7 Nov 2000, 23:55 UTC
Florio's Response to Ferguson
- From
- V.John White vjw@cleanpower.org
- Date
- Tue, 7 Nov 2000 15:55:00 -0800 (PST)
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>X-Sender: mflorio@mail.turn.org >X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 >Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2000 18:24:35 -0800 >To: "Bill Marcus" <bill@jbsenergy.com>,"Sara Myers"<ssmyers@hooked.net>, > <mshames@ucan.org>,<Dan_Kirshner@environmentaldefense.org >, > "Jim Caldwell" <tgaljhc@aol.com>,<vjw@cleanpower.org>, > "Julian, Bill" <bill.julian@gov.ca.gov> >From: Mike Florio <mflorio@turn.org> >Subject: Fwd: Re: Wohin gehen wir? > >I forgot to hit the "reply to all" button when I responded to Rich . . . . > > >>Date: Fri, 03 Nov 2000 18:20:06 -0800 >>To: Rich Ferguson <Rich@Cleanpower.org> >>From: Mike Florio <mflorio@turn.org> >>Subject: Re: Wohin gehen wir? >>Cc: ETeam >> >>Rich-- >> I like the idea, but I'm not sure I'm a very good test case. >After all, I have been branded as the last living defender of command and >control regulation, socialist central planning, and everything else "bad" >that you've ever thought of. >> Could the role of CalPower be better filled by an existing >for-profit company? [eg Enron?]. NO WAY! Any private seller would have all >the same conflicts as the utilities, and then some. But Michael Shames is >interested in the idea of auctioning off all or parts of the retail >franchise in San Diego, since SDG&E doesn't seem to want to be in the >business anymore. I have been pushing a core/noncore distinction such as >you suggest, although I haven't been bold enough to suggest a non-profit >procurement entity. (I did push this idea for PG&E's gas procurement back >in the bad old Gas Accord days, but the idea got nowhere then.) What I've >talked about is including the retained (at least for now) generation in the >core portfolio, along with some contracts and some spot. Haven't developed >any numbers yet. >> I would certainly encourage shopping the idea. Sellers will >probably hate it, because this entity would have more market buying power >than even the current UDCs. But so what, that's what we want, right? I'd >suggest running it by Bill Julian for a political straight face test, but I >would guess he'd like it. And it would be a perfect vehicle for RPS, which >we would certainly like to revive. Let's keep exploring this. MIKE >> >> >> >>At 04:52 PM 11/03/2000 -0800, you wrote: >>>Folks, >>>I am growing increasingly worried about future public policy oversight of >utility power purchases, given the current conventional wisdom that more >long term purchases should be made. I have been promoting the notion that >the default power portfolio should be maintained by a new non-profit >quasi-public entity with revenues guaranteed by the PUC, rather than by >three separate IOUs subject (or not) to reasonableness reviews. Your >comments on this notion are eagerly sought. >>> >>>Purchasing power for default customers >>>The recently proposed FERC decision essentially puts California back where >it was in 1990. There appears to be near universal agreement that the IOUs >should enter into long term power purchase agreements and limit exposure to >the spot market. As you recall, the BRPU reached the same conclusion, >decided how much should be purchased, held the auction, etc.. And then FERC >blew it up after deciding that the state's avoided cost estimates were >wrong. FERC appears now to agree it made a mistake, and essentially orders >us to start the process all over again. >>> >>>However, the proposed order makes no mention of state oversight of utility >purchases. But at the briefing held last Wednesday for Bowen and legislative >staff, FERC staff made it clear that they were not mandating any alternative >to replace the must sell/buy requirement that they were eliminating. >Presumably the state could still mandate the IOUs buy 90% in the PX (or >whatever) and still comply with the FERC order. As long as the utilities >remain regulated by the PUC, the state can control their power purchases. >>> >>>The problem is that after screwing around for ten years, there is now >enormous pressure to let the utilities do what they will, a result that I >fear would be bad for consumers and bad for the environment. On the other >hand, there no time nor stomach for repeating the BRPU process. >>> >>>My preferred solution is the establishment of a new, not for profit >"utility", that would make power portfolio decisions for default customers - >let's call it CalPower. The three existing regulated utilities would no >longer sell energy at retail. CalPower decisions would be subject to >whatever public policy conditions the legislature and/or the PUC chose to >impose. However, some kind expedited review process would allow CalPower to >be very nimble in the power market and recovery of their revenue requirement >would be guaranteed. Direction of CalPower could be by political appointees, >elected representatives, or some combination. My fantasy is a governance >structure similar to CalPERS, in which broad legislative guidelines are >interpreted by a board of directors and implemented by experienced traders. >>> >>>Compared to the present structure in which default portfolios are designed >by three different for-profit utilities, CalPower appears to have the >following advantages: >>>The non-profit structure eliminates all financial conflicts of interest in >portfolio design and ensures optimum implementation of public policy goals; >>>It ensures equitable treatment of all customers state-wide, with price >differences reflecting market realities rather than differing purchase >criteria by each utility; >>>It allows CalPower to be as nimble in the market as any other commercial >trader by allowing the PUC or other state agencies to participate in >portfolio design issues up-front, rather than requiring lengthy after the >fact review. >>> >>>CalPower's disadvantage appears to be that it requires yet another new >state-chartered non-profit organization. Politicians appear intent on >blaming the two they have already and returning to the old utility-centric >system, rather than risk their necks by proposing solutions that they then >would be responsible for. >>> >>>Obviously, there are many questions and details to be worked out. >>>Which customers would be default customers? [My option would be to declare >all customers under 50 KW permanent default customers - green or other >marketers could participate through contracts for differences, but physical >power would be acquired for all these customers by CalPower. Customers > >50KW would be on their own.] >>>What is the relationship with the PUC? With the legislature? >>>Could the role of CalPower be better filled by an existing for-profit >company? [eg Enron?] >>>How are the benefits/costs of existing utility generation assets and PP >contracts shared? >>>Etc >>> >>>Is this concept attractive enough to be worth pursuing? The next step >would be to get a group of interested parties together to put some meat on >these bones and float the idea seriously - perhaps even get some draft >legislation on paper to shop around. Interested? Let me know. >>> >>>Regards, >>>Rich >