario than blackouts is that PX prices will rise in southern
California, the ISO will
make available more RMR contracts in the basin, and those contracts will
provide a higher
level of cost recovery, thus offsetting the impact of the demand charges.
This completes my rebuttal testimony.