17 Jul 2001, 00:14 UTC
PennFuture's E-Cubed - Market Lessons from 2000
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PennFuture's E-cubed is a commentary biweekly email publication concerning the current themes and trends in the energy market.
July 16, 2001
Vol. 3, No. 13
Market Lessons from 2000
School's still out for summer, but just as the new and improved Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a watershed RTO decision last week which could lead to substantial expansion of PJM into the Northeast, PJM's State of the Market Report 2000 contains some interesting information and lessons for us.
After the California experience demonized spot electricity markets, it would surprise many that PJM's 2000 spot energy market was a bargain. Spot prices in 2000 were below $30.00 per megawatt-hour (MWh), or three cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), 70.88 percent of the hours in the year. The single highest hourly price was $810 per MWh or 81 cents per kWh, but prices reached or exceeded $200 per MWh during only 13 hours in the entire year (download charts on our website by typing www.pennfuture.org/items/hourlypricecharts_71601.pdf in your browser). By contrast, California experienced spot prices that often exceeded $200 per MWh for most of the last 12 months.
Authored by the PJM Market Monitoring Unit - but likely reviewed and edited by top PJM management - the Report delivered to FERC concludes that all of the markets operated by PJM were "reasonably competitive." It cautions, however, that,
"there are potential threats to competition in the energy, capacity and regulation markets that require ongoing scrutiny and in some cases may require action in order to maintain competition. Market participants do possess some ability to exercise market power under certain conditions in PJM markets."
In order to maintain and improve the functioning of the PJM markets, the Report recommends:
Retention of the $1000/MWh bid cap in the PJM energy market and investigation of other rule changes to reduce incentives to exercise market power.
Retention of the $100/mw bid cap in the PJM regulation market.
Evaluation of additional actions to increase demand-side responsiveness to price in both energy and capacity markets.
Modification of incentives in the capacity market to require all Load Serving Entities (LSEs) to meet their obligations to serve load on a longer-term basis, and require all capacity resources to be offered on a comparable longer-term basis.
The Report uses several analytical methods to reach these recommendations and conclusions, including looking at the net revenue for generation from all sources, the increase in bid amount over marginal cost, market concentration (as measured using the HHI index), and lastly an analysis of the resulting prices.
See Spot go to market
Perhaps the Report's most intriguing information on price trends concerns the spot energy market, where average prices declined by 9.81 percent from 1999 levels. Driven by lower peak prices in the most expensive 100 hours of the year, the average locational marginal price (LMP) in 2000 was $30.72 per MWh (3.072 cents per kWh), falling from the 1999 average of $34.06 per MWh (3.406 cents per kWh). This average price decline in the spot market was more significant because it occurred even though fuel costs were sharply higher in 2000. Indeed, the average fuel-adjusted LMP in 2000 declined to $24.78 per MWh, or 27.25 percent from the 1999 price of $34.06 per MWh.
And when one compares 2000 spot market prices to competitive future prices for the year 2000 and to 1996 regulated rates for generation, it becomes clear that spot market prices in 2000 were significantly lower than 2000 future contracts. Even with appropriate price adjustments to facilitate comparison, they were also much lower than 1996 regulated residential generation rates for all hours charged by Pennsylvania's six major electric utilities, which ranged from about $51 dollars to $85 dollars per MWh, or 5.1 to 8.5 cents per kWh.
The lesson
Spot market prices, which received so much bad publicity as a result of the California fiasco, can be a bargain and customers who are able to manage their demand to reduce or avoid the hours of high spot prices can reap major savings by purchasing electricity from the spot market.
In fact, spot market prices in 2000 were below most of Pennsylvania's shopping credits or "prices to compare." That's saying something, since the shopping credits in turn are as much as 4.0 cents per kWh less than the 1996 regulated rate for just generation paid by customers to the monopoly utilities.
But?
Since spot market prices in 2000 were well below both the 1996 generation rate paid to monopolies and the much lower shopping credits, why were energy suppliers increasingly unable to offer electricity at prices below the shopping credits?
ICAP pricing and reliance by electricity suppliers on higher priced future or forward market contracts supply most of the answer.
The spot market gives a good indication of what the forward markets should be under typical circumstances. As the data below indicate, the average spot market price for all market locations in 2000 was $30.72/MWh, almost 10 percent less than during 1999, and more than 27 percent lower upon adjusting for higher year 2000 fuel prices.
PJM Load-Weighted Average LMP ($/MWh)
1999 2000 Change
Average LMP 34.06 30.72 -9.81%
Median LMP 19.02 20.51 7.83%
Standard Deviation 91.49 28.38 -68.98%
Average Fuel Adjusted LMP 34.06 24.78 -27.25%
Median Fuel Adjusted LMP 19.02 16.80 -11.67%
Standard Deviation 91.49 22.04 -75.91%
While the dramatically lower standard deviation in 2000 indicates that prices were much less volatile than in 1999, there remained a substantial gap between average and median prices, indicating that extreme prices during a small number of hours continued to substantially skew overall average prices.
Grading on a curve
The PJM 2000 price duration curves, measuring the percent of time prices were at or below a particular level, tell an interesting story. As one would expect with higher fuel prices, especially for natural gas, the general trend was for prices to be slightly higher during periods where natural gas was the marginal fuel. For approximately 99 percent of all hours, 2000 energy prices were more expensive than in 1999. Yet, with relatively low peak demand, the price for the most expensive 1 percent of demand during 2000 was considerably lower in 2000 than in 1999, accounting for the entire 9.81 percent average reduction in 2000 prices from 1999. If not for the reduced prices for the most expensive 1 percent of demand, overall prices for 2000 likely would have risen approximately 18 percent over 1999, due largely to higher fuel costs.
For these reasons, the Report recommendation to "evaluate" additional actions to increase demand-side responsiveness is SEVERELY understated. PJM and all consumers have an essential interest in implementing demand-side response programs to the maximum economic level, with dramatic implications for saving individual consumers money, improving system reliability, keeping market prices lower for everyone, and improving market competitiveness.
Can everyone say I-C-A-P?
So with the lower wholesale energy prices and plenty of supply, why did the retail market sputter?
Installed capacity (ICAP) price increases are a partial explanation. In addition to energy, the controversial charge for ICAP is the other significant cost born by electricity consumers within PJM. ICAP represents a call option on physical generation resources by PJM during system emergencies. All LSEs are required to purchase an amount of installed capacity equivalent to their customer's peak load contribution plus an adequate reserve margin, currently 19 percent. But although it exists for reliability purposes, PJM curtailed the export of energy outside PJM from PJM-committed installed capacity on only one day during 2000.
Logically, the price for installed capacity, like the price of energy, might have been expected to decrease during 2000. Yet that didn't occur. As energy prices decreased within PJM, they remained high or continued to increase in surrounding control areas. Higher prices in the surrounding markets led some generation owners to de-list their generation committed to PJM in order to sell out to other control areas without the risk of being curtailed by PJM. The result was an increase in ICAP prices from an average of $52.86 in 1999 to $60.55 in 2000. The increase was concentrated over the summer with prices in the daily markets rising to $177 or more for most of June, July and August. The increase in ICAP prices raised the cost of supplying many retail customers by about 1 cent per kWh. The Market Monitoring Unit concluded that the price spikes over the summer months were a direct result of the opportunity cost associated with the prices in neighboring control areas.
But the Report's finding that the ICAP market was "reasonably competitive" seems inconsistent with PJM's conclusion last year that the 2000 ICAP market performed so poorly that it needed a major overhaul. This inconsistency raises questions about the reasonableness of that portion of the 2000 Report or giving the 2000 ICAP market the PJM seal of approval.
PJM has invested substantial time and resources since last summer in an extensive stakeholder process to revise its ICAP rules, especially concerning the allocation of deficiency revenues and the interval over which ICAP is purchased. But since the "reformed" ICAP market began operating only recently on July 1, 2001, it's too soon to know whether it is functioning well or competitively. We remain skeptical that the PJM prescription cures the disease, or is merely life support for a dying program.
See Spot offer lower prices
Apart from the ICAP market, the differing prices in forward and spot markets provide substantial explanations for why electricity suppliers have found it easy to beat the 1996 regulated generation rate for most utilities but difficult or even impossible to beat the lower shopping credits. (Shopping credit = 1996 regulated generation rate - stranded generation cost). Prior to the 2000 summer season, prices in the forward markets, before anyone knew how mild the weather was going to be, substantially reflected the high-priced experience of 1999. Because of the high prices in 1999, energy that was purchased through forward markets - about 82 percent of all energy - was considerably more expensive than the spot prices turned out to be. Since customers often prefer to lock in a price in advance, competitive suppliers generally didn't want to provide fixed prices below the retail shopping credits. If suppliers had relied on the spot market, they could have offered lower prices. Also, customers who can reduce or shift demand may well benefit from purchasing more power from the spot market.
Recent developments
Both in the East and West coast markets this week, electricity in daily trading has been near its low for the 52-week period. Several developments are pushing down the price of wholesale electricity. Mild weather, falling gas prices, new generation coming online, increasing demand response and conservation as well as a FERC which understands that competition must exist prior to price deregulation, are all pushing prices lower. Moreover, forward market prices for 2002 within PJM are beginning to fall and are under downward price pressure.
The new downward trend in forward markets partially results from moderate prices this summer, even during high demand periods, with prices generally staying under $150 MWh/$0.15 kWh. A good example of this was July 10, a relatively hot day with significant demand, which saw prices reach $150 per MWh for one hour but average $62.78 per MWh for all on-peak hours.
What's driving forward prices lower?
More efficient generation being installed (below 8000 btu/kWh as opposed to 11000 btu/kWh).
More ICAP in the market (new capacity estimated at over 4000 MW with load growth at only 1.5 percent or 1000 MW).
More demand-responsive load in the form of 300 additional MW of Active Load Management.
The addition of PJM West slated for 2002, with lower prices generally.
Lower natural gas prices - falling from $4.0561 /mmBtu in July 2000 to $3.29/mmBtu as of July 12, 2001.
This good news, which suggests that retail customers in late 2001 or 2002 may again see retail competitive offers below the Pennsylvania shopping credits, must be weighed against the troubled ICAP market. ICAP remains an anachronism. ICAP prices have not returned to competitive levels and remain one of the significant obstacles to serving retail customers. The forward prices for ICAP alone have remained above 10 percent of the typical shopping credit.
Yet even in the world of ICAP there is hope. ICAP prices may be beginning to soften in the face of a substantial amount of new generation that is coming online and increased demand response from customers. PJM has instituted both an emergency and an economic demand-response program, through which more customers can respond to prices and reduce the price that all customers pay for electricity.
Tomorrow's homework
The State of the Market Report contains plenty of data which confirms that PJM is the country's best-run independent system operator and best (though still flawed) wholesale market. Prices in the spot energy market were well below 1996 regulated generation rates, even with appropriate adjustments. But none of this warrants complacency. Only when PJM becomes the first market to give consumers the tools they need to change their demand for electricity, will the wholesale and retail markets within PJM be FULLY, as opposed to "reasonably," competitive.
A link to download (in .pdf) the PJM MMU Report can be found on the Internet at: http://www.pjm.com/market_monitoring/reports.html .
E-cubed is available for reprint in newspapers and other publications. Authors are available for print or broadcast.
PennFuture (www.pennfuture.org ), with offices in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, is a statewide public interest membership organization, which advances policies to protect and improve the state's environment and economy. PennFuture's activities include litigating cases before regulatory bodies and in local, state and federal courts, advocating and advancing
legislative action on a state and federal level, public education and assisting citizens in public advocacy.
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- vol3no13_71601.doc