25 Apr 2001, 10:18 UTC
Andersen releases reptort on CA crisis, lessons for regulation and market
- From
- Ray Alvarez ray.alvarez@enron.com
- To
- Steve Walton, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Leslie Lawner, Rebecca W Cantrell, Donna Fulton, Jeff Dasovich, Christi L Nicolay, Jeffrey C. Alexander
- Date
- Wed, 25 Apr 2001 03:18:00 -0700 (PDT)
All: Attached for the reading pleasure of the CA team is the Andersen report - "Energy Crisis in the Western U.S." Reproduced below is a related article, and that is followed by the text of the Andersen press release on the report. Ray NGI's Daily Gas Price Index published : April 25, 2001 Andersen Warns Of Increased State/Federal Tensions The likelihood of friction between state and federal regulators increasing over deregulation plans if states slow or walk away from retail competition is just one of several important implications resulting from the ongoing shockwave that has rolled through the Western energy markets, according to a new report issued Tuesday by Andersen. The report, "Energy Crisis in the Western United States: Lessons for Navigating Regulatory and Market Minefields," was unveiled by Andersen's North American Energy Consulting Practice at a Washington, D.C., briefing. David Jermain, principal with Andersen's North American Energy Consulting Practice, noted that the report identifies eight overriding implications emanating from the Western energy crisis. "These aspects of the California virus will shape the longer-term operations of the Western grid, the regional and national economy, domestic energy policy and the industry's evolution," he added. The eight implications singled out in the Andersen report are: Increased deregulation uncertainty and risk Reduced investor confidence Contributing factor in economic softening Increased pressure on the Western grid Unbundling failures that push companies back to portfolio strategies Ineffectiveness in changing siting and development restrictions Procurement management that alters user-utility negotiating leverage; and Increased emphasis on distributed generation and new technologies "Tensions and differences between state and federal regulators raise the specter of repeating the regulatory and political conundrum California's investor-owned utilities have been facing," Jermain said. If federal initiatives open wholesale markets while retail markets remain regulated, a crucial question emerges, namely whether state regulators will pass-through higher wholesale costs if they should occur. "Tensions between state and federal regulators over policies on deregulation will grow if states delay or abandon retail competition," Jermain stated. As to the California situation creating increased pressure on the Western grid, Jermain noted that "Even as capacity increases and demand reductions work to resolve the California crisis, these solutions have long-term implications for the Western grid." Such implications include a realistic chance that California could become an "energy island" as a result of near-term reduction in available regional resources for export to California, according to the Andersen report. Also, there could be increased emphasis on security control to protect against overall Western grid failure as sub-regions have difficulties. Along with yesterday's report, Andersen also issued the results of an Andersen survey of senior executives from 16 non-California utilities detailing their views of the implications of the California power crisis for their companies and the industry. The survey was conducted between February 19, 2001, and March 2, 2001, by Knowledge Systems & Research Inc. of Syracuse. On the deregulation front, nearly all the executives surveyed said they believe recent California events will slow the pace of deregulation over the next five years for states that have not begun or finished writing restructuring legislation. None believe that it will result in advanced states deciding to re-regulate markets, although many states will review their legislation to assess the risk of duplicating California's current situation and make any changes necessary to avoid it. As to legislation at the federal level, the survey found that few executives suggest that the California situation will spark national energy policy/legislation. Other executives believe that it will be a continuing issue but, because of state-to-state variances, Congress will be unable to pass any comprehensive measures or force states to a restructuring timeline. Turning to company strategies, most of the executives surveyed do not see any changes to their business models or strategies for generation, distribution or supply procurement as a response to the situation in California. However, many have, among other things, expanded their risk management programs, reduced spot market purchases and started emphasizing long-term supply contracts. Those executives facing price caps are rethinking their stance on them, according to the Andersen survey. The full Andersen report on the Western energy crisis can be downloaded at www.andersen.com. ower companies and regulators must take steps to avoid spread of California Power virus: Andersen analysis WASHINGTON, D.C., April 24, 2001 * A &new virus spawned in California8 poses formidable challenges requiring new strategies on the part of power companies, regulators and policymakers to contain and reverse its damage, according to Energy Crisis in the Western United States: Lessons for Navigating Regulatory and Market Minefields, a new Andersen report released today. &The implications for the development of competitive energy markets go far beyond the Western United States,8 Andersen,s national utility practice head Matthew D. Smith told a Washington briefing. &Unfortunately, California has taught the nation that regulatory and political barriers can create and sustain an energy crisis.8 &California has demonstrated that the risks in the electricity industry, if not properly acknowledged and managed, can simultaneously and profoundly impact all market participants. To be effectively managed, these risks need to be exposed, assumed or shared, measured and monitored. When they are hidden or ignored, all parties can potentially suffer. A shared, integrated view of these risks, and a strategy for their assumption and management, is critical to avoiding rapid value destruction within the energy market,8 Smith said. An Andersen survey of senior utility executives outside California, also released at the briefing, indicates most utility companies believe they inoculated themselves against the California virus so that it is unlikely to affect their operations beyond slowing the pace of deregulation and increasing investor scrutiny. However, based on the potential implications it sees of the California situation, Andersen believes a series of booster shots are advisable for power companies and regulators. &To deliver reliable service at a predictable cost in today,s environment, companies must focus on market integration by developing new and innovative relationships between suppliers, customers, employees and investors ) while working with government officials and regulators to chart a smoother transition to a deregulated power market,8 according to Smith. Eight Implications The Andersen report identified eight overriding implications emanating from the Western energy crisis that are shaping the longer-term operations of the Western grid, the regional and national economy, domestic energy policy and the industry,s evolution: 1. Increased deregulation uncertainty and risk ) Tension and differences between state and federal regulators raise the specter of repeating the regulatory and political conundrum California,s investor-owned utilities have faced. If federal initiatives open wholesale markets while retail markets remain regulated, a crucial question is raised: Will state regulators pass-through higher wholesale costs if they should materialize? Tensions between state and federal regulators over policies on deregulation will grow if states delay or abandon retail competition. As wholesale markets are deregulated and RTOs begin operating, the prudence principles that state regulators have used for many years may have to be changed. For example, if FERC and RTO monitors determine that deregulated wholesale markets operate fairly, prices derived from those markets must be considered reasonable. If so, these costs should be allowed into state-regulated retail rates without regard to the prudence principles state regulators have used for years. Therefore, utilities, traditional burden of proving costs are or are not justifiable shifts to regulators. 2. Reduced investor confidence ) Prior to deregulation, stringent prudence review and disallowance of generation costs in the rate base made regulatory risk largely uncontrollable, killing IOU interests in most new investment. A major purpose of deregulation was to create an environment in which risk could be managed, but California,s political and regulatory environment provides only a limited ability to manage risks. The confidence and perceptions needed to support investment decision-making will be slow to return given the approach of the state to remedy the crisis. 3. Contributing factor in economic softening ) Uncertain energy reliability and higher costs can drive-out marginal businesses, cause healthy companies to constrain expansion, and lead new entrants to question whether to make new investments. As such, an extended energy crisis contributes to inflation pressures and may slow economic growth. 4. Increased pressure on the Western grid ) Even as capacity increases and demand reductions work to resolve the California crisis, these solutions have long-term implications for the Western Grid. These include a realistic possibility of California becoming an &energy island8 as a result of near-term reduction in available regional resources for export to California; increased emphasis on security control to protect against overall Western grid failure as sub-regions have problems; RTO requirements to strengthen locally available supplies to bolster overall system reliability; longer-term development of new plants using plentiful coal resources and clean coal technology will alter the pattern of imports into California; and the emergence of Mexico as a major supplier to southern California and Arizona, contributing to a bifurcation of the Western Grid into northern and southern markets 5. Unbundling failures that push companies back to portfolio strategies ) For California investor-owned utilities, unbundling has achieved neither the least-cost solution sought by regulators nor value maximization targeted by investors. This necessitates a reevaluation of portfolio management strategies potentially involving generation, transmission, power trading and marketing, and retail businesses in multiple geographies serving multiple markets. 6. Ineffectiveness in changing siting and development restrictions ) California,s retail price caps and multiple explanations for the crisis have left accelerated siting processes and environmental standards changes open to challenge by various interests. In addition, limiting application of new siting orders only to small generators contributes to uncertainty and investor hesitancy. 7. Procurement management that alters user-utility negotiating leverage ) Competitive markets compel participants ) suppliers, marketers, large industrial buyers, etc. ) to strategically manage procurement as a critical value-driver. Because risk is explicitly shared and always has the potential of shifting advantage to either seller or buyer, the sophistication of negotiations and contracts increases as competitive markets evolve. 8. Increased emphasis on distributed generation and new technologies ) California,s reliability and price challenges have triggered a re-emergence of energy crisis measures from the 1970s. End-users are investing in solutions they control, and the distributed generation market is being aggressively developed among large retailers, industrial users and residential customers. This makes possible the development of microgrids connecting consumers in local areas and related changes in traditional grid systems, from modifications in interconnection agreements to changing definitions of reserve margins and system reliability. Industry Executives, Response Senior executives from sixteen non-California utilities with a combined market capitalization over $120 billion and $145 billion in revenues responded to an Andersen survey with their views of the implications of the California power crisis for their companies and for the industry. The survey, conducted between February 19, 2001 and March 2, 2001 by Knowledge Systems & Research, Inc. of Syracuse, found that the companies are observing the California situation carefully, expect a slowing ) but not a turnaround -- of deregulation, and believe their internal plans and preparations are on-target for the changing environment: Deregulation - Nearly all executives believe recent California events will slow the pace of deregulation over the next five years for states that have not begun or finished writing restructuring legislation. None believe that it will cause advanced states to re-regulate markets, although many states will review their legislation to assess their risk of duplicating California,s current situation and make any changes necessary to avoid it. National legislation - Few executives suggest the situation will initiate national energy policy/legislation; others believe it will be a continuing issue but, because of state-to-state variances, Congress will be unable to pass any comprehensive measures or force states to a restructuring timeline. Some expect additional state-level legislation. Company strategies - Most do not see any changes to their business models or strategies for generation, distribution or supply procurement as a response to the situation in California. However, many have expanded their risk management programs, reduced spot market purchases, begun emphasizing long-term supply contracts, planning new power generation capacity, and started hedging with futures trades. Those facing price caps are rethinking their stance on them Investor scrutiny ) Many executives indicate their shareholders are aware of the situation and investors -- particularly institutional investors -- are more heavily scrutinizing their actions. Many say news coverage has prompted retail, commercial and industrial customer skepticism of industry restructuring. Transmission deregulation - Many executives agree the California situation will increase interest in FERC,s regional transmission organizations (RTO) deregulation effort. Utility Company Action Items Both to guard against a sudden California cascade and as a potentially powerful competitive thrust, forward-thinking utilities should bolster their basic preparedness with a variety of tactics -- or inoculations -- specifically aimed to combat a potential California power virus, according to Andersen partner Mark Moskovitz: Improve procurement management and risk management capabilities - To manage exposure to volatile supply and demand shifts, organizations must be sure that comprehensive and clear supply procedures, controls, decision points, risk limits and communications are in place. Plan and design innovative rate and pricing structures ) Companies and regulators must focus on communicating price signals that create value for both the customer and the provider. Innovative rate and pricing structures that more closely tie the customer,s price to the real cost of supply will better signal the value of the service as well as providing more accurate information upon which both end user and supplier can make decisions. Increase emphasis on demand side management (DSM) strategies ) In addition to new pricing strategies to help achieve and maintain supply-demand equilibrium, companies must now focus on employing more extensive and innovative demand side management programs. These programs may offer significant benefits with limited risk to both the customer and energy supplier. Assess the supply and generation dynamics in adjacent jurisdictions ) Companies must take a broader view ) beyond typical geographic market definitions -- of the economics of generation and related business decisions in an increasingly volatile market in which supply will follow the best prices. Develop contingency plans for the continued deferral of new generation capacity ) In the face of potential ongoing generation capacity shortages, companies and regulators must be prepared to move with a portfolio of strategies to meet demand, including for example DSM, flexible pricing and distributed generation. In addition, they should explore efficiency-improving upgrades to existing facilities and seize any opportunity to accelerate near-term construction plans. Proactively address potential organizational disruption ) As regulatory and economic changes continue to churn the industry waters and companies adjust and/or restructure, they must be highly cogniscent of, sensitive to, and directly address employees, concerns with information about the company,s future and theirs,. Industry/Regulatory Lessons There are also a number of broad primary lessons the electric power industry -- nationally and internationally -- should take away from its first major domestic test case in deregulation and restructuring, according to Andersen principal David O. Jermain: Simplify market design. Build a continuing role for regulators. Maintain communications with multiple constituent interests. Prepare contingency plans for extreme stress conditions. Couple real-time retail pricing with transparently priced wholesale competition. Provide special incentives for RTO investment, formation and development. Break down regulatory and political barriers to market signals and responses. Copies of the Energy Crisis in the Western United States: Lessons for Navigating Regulatory and Market Minefields report can be obtained at www.andersen.com/energyandutilities.