8 May 2001, 10:04 UTC
FERC Orders
- From
- Sarah Novosel sarah.novosel@enron.com
- To
-
Kevin M Presto, Mark Dana Davis, jeff.ader@enron.com, Edward Baughman, joe.gordon@enron.com, Janelle Scheuer, mbrown9@enron.com, Mark Bernstein, John Llodra, George Wood, Paul J Broderick, jason.thompkins@enron.com
and 26 more
Mason Hamlin, Robert Stalford, Tom May, Gautam Gupta, Narsimha Misra, Steve Montovano, Garrett Tripp, berney.aucoin@enron.com, Rob Wheeler, Jim Meyn, Aleck Dadson, Daniel Allegretti, Pearce W Hammond, Joe Hartsoe, Donna Fulton, Howard Fromer, Kathleen Sullivan, Tom Hoatson, Thane Twiggs, Sarah Novosel, Christi L Nicolay, James D Steffes, Linda Robertson, Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean, Charles Decker - Date
- Tue, 8 May 2001 03:04:00 -0700 (PDT)
The following are a few summaries of recent New England orders. Please let us know if you have any questions. Sarah FERC Approves NEPOOL's Three-Part Bids On April 25, FERC approved NEPOOL,s proposal to implement a system where generators can submit three-part supply offers consisting of a start-up price, an hourly no-load price, and an incremental energy price. NEPOOL also proposed that when a supplier,s total revenues over a day from the energy and operating reserves markets were less than its total bid costs, the shortfall would be paid to the supplier as net commitment period compensation (NCPC) uplift. There was disagreement within NEPOOL as to who will pay these uplift costs. In approving NEPOOL,s three-part bid system, FERC finds that the system is consistent with the policies in place in New York and PJM. With regard to NCPC uplift cost allocation, FERC finds that NEPOOL,s exiting method of allocating NCPC uplift costs broadly, based on electrical load, is appropriate since it is difficult to determine who causes what amount of uplift costs. The new three-part bid system will take effect July 1, 2001. FERC Rejects Proposal to Disclose Bidding Information In an April 13 FERC order of no overall interest to us, FERC includes a discussion about the rules for disclosure of bidding and other data gathered by the ISO. Braintree had argued that FERC should require public disclosure of bidding and other data in order to allow NEPOOL participants to monitor the actions of others. FERC rejected Braintree,s arguments, finding that FERC,s rules strike an appropriate balance between the need to disclose as much information as possible and the desire to avoid disclosure requirements that will make it more difficult for the ISO to obtain information from market participants in the first place. FERC states that because data collection is critical to the ISO,s ability to monitor the NEPOOL markets, it does not want to take action that would impede the ISO,s ability to collect this information. Information Policy NEPOOL submitted a March 5, 2001 request for revisions to NEPOOL,s Information Policy, to be effective May 5, 2001, which permits FERC to obtain NEPOOL Participant confidential information directly from ISO-NE. On April 25, 2001, FERC issued an order approving the filing. FERC stated that ISO-NE should be able to turn over confidential information to FERC without first being required to notify the affected member of receipt of a request for information. However, the Commission notes that the information given to FERC will be treated confidentially by FERC until FERC rules otherwise, and those Participants' whose information is given to FERC will retain the opportunity to oppose release of that information to the general public before FERC makes the information public. Market Monitor Information Collection ISO filed revised procedures intended to give ISO the authority to monitor for generator physical and economic withholding as a way to raise prices. Under the revised procedures, a reference price is calculated for each 10MW block for each generating unit. The specific reference price is an average of in-merit bids over the last 30 days. ISO will investigate all bids that deviate significantly from the reference price. Under the ISO's proposed procedures, prospective mitigation will occur if ISO determines that the bid will have a significant effect on the relevant market clearing price or uplift payment and the generator cannot adequately justify why its bid is not anti-competitive. If a bid is mitigated, ISO will substitute the generator,s reference price as its default bid. ISO will implement these new mitigation measures on July 1. ISO also proposed to release bid data after a 3 months delay (FERC previously ordered ISO to release bid data after a 6 month delay). Many generators opposed the procedures; Braintree argued they do not go far enough. On April 26, FERC accepted ISO,s changes, finding that they do not give ISO too much discretion and are consistent with NYISO mitigation procedures. FERC rejected ISO,s proposal to release data 3 months after-the-fact and directed ISO to wait 6 months before release.