17 Nov 2000, 10:52 UTC
Re: Outline for Project on Real-Time Markets
- From
- Steven J Kean steven.kean@enron.com
- To
- Eric Hirst
- Cc
- Steve Walton
- Bcc
- Steve Walton
- Date
- Fri, 17 Nov 2000 02:52:00 -0800 (PST)
Contact Steve Walton Eric Hirst <Eric@EHirst.com> 11/10/2000 10:03 AM To: Skean@enron.com (Steve Kean) cc: Subject: Outline for Project on Real-Time Markets Dear Steve, Once again, I call on you for advice. Who, within Enron, should I talk with about a new project I am working on, related to real-time balancing operations and markets (all the messy stuff that causes so many problems within all the existing ISOs)? Here is the outline for the project. Can you send me your suggestions on revising the outline, other people at Enron (and elsewhere) to contact related to these markets, and written materials on how the various ISO markets operate. Thanks. Eric ---------------- ISSUES TO DISCUSS FOR PROJECT ON: REAL-TIME BALANCING OPERATIONS AND MARKETS November 6, 2000 1. Introduction: Importance of real-time operations and markets Essential for reliability, especially security Basis for all forward contracts (hour- and day-ahead, block monthlies, bilaterals) Real-time prices motivate generation-capacity decisions: new construction, repowering, retirements Ensure equitable treatment for &new8 intermittent and distributed resources 2. Physical Requirements and Operations Balance generation to load in near-real time (intrahour) Normal conditions (frequency response, CPS1, CPS2) Contingency conditions (DCS) In neither case is it necessary for generation to exactly balance load over short time periods (e.g., 10 minutes), but must balance energy over longer intervals Benefits of aggregation Performance and characteristics of individual generation and load resources: random fluctuations, energy level, ramp rate, acceleration rate, startup time, minimum run time, block loading, energy-limited characteristics of hydro units, etc Control-area balance vs individual-schedule balance, good vs bad inadvertent interchange NERC and FERC requirements 3. Operations with Vertically Integrated Utilities Unit commitment Economic dispatch Regulation Contingency reserves Control area forecasts of loads and resources, effects of forecasts on unit commitment and dispatch Treatment of (payments and penalties for) energy imbalance and inadvertent interchange 4. RTO Operations and Markets Generation not owned by RTO, RTO must purchase outputs from generation and load resources Relationship between real-time operations and markets, how are resources dispatched (and by whom) and how are they compensated Time interval (1, 5, 10, or 15 minutes) for dispatch and price setting; what are the tradeoffs in choosing among these intervals Single market-clearing price in each interval vs pay-as-bid for each resource Pay for energy only or pay also for maneuverability (e.g., ramp and acceleration rates); how do resource constraints determine which resources are permitted to set the market-clearing price and which aren't, and why? Set prices ex ante or ex post? If prices set ex ante, what is the basis for the value? Should unit commitment (resource scheduling) be done by individual suppliers, by RTO, or both? Relationship between real-time markets and ICAP and RMR requirements, and RTO requirements to ICAP and RMR units to bid resources into real-time market Treatment of exports and imports, rules governing interchange scheduling (number of schedule changes per hour permitted, ramp rates for schedule changes) To what extent does the RTO make short-term forecasts of load and generation, how far into the future (10 minutes to 24 hours), how does the RTO use these forecasts? Should the RTO commit and dispatch resources on the basis of expected future conditions (i.e., beyond the current and next interval)? Who pays for these RTO decisions? Should RTO publish prices and let demand and supply respond to the price signal, or should RTO dispatch resources up and down based on supplier bids? If the RTO explicitly dispatches resources, should uninstructed deviations be treated differently, in terms of payment or penalties, from instructed deviations? What about a resource,s failure to follow instructions? Under what circumstances should RTO go &out-of-market8 for resources? What should set the price of (payment to) these resources? Under what conditions, if any, are penalties appropriate, for what kinds of behavior, what determines the magnitude of the penalty? Should penalties apply to generation only or to loads also? How, if at all, should capacity assigned to ancillary services (especially the reserve services) be incorporated into real-time operations and markets? For example, should the capacity assigned to contingency reserves be set aside and used only when a major outage occurs? Or should such reserves be used routinely whenever it is economic to do so, as long as sufficient capacity is available to meet the NERC reserve requirements? How should intermittent resources (e.g., wind) be treated in real-time operations and markets? Should they be treated any differently from a large, volatile load? Can retail loads participate in real-time markets? How? 5. Case Studies of U.S. ISOs California PJM, New York, and New England ERCOT 6. Conclusions and Recommendations Key features of operations and markets What works What are the options What problems still remain ---------------------------------------------- Eric Hirst Consulting in Electric-Industry Restructuring 106 Capital Circle Oak Ridge, TN 37830 865-482-5470 (phone & fax) Eric@EHirst.com http://www.EHirst.com/