29 Sep 2000, 17:42 UTC
More on California Deregulation Nightmares
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- Miyung Buster miyung.buster@enron.com
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- Steven J Kean
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- Fri, 29 Sep 2000 10:42:00 -0700 (PDT)
UB Comment More on California Deregulation Nightmares Martin Rosenberg 09/30/2000 Utility Business Copyright 2000 by Intertec Publishing Corporation, a PRIMEDIA Company. All rights reserved. What were California utility regulators and state legislators smoking when they devised California's so-called "pioneering" stab at electric deregulation? The flaws in the scheme they came up with are profound. They are also rather easy to identify. Simply put, California's deregulation gurus required distribution utilities to shed their generation and buy power ONLY through the California Power Exchange and predominantly on a spot basis. Generators had total market power. The utilities - and the millions of Californians that they serve - were captive customers. Whatever price the generators could generate, the utilities had to pay. They could not use the threat of dropping off the Power Exchange system if prices got too high. Second, the utilities were stripped of any of the powerful tools available to deal with risk. Doug Kline, spokesman for San Diego Gas & Electric, says his company had a limited ability to hedge - or protect itself against soaring prices - going into this summer. It could hedge 10 percent of its power needs up to three months in advance. "We could go into the block forward market if someone would accept our proposal," Kline said, but "it's thinly traded." This is where the California scheme borders on being criminally irresponsible. Why expose utilities to market risks without providing them with means of protecting their customers against wild swings in market prices? The futures market is complex. But there are some easy patterns to discern. Electric prices in many parts of the country peak in the summer when consumer demand for air conditioning peaks. They are lowest in the winter. Generally, futures prices track these seasonal fluctuations. A few years ago, some wags observed that New York Mercantile Exchange futures traders who felt snow falling on their necks going to lunch returned to work and bid up the futures price of natural gas. As one trading company official says, "It doesn't take a brain surgeon to know electricity is going to go up in the summer." This summer it zoomed to 19.3 cents per kilowatt hour, up from 4.2 cents a year earlier. Demand for power is not up sharply this summer and supply is about equal, compared to last year. "It is difficult to explain a five-fold increase in prices," Kline says. San Diego Gas & Electric in the winter time - when electricity futures prices tend to be low - should be able to buy a futures contract for electricity to be delivered the following summer. Then, if prices soar, the utility's exposure would be limited. In their wisdom, however, California policymakers decided to largely deny utilities access to the futures market. Furthermore, the utilities could not buy power outside of the California Power Exchange. San Diego tried. "We applied more than six months ago for authority to buy outside the California Power Exchange, and the California Public Utilities Commission denied it," Kline says. The rise of trading Large industries in California can strike a deal with competitive suppliers. However, major traders have stayed away from smaller users - and consumers - because the margins are too thin. So consumers are captive of the utilities that in turn are captive of the California Power Exchange. Meanwhile, a robust energy trade has been developing in the rest of the country. A recent study by the Yankee Group in Boston reports that $70 billion in electricity and natural gas will be traded on electronic energy commodity exchanges this year, up from $25 billion last year. That's a healthy hunk of the $225 billion worth of electricity and natural gas sold on wholesale markets. "As energy-trading firms migrate to these exchanges, over 90 percent of wholesale natural gas and electricity will trade across commodity exchanges within three years...An expanding trading market will result in $450 billion of energy trading by 2005 - virtually all of it electronically," the Yankee Group's May study states. So far, marketers are sitting on the sidelines. Al Butkus, a spokesman for UtiliCorp United, says, "We don't deal in California," Butkus says. "It's not an important market to us." That is an indictment of efforts to deregulate the state. UtiliCorp owns Aquila Energy, which last year was the second largest wholesaler of power and the third largest wholesaler of natural gas in North America. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in late August announced it would investigate developments in the California market. The commission will try to determine if the market rules need fixing, and whether remedial action must be taken because rates are unjust. Stephen Baum, head of San Diego's parent, Sempra Energy, says, "We strongly believe that FERC's investigation opens the door for substantial reforms of the state's wholesale electricity market, which is not workably competitive, and will eliminate the extreme wholesale price spikes that we have experienced this summer." While announcing the investigation, as part of a national market review, James J. Hoecker, commission chairman, said, "We do not find finger-pointing to be helpful at this juncture." At some point, however, the following conclusions are likely to be drawn: - In deregulated markets, suppliers cannot be free to raise prices with impunity while consumers are naked to the howling winds of competition. Utilities must be able to hedge their risks. - If free markets are to work, the benefits of competition must flow to residential consumers and other small users. It is not sufficient to place an artificial "cap" on rates - since costs are still incurred that must be recovered at some later date. There should be a profit incentive for marketers to court consumers. Factors limiting the emergence of a competitive consumer market should be identified and eliminated. - California, as large as it is, is not an island. Utilities in the state should not be required to buy from the California Power Exchange. - California regulators, who declined several requests for interviews for this column, and legislators should apologize to traumatized California consumers. They should admit they were unequal to the task of devising fair, workable deregulation policies.