2 Apr 2001, 07:37 UTC
Newsletter
- From
- Vince J Kaminski vince.kaminski@enron.com
- Date
- Mon, 2 Apr 2001 00:37:00 -0700 (PDT)
Vasant, Can you, please, review this Newsletter article. I had to put something together rather quickly last night. Vince
Quoted or forwarded from earlier messages
---------------------- Forwarded by Vince J Kaminski/HOU/ECT on 04/02/2001 07:37 AM --------------------------- VKaminski@aol.com on 04/01/2001 11:22:50 PM To: vkamins@enron.com cc: VKaminski@aol.com Subject: Newsletter Complexity of modern financial markets never ceases toamaze me. Te links between different financial instruments are sometimes verysubtle and it takes understanding of many different types of transactions toexplain the interdependencies. Recently, I have been receiving E-mails fromdifferent academics and practitioners asking for explanation of anomalydetected in pricing of credit default swaps. One E-mail asked the followingquestion: According to a Bank of America publication, your (Enron) default swapspreads are consistently trading about 80 basis points wider than your assetswaps. Any idea of what is going on here? Icame up with an answer with the help of Bryan Seyfried from Enron Credit.com,our unit in London trading credit protection tools. The answer requiresexplaining first what are credit default swaps. In a plain-vanilla credit default swapstructure, the buyer pays a premium for protection he or she receives in case acredit event (default) takes place in the case of a reference entity. In theevent of default by the reference entity, the seller of the protection isrequired to pay an amount equal to the difference between the initial price ofthe credit exposure and its recovery value. For example, the protection may bepurchased for a bond issued by the reference entity. In the case of a default,the seller of protection pays the difference between the face value of the bondand its current(post-default) market price. Mispricing of credit default swaps often takes placefollowing an issuance by the reference entity of convertible bonds. Aconvertible bond can be looked at as a combination of a regular coupon bond anda long-term equity option. Sometimes the equity option may be mispriced and beavailable at a lower price than the comparable equity options that can beobtained at the derivatives markets. The hedge funds buy convertible bonds toacquire the option component but are not interested in taking the issuer,scredit. They seek to lay off credit risk by selling the asset swaps or bybuying protection through default swaps. This arbitrage leads in many cases,after a large convertible bonds issue, to imbalance in the asset swaps marketsvs. default swaps markets. The cost of credit protection goes up but this hasnothing to do with deterioration of the issuer,s credit. One may expect that this imbalance will be eliminated overtime and the prices of default and asset swaps will converge. Frictions andrigidities in the capital markets may slow down this process. Enron issues recently a$1.9 billion convertible bond that became a target of arbitrage activitiescarried out by the hedge funds. What is very interesting is that analysts wholook at one segment of the financial markets in isolation from other segmentsmay be unable to explain the dynamics of prices. Globalization has arrived andit has more than one dimension. - credit.doc